r % W^ 











* „«? *^. •% ^* 4- 












V 




«*°. 
r 



» • C 


















V • ' • o 

; ^^ 

N> ■••■•- A v ^ ■*•••- <> <> 



£* 




* a * ^ 
* «? ^ *^l 1* a^ "^ 



i**^ 







THE 

PROBLEM OF EVIL 

A CRITICISM OF THE AUGUSTINIAN 
POINT OF VIEW 



BY 
MARION LE ROY BURTON, B, D., Ph.D. (Yale) 

PRESIDENT-ELECT OF SMITH COLLEGE 

FORMERLY ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 

AT YALE UNIVERSITY 



CHICAGO 
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY 

LONDON AGENTS 

Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 
1909 



3* 



Copyright i9°9 

by 

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO. 

CHICAGO 



248401 



P 



TO MY WIFE 

I AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATE 
THIS VOLUME 



PREFACE 

This book is not intended for the popular reader. 
It is a rather detailed and technical criticism of the 
philosophical basis of the Augustinian treatment of 
the problem of evil. The author does not presume to 
have fathomed this eternal mystery nor to have re- 
formulated the doctrine of sin. If, however, he has 
set forth in a true light the historic theory which for 
centuries has dominated Christian thought, and has 
shown the absolute necessity of a reconstruction of the 
doctrine of sin, then in a measure he has realized his 
purpose. Anyone who may pick up this work, an- 
ticipating something more entertaining than a philo- 
sophical or theological discussion, would be wise to 
lay it down at once. If any reader does not care for 
the detailed arguments by which the author has arrived 
at his position, it is suggested that the last chapter, 
which summarizes his conclusions, be read first. 

The present volume was written, as it now stands, 
while the author was still a graduate student in the 
department of philosophy at Yale University. Parts 
of it have been delivered before the George Barker 
Stevens Theological Club of Yale and the Manhattan 
Congregational Ministers' Association of New York 
City. While the author occupied the chair of Syste- 
matic Theology in Yale Divinity School much of the 
material here presented was incorporated in lectures 
before the students of that institution. 

The present work grew out of a suggestion made to 



PREFACE 

the writer by the late Professor George B. Stevens. 
The suggestion was that there existed a distinct need 
for a complete and impartial statement and criticism 
of the speculative basis upon which the Augustinian 
doctrine of sin rests. Consequently it has been the 
definite aim of the writer to formulate such a state- 
ment, endeavoring to make it at once historical, critical 
and constructive. Augustine was a man of keen 
spiritual insight; he was also a profound philosopher. 
He affirmed that his mind preferred nothing to the 
discovery of truth. It is in keeping, therefore, with 
the Augustinian spirit and mode of procedure to ap- 
proach our task from the purely intellectual stand- 
point. 

The writer has sought to deal with the problem 
from a philosophical rather than from a religious point 
of view. That the problem of evil lends itself to both 
forms of treatment is apparent, but the task here un- 
dertaken concerns itself primarily with the rational 
grounds of our author's position. It is for this reason 
that the biblical material pertaining to the origin and 
nature of sin has not been given fuller consideration. 
The writer has not felt called upon to enter into a 
discussion of the questions that might be raised in 
regard to biblical sources. Those inquiries lie outside 
the scope of the present work. 

The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to 
Professor George H. Palmer of Harvard University 
for valuable suggestions relating especially to the con- 
ception of evil and the problem of freedom. To Pro- 
fessor Charles M. Bakewell, of Yale University, the 
author takes this occasion to record his deep gratitude 
for many suggestions and criticisms which have been 
invaluable. 



PREFACE 

The end sought in compiling the bibliography has 
not been to offer a complete list of works bearing upon 
every phase of Augustine's thought, but rather to in- 
dicate those which have actually been used and have 
proven especially helpful in dealing with the particular 
aspect of the system here under examination. We in- 
clude in the bibliography only a partial list of Augus- 
tine's own works, selecting such as bear directly upon 
the problem of evil. 

Marion LeRoy Burton. 
May 5, 1909. 

Brooklyn — New York City. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. The Problem i 

God, the source of all being, i. — Analysis of 
the conception " natura," 5. — Creation ex nihilo, 
14. — Presence of evil, 18. — Relation of malum and 
peccatum, 21. 

II. Quid Est Malum? 27 

His Manichean conception, 27. — Non substan- 
tia, 29. — Vitium, 30. — Contra naturam or incon- 
venientia, 31. — Privatio boni, corruptio, negatio, 
33. — Non esse, 37. — Defectus, 40. 

III. Unde Est Malum? 45 

Rejects evil principle of Manichaeus, 45. — God's 
relation to evil, 47. — Its source in the creature, 55. 
— (1) Metaphysical imperfection, 56. — (2) Free- 
dom, 60. 

IV. Unde Est Malum? (Continued) 70 

Rejects pre-existence theory, 71. — Rejects flesh 
theory, yy. — Rejects contrast theory, 88. — Defends 
freedom, 99. 

V. Freedom . 115 

Defends freedom against Manicheism, 117. — 
Asserts both freedom and God's foreknowledge, 
123. — Influence of the Pelagian controversy, 124. — 
Various meanings of the term " freedom," 131. — 
Causa efficiens and causa deficiens, 139. 

VI. The Conception of Sin 145 

Original sin, 146. — Actual sin, 156. — The com- 
mon element in all sin, 161. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

VII. The Final Outcome 166 

Implications of the doctrine of predestination, 
166. — Temporary mingling of good and evil, 170. 
— Final destruction of evil, 172. — " Civitas ter- 
rena" eternal, 174. 

VIII. A Critique 176 

Evil as negation, 176. — Metaphysical imperfec- 
tion, 183. — Man's original perfection, 188. — In- 
dividual wills in Adam, 191. — Catastrophic fall 
and freedom, 196. — Human nature a mass, 207. — 
Propagatio, 211. — Summary and conclusion, 215. 

Bibliography 220 



THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 

CHAPTER I 

THE PROBLEM 

The problem of evil exists because mankind be- 
lieves in a wise and benevolent Creator. It is because 
man in his better moods believes that the universe is 
grounded in love, that evil has demanded an explana- 
tion. Abolish God and evil needs no explanation. 
Consequently we can most readily understand what 
the problem of evil was for Augustine by beginning 
with a statement of his conception of God. 

GOD, THE SOURCE OF ALL BEING. 

To Augustine God was in himself the supreme 
existence, the author of all being, and the source of 
all life. At the very apex of all being is God, the 
only immutable nature. The nine years which Au- 
gustine spent in a vain endeavor to understand and to 
accept fully the principles of Manicheism resulted in 
his complete rejection and utter repudiation of its 
dualism, and in his rigorous insistence upon one and 
only one eternal Being. Remembering that to Au- 
gustine anything is good in so far as it exists or is, 
and that God is the supreme existence, we can under- 
stand why God is regarded by him as the " summum 
bonum." x 

Furthermore God is not only the one immutable 



1 " Ipse summum bonum est "— Liber de Diver. Qusest. 
LXXXIII. XXI. 



i 



2 THE PROBLEM 

good, he is also the author of all life. Here we must 
not forget the emphasis that Augustine places upon 
the word " all." God is not the source of a part of 
the life of the universe but of the life of everything 
that exists. This, too, is his answer to Manichean 
dualism. He cannot be too explicit. He asserts that 
there is no life whatsoever, in so far as it is life at 
all, which does not find its origin in God, the one and 
only source of true life. " Nullam esse qualemlibet 
vitam, quae non eo ipso quo vita est, et in quantum 
omnino vita est, ad summum vitse fontem prin- 
cipiumque pertineat: quod nihil aliud quam summum 
et solum verumque Deum possumus confiteri." 2 In 
his Retractions Augustine takes the opportunity to 
explain the sense in which he wished this to be under- 
stood. While still defending the position that God 
is the one author of life, he insists upon a distinc- 
tion between the Creator and the creature. 3 The lat- 
ter is to be regarded as of Him but not as a part of 
Him. 

In this same writing against the Manicheans he 
argues further that God is the author not only of 
all life but of all being and existence. Whatever ex- 
ists, and just in so far as it exists, receives its being 
from God. " Omne quidquid esset, quoniam esset in 
quantumcumque esset, ex uno Deo esse." 4 There 
can be no question as to Augustine's view upon this 
point. Everywhere throughout his writings this con- 
ception is frequent : " qui omnium quae sunt auctor 



2 De D^bus Anim. c. Manich. i. 

3 " Ita dixi, ut tanquam creatura ad Creatorem pertinere 
intelligatur, non auetm de illo esse tanquam pars ejus ex- 
istimetur." I. cap. XV. I. 

4 De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. g, io. 



GOD, THE SOURCE OF ALL BEING 3 

est." 5 The only cause of all created things, whether 
visible or invisible, is the goodness of the Creator. 
Absolutely nothing is, or has existence, except God 
Himself, that does not owe its existence to Him. 6 
All natures and all substances, although not parts of 
God Himself, are made by Him, and owe their being 
to Him. 7 

Without anticipating a section in Chapter III in 
which we deal with God's relation to evil, it must be 
pointed out at this juncture that Augustine did not 
regard these statements as making God the author of 
evil. Evil is that which tends to nonexistence, and 
therefore, God as the author of that which is, is in 
no sense the author of that which is not. 8 But what 
is God's relation to all the evil things which exist? 
Do they subsist without any connection with Him? 
If so, must not our author admit the necessity of the 
Manichean principle of evil? 

As we shall see in the second chapter, evil tends to 
nonexistence. Everything in so far as it exists is 
good. This good nature it has from God. Evil is 
the diminution or falling away of this good nature. 
Therefore as the evil increases, being must decrease 



s Liber de Diver. Qusest. LXXXIII. XXI. 
6 Enchir. IX. 

7 " Item dixisti mihi, Domine, voce forti in aurem interior- 
em, quod omnes naturas atque substantias quae non sunt 
quod tu es, et tamen sunt, tu fecisiti :" Conf. XII. 11. 

8 " Quo circa cum in Catholica dicitur, omnium naturarum 
atque substantiarum esse auctorem Deum, simul intellegitur 
ab eis qui hoc possunt intelligere, non esse Deum auctorem 
mali. Quomodo eum potest ille, qui omnium quae sunt, 
causa est ut sint, causa esse rursus ut non sint, id est, ut 
ab essentia deficiant, et ad non esse tendant ? " De Mor. 
Manich. II. 3. 



4 THE PROBLEM 

and just as you expect to put your hand on the 
summum malum it vanishes into non-being. Thus all 
that exists, even if evil has made its inroads upon its 
being, still derives all its existence from God, who 
is the sole principle of the universe. Augustine in- 
sists upon this in the most rigorous fashion. " Ego 
quidem conditorem hominum omnium, quamvis omnes 
sub peccato nascantur, et pereant nisi renascantur, 
non dico nisi Deum. Vitium quippe inseminatum est 
persuasione diaboli, per quod sub peccato nati sunt, 
non natura condita qua homines sunt." 9 Here we 
see that Augustine, while clinging to original sin, still 
maintains that God alone is the Creator of man. 

In another section of this same work he raises this 
specific question: In what sense does God create 
evil beings? His answer is that He creates them in 
the sense that He bestows on them what pertains to 
the goodness of nature. The very fact that a human be- 
ing exists, even though he be evil, is proof that he has 
good which pertains to all nature and is the bestowal 
of God. 10 This same principle appears when our 
author attempts to account for the evil will possessed 
by man. God provides a good nature and just pun- 
ishment, but the evil will man obtains from himself. 11 



9 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 55. 

10 " Sic itaque creat malos quomodo pascit et nutrit malos : 
quia quod eis creando tribuit, ad naturae pertinent bonitatem; 
et quod eis pascendo et nutriendo dat incrementum, non 
utique malitiae eorum, sed eidem bonae naturae quam cre- 
avit bonus, bonum tribuit adjumentum. In quantum enim 
homines sunt, bonum est naturae, cujus auctor est Deus: in 
quantum autem cum peccato nascuntur, perituri si non renas- 
cuntur, ad semen pertinent maledictum ab initio, illius anti- 
quae inobedentiae vitio." Ibid. II. 32. 

11 " A se quippe habent voluntatem malum, ab illo autem 



NATURA 5 

Evil in man then does not owe its origin to God, nor 
on the contrary can either man or evil exist except as 
God provides the good gift of nature. Evil can only 
arise from nature. It has nothing to which it may 
attach itself, unless nature is provided, and God alone 
creates this substratum. 12 The vigor with which 
Augustine clings to this belief reaches its culmination 
in the assertions that vicious souls, not in so far as they 
are vicious, but in so far as they are souls must be 
regarded as creatures of God, 13 and that even the devil 
and all the evil angels subsist only because God pro- 
vides their life and nature. 14 

This is sufficient to show how Augustine's concep- 
tion of God contributed to the problem of evil as he 
conceived it. God is the one supreme and unchangea- 
ble existence, the source of all life, the author of all 
being, including that being and nature into which 
evil has entered. 15 



ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTION, " NATURA.*' 

God then is the Creator. But what has He created? 
The answer is " nature." Here then we come upon a 
technical term of Augustine's. His use of the word 



et naturam bonam et justam poenam." De Genesi ad Lit. 
XL 12. 

12 " Quia nee oriri malum potest, nisi ex natura ; nee ubi 
sit habet si non fuerit in natura. Confiteor igitur opus Dei 
esse qui nascitur, etiam trahens originale malum." Cont. Jul. 
Pelag. III. 56. 

13 De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. 5. 

1* De Trin. XIII. XII. 16. 

15 Cf. Fairbairn who says, referring to Augustine : " There 
is but one God, one supreme essence from whom whatever is, 
holds its existence." The Phil, of the Christ. Religion, p. ioo. 



6 THE PROBLEM 

" natura " must be carefully analysed if we are to 
understand the problem of evil as he formulated it. 
Augustine's thought cannot be understood apart from 
the controversies into which he entered, and the phi- 
losophies which he combated. This is pre-eminently 
true in any effort to understand his conception of 
" natura." That conception was formulated in his 
endeavor first to combat Manichean dualism and then 
on the other hand to oppose the over-exaltation of 
human nature by Pelagianism. 

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of 
Manicheism. It is sufficient for our purpose to re- 
call that Manichseus asserted a most radical dualism. 1 
The evil principle which he set over against God and 
made continual with Him, was according to Alexan- 
der of Lycopolis, MA^: God he affirmed to be good, 
and matter evil. Thus the Kingdom of Darkness was 
practically identified with 'vkrj. Or to state it from 
a slightly different point of view, VAry belonged com- 
pletely to the Kingdom of Darkness and was without 
origin. But not only the supposition that all matter 
was evil and belonged to a Kingdom wholly inde- 
pendent of God, but also the belief that creation was 
a necessity for God, and that his works were made 
out of substances derived from other sources than 
himself, and that these works served as a barrier 
against his enemies, preventing further rebellion, 2 — 



1 " Mani teaches : Two subsistences from the beginning of 
the world, the one light, the other darkness; the two are 
separated from each other. The light is the first most glo- 
rious being, limited by no number, God himself, the King of 
the Paradise of Light. — The other being is the darkness, and 
his numbers are five: cloud, burning, hot wind, poison and 
darkness." Fihrist quoted in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fath. IV. n, 

2 Conf. XIII. 45. 



NATURA 7 

all of this was the background against which Au- 
gustine developed his conception of nature. 

In the first section of this chapter we have seen 
that Augustine portrays God as the source of all life 
in opposition to the Manichean principle of evil, in 
this section we must find his answer to their belief 
that all created things are evil. Augustine found it 
necessary to so shape his idea of nature that he could 
take a position midway between Manicheism and 
Pelagianism. He would not vituperate human nature 
as did the Manicheans, for God was the author of all 
existence, nor could he credulously praise it as did 
the Pelagians, for his theological opinions demanded 
that he recognize a fatal " vitium " in all human 
nature. 3 It is only as we remember that Augustine 
was attempting to steer between this Scylla and 
Charybdis that we will rightly understand his notion 
of " natura." Thus three distinct theories are pre- 
sented to us, that of the Manicheans, that of the Pelagi- 
ans, and that of the Catholics as represented by Au- 
gustine. 

Our author himself has attempted to draw a clear 
demarcation between the three positions. He says : 
" Catholici dicunt humanam naturam a creatore Deo 
bono conditam bonam, sed peccato vitiatam medico 
Christo indigere. Manichsei dicunt humanam na- 
turam, non a Deo conditam bonam peccatoque vitia- 
tam, sed ab seternarum principe tenebrarum de com- 
mixtione duarum naturarum, quae semper fuerunt, 
una bona et una mala, hominem creatum. Pelagiani 



8 "Ac per hoc Manichaeus quidem naturam humanam de- 
testabiliter vituperat, sed tu crudeliter laudas." Op. Imp. c. 
Jul. III. CXXXVIII. See also ibid. III. CXLIV. 



8 THE PROBLEM 

et Coelestiani dicunt humanam naturam a bono Deo 
conditam bonam, sed ita esse in nascentibus parvulis 
sanam, ut Christi non habeant necessariam in ilia 
setate medicinam." 4 This then is the historical set- 
ting in which we find Augustine's conception of 
" natura " developing. 

Now what is this " natura " ? It is easier to find 
Augustine answering this question by telling us that 
there are several kinds of nature, that it is good, that 
it is necessary for the existence of everything, even 
of evil, than it is to find a definite conception as to 
what nature actually is. But as we go on in this 
discussion we shall see that nature is practically synon- 
ymous with being or existence. 5 Nature is that 
which is. Nature, just in so far as it is nature, ex- 
ists. When, in the second chapter, we come to 
see what our author's conception of evil is, we shall 
find that it is that which is " contra naturam." But 
evil is that which tends to nonexistence, to non- 
being. Nature, therefore, is being or existence. 

Nature then, from another point of view is sub- 
stance, it is " substantia," the underlying something 
which gives being and existence to all reality, whether 
finite or infinite, whether physical or spiritual, whether 
visible or invisible. 6 At times Augustine seems to 



4 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 9. 

5 " Nam et ipsa natura nihil est aliud, quam id quod in- 
telligitur in suo genere aliquid esse." De Mor. Manich. II. 
2. 

6 " Dicitur homo, dicitur pecus, dicitur terra, dicitur ccelum, 
dicitur sol, luna, lapis, mare, ser : omnia ista substantias sunt, 
eo ipso quo sunt. Naturae ipsa, substantia dicuntur. Deus 
est quaedam substantia ; nam quod nulla substantia est, 
nihil omnino est. Substantia ergo aliquid esse est." Enar. 
in Ps. LXVIII. 5- 



NATURA 9 

approximate closely Aristotle's conception of 'vXrj. 
Especially in the Confessions we find him speaking 
of a certain formlessness which is almost nothing 
and yet is not altogether nothing. It exists and is 
the formless something whose good is its existence 
and its capacity for form. 7 " Nonne tu, Domine, 
docuisti me, quod priusquam istam informen materiam 
formares atque distingueres, non erat aliquid; non 
color, non figura, non corpus, non spiritus? Non 
tamen omnino nihil : erat qusedam informitas sine ulla 
specie." 8 A similar conception seems to underlie the 
phrase " ipsam adhuc informen inchoationem verum 
formabilem creabilemque materiam," 9 which suggests 
a substance formless but capable of receiving form 
and making. 

" Natura " then is existence or being. This be- 
comes more apparent when our author begins to point 
out that nature assumes a threefold aspect. There 
is a mutable nature which falls into two classes, 
" corpus " and " anima." There is the one immuta- 
ble nature, which is God, the supreme existence. 10 

We are now prepared to observe how Augustine 
opposes this idea to Manicheism. God is the Creator 
of this nature, and therefore all nature is good. Even 
that material which is absolutely formless and without 
quality is not to be called evil. It possesses the 



7 De Natura Boni c. Manich. 18. 

s Conf. XII. 3, 24, 25. 

9 Ibid. 26. 

10 " Est natura per locos et tempora mutabilis, ut corpus. 
Et est natura per locos nullo modo, sed tantum per tempora, 
ut anima. Et est natura quae nee per locos, nee per tem- 
pora mutari potest, hoc Deus est." Ep. XVIII. 2. Cf. De Mor. 
Manich. IV. 6. 



io THE PROBLEM 

capacity for form, and that in itself is an unquestiona- 
ble good. 11 Here he is diametrically opposed to the 
Manicheans who held that 'vA^ belonged completely to 
the evil world. But Augustine does not pause with 
his assertion about l vX-q, he maintains repeatedly that 
all nature in so far as it is nature is good. 12 He uses 
late in life the same thought in combating Pelagian- 
ism. Thus he writes against Julianus : " Ita ut om- 
nino nulla natura sit quae non aut ipse sit, aut ab ipso 
facta sit; ut quantacumque aut qualiscumque natura 
sit, in quantum natura est, bonum sit." 13 

This doctrine reaches its fullest expression when 
our author argues that if the nature is purer when the 
evil is removed, and does not exist at all if the good 
is taken away, then it must be the good which makes 
the nature of the thing, and the evil is not nature, 
but against nature. " Si ergo malo illo adempto 
manet natura purgatior, bono autem detracto non 
manet ulla natura : hoc ibi f acit naturam quod bonum 
habet; quod autem malum, non natura, sed contra 



11 " Neque enim vel ilia materies quam antiqui hylen dixe- 
runt, malum dicenda est. — Sed hylen dico quamdam penitus 
informem et sine qualitate materiem, unde istae quas senti- 
mus qualitates formantur, ut antiqui dixerunt. Hinc enim et 
silva grsece vXtj dicitur quod operantibus apta sit, non ut 
aliquid ipsa faciat, sed unde aliquid fiat. Porro si bonum 
aliquod est forma, unde qui ea prevalent, formosi appelantur, 
sicut a specie speciosi, procul dubio bonum aliquod est etiam 
capacitas formse." De Natura Boni c. Manich. XVIII. 

12 " Quapropter quod verissime dicitur, omnis natura in- 
quantum natura est, bona est — Omnis igitur substantia aut 
Deus, aut ex Deo, quia omne bonum aut Deus aut ex Deo." 
De Lib. Arbit. III. 36. See also Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CXIV 
where he uses the same words, and De Natura Boni c. Manich. 
XIX. 

13 Cont. Jul. Pel. I. 36 fin. 



NATURA ii 

naturam est — Unde intelligitur eas, in quantum na- 
turae sunt, bonas esse: quia cum eis vicissim omne 
quod bonum habent detraxeris, naturae nullae 
erunt." 14 

Here then the good is the nature, and everything 
so far as it is nature, is good. Remove the good and 
no nature remains. It is very apparent that we are 
dealing here with a metaphysical not a moral good. 
Confusion between these two conceptions and the fail- 
ure to distinguish them clearly has led to much error. 
It is upon this distinction that the question of reality 
in good and evil must be based. 

If we should conclude our statement of Augustine's 
conception of " natura " at this juncture we would 
do him an injustice. All nature is good but all natures 
are not equally good. 15 It has already been pointed 
out in this chapter that Augustine regarded God as 
the one supreme existence, the one immutable good. 
God then is the one nature which is supremely good. 
God is good not by any participation in good, but 
solely by virtue of his own nature and essence. 16 The 
things which God has created are all good but their 
goodness lies in their participation in God's goodness 



" Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXIII. 36. 

15 Cont. Ep. Manich. XXV. 27. 

16 " Hoc enim maxime esse dicendum est, quod semper 
eodem modo esse habet, quod omnimodo sui simile est, quod 
nulla ex parte corrumpi ac mutari potest, quod non subjacet 
tempori, quod aliter nunc se habere quam habebat antea, non 
potest. Id enim est quod esse verissime dicitur. Subest enim 
huic verbo manetis in se atque incommutabiliter sese habentis 
naturae significatio. Hanc nihil aliud quam Deum possumus 
dicere, cui si contrarium recte quseras nihil omnino est. 
Esse enim contrarium non habet nisi non esse. Nulla est 
ergo Deo natura contraria." De Mor. Manich. I. 1. See 
also ibid. IV. 6, and De Perf. Just. Horn. XIV. 32. 



12 THE PROBLEM 

and in his bestowal of nature. 17 Hence they are not 
equal to God. Their good is not supreme and un- 
changeable, and yet they are good. 18 Thus we find 
gradations in nature, some natures are more excel- 
lent than others, and yet all, from the highest to the 
lowest order, are good. 19 It is apparent here that 
Augustine on the one hand is endeavoring to combat 
the Manichean idea that all matter is evil, and at the 
same time to state what to-day is recognized as a 
truism, viz., that the creature is finite, that the very 
fact of being derived or created involves metaphysical 
imperfection. This Augustine has clearly formulated 
in the statement : " Ita et Deus summum bonum 
est, et ea quae fecit, bona sunt omnia quamvis non 
sint tarn bona, quam est ille ipse qui fecit. Quis 
enim hoc tarn insanus audet exigere, ut sequalia sint 
artifici opera, et condita conditori ? " 20 

If one asks wherein the various natures differ, or 
in what sense they are all good but not equally good, 
the answer lies in the fact that the works of God are 
capable of change. Augustine attacks the Manichean 
belief of two principles, one good and the other 
evil, and asserts that both are good. Applying it to 
the case of man he affirms that both the spirit and 
the flesh are good. They differ from the highest 
good only in that they are capable of change. 21 Nor 
can we justly pause here in the analysis of Augus- 
tine's conception of nature. All nature is good and 



* 7 De Mor. Manich. IV. 6. 

isEnchir. X. 

is Cont. Ep. Manich. XXV. 27. 

20 De Mor. Manich. IV. 6. Also Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 12 
and 21. 

21 De Continentia 18. 



NATURA 13 

without nature, evil could not exist. 22 " Non enim 
potest esse ullum malum nisi in aliquo bono; quia 
non potest esse nisi in aliqua natura." 23 He even 
ventures to apply this to human nature, which he 
always rigorously insists is corrupted by a fatal flaw. 
But regardless of this original taint, human nature 
is not evil because it is nature, but because it is 
vitiated. 24 We also find the converse of this. Not 
only is no evil possible without some nature to which 
to attach itself, and thus convert its negativity and 
sham existence into act, but also all evil is good in so 
far as it is nature. 25 The secret of such a paradoxical 
statement lies in the failure to distinguish between 
" bonum metaphysicum " and " bonum morale." To 
assert that evil is a good in so far as it is nature, 
certainly does not apply to the ethical meaning of the 
word good. We are dealing with two separate and 
distinct spheres. 

Augustine even uses the existence of evil and vice 
to prove that nature is good. The vices themselves 
are testimonials to the fact that nature is good. For 
were it not good, vices could not hurt it. 26 Indeed, 
evil would never have existed had not good nature, 26 
though mutable, brought evil upon itself. And this 



22 Enchir. XIV. Cf. also Ep. CLIII. 3, and De Nupt. et 
Concup. II. 48. 

2 3 Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CXIV. 

24 " Natura humana, etsi mala est, quia vitiata est, non 
tamen malum est, quia natura est. Nulla enim natura in 
quantum natura est, malum est; sed prorsus bonum, sine quo 
bono ullum esse non potest malum: quia nisi in aliqua 
natura ullum esse non potest vitium." Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. 
CCVI. See also Cont. duas Ep. Ped. II. 8. 

25 Enchir. XIII. also Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CXCVI. 

26 Civ. Dei XII. 3. 



14 THE PROBLEM 

very sin is itself evidence that its nature was origi- 
nally good. For just as blindness is a vice of the 
eye, this very fact indicating that originally the eye 
was made to see the -light, so vices in man indicate 
that his nature was originally good. 27 

It is now evident that to Augustine " natura " was a 
very definite conception. It grew out of his strife 
with the Manicheans and Pelagians, and formed the 
basis of his opposition to both these philosophies. His 
fundamental idea is that all nature is good. All na- 
tures are not equally good, for one is immutable, and 
others are capable of change, but nevertheless all na- 
ture, in so far as it is nature, is good. Indeed without 
nature, no evil could exist, and even evil in so far as 
it is nature is good. The very existence or presence 
of evil is testimony to the fact that all nature is 
good. Clearly this " bonum " must be interpreted as 
" bonum metaphysicum." The following sentence 
sums up his conception of " natura " and at the same 
time prepares the way for his negative view of evil. 
" Ei ergo qui summe est, non potest esse contrarium nisi 
quod non est : ac per hoc sicut ab illo est omne quod 
bonum est sic ab illo est omne quod naturaliter est; 
quoniam omne quod naturaliter est, bonum est. Om- 
nis itaque natura bona est, et omne bonum a Deo est : 
omnis ergo natura a Deo est." 28 

CREATION EX NIHILO. 

God then is the Creator, the sole source of all life 
and being, and that which He creates is nature, which, 



27 Civ. Dei XXII. i. 

28 De Natura Boni c. Manich. XIX. 



CREATION EX NIHILO 15 

in so far as it is nature, is good. Have we not then 
a closed circle? How, under this conception of Cre- 
ator and creatura can any place be found for malum 
and peccatum? We would fail to understand Au- 
gustine's metaphysics if, at this juncture, we did not 
recognize his doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and what 
it involves in regard to the possibility of evil. We 
would not rightly conceive the problem of evil as it 
shaped itself in the mind of Augustine, if after stat- 
ing his conception of God and nature, we did not 
recognize this basal condition which he places over 
all creation. When in Chapter III we come to a con- 
sideration of the question " Whence is evil ? " we 
shall see the importance of this idea. Here for the 
sake of completeness in the statement of the problem, 
we need only to recognize this element in his thought, 
and show what it involves in regard to the possi- 
bility and existence of evil. 

We find this doctrine stated repeatedly throughout 
the works of Augustine. In an early philosophical 
work written in the year 387 A. D. we find this sen- 
tence : " Deus qui de nihilo mundum istum creasti, 
quern omnium oculi sentiunt pulcherrimum." x The 
distinction upon which Augustine insists is that all 
created things were made by God but not of God. 2 
Yet the matter out of which God created his works 
was not some substance not his own, nor any sub- 
stance that existed before creation. 2 This doctrine 
then of creation ex nihilo shows evidences of having 
been developed and set forth in opposition to the 
Manichean notion of creation, which held that God 



1 Solil. L 2. Also Sermo CXXVII. 15 and Conf. XII. 7. 

2 Conf. XIII. 48. 



16 THE PROBLEM 

was compelled to create the universe out of material 
which was inherently evil. Augustine repudiates the 
thought of an evil matter and enunciates the doctrine 
that God created the universe out of nothing, and, at 
the same instant that the formless matter was brought 
into being, it was given form. 

Now in this doctrine of creation " out of nothing " 
we find the cause of the difference in the various 
kinds of nature noted in the preceding section. The 
logical implication of creation ex nihilo is the ex- 
istence of a nature not coeternal with God. " A Deo 
factam esse de nihilo, ideoque illi non esse coseter- 
nam." 3 All creatures are good but they are not equal 
to God because they are created out of nothing. Mu- 
table nature differs from the supreme and unchangeable 
nature of God, because it has been made out of noth- 
ing. 4 All creation possesses a weakened and de- 
fective reality, not because it was not made good by 
the Creator, but because it was made out of nothing. 5 
No object could exist unless made by God, but never- 
theless it could not be equal to Him because made 
out of nothing. 6 Thus the instability of mutable 
nature is the inevitable result of creation ex nihilo. 

Hence we are prepared to understand why evil 
arose in man. It arose because he was made out of 
nothing. This is abundantly and repeatedly set forth. 7 



3 Conf. XI. 31. 

4 " ' Ut dictum est, atque incommutabili bono universam con- 
ditam dicit esse creaturam, naturasque omnes bonas, quamvis 
impares creatori quia ex nihilo creatus, ideoque mutabilis. 
Cont Jul. Pelag. I. 36. 

s Civ. Dei XII. 1. 

6 Ibid. 5. 

7 Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XXX-XXXIX. 



CREATION EX NIHILO 17 

It need not be dwelt upon here for the proper place 
for its full consideration is in Chapter III where we 
deal with the origin of evil. It is important to ob- 
serve at this juncture that this conception of creation 
ex nihilo involved not the necessity but the possi- 
bility of evil. " Non igitur ideo peccavit, sed ideo 
peccare potuit, quia de nihilo factus est. Inter pec- 
cavit, et peccare potuit plurimum distat : ilia culpa est, 
ista natura." 8 

Augustine is very emphatic in his statement of this 
conception. He asserts that he knows that the nature 
of God cannot under any possible construction be 
conceived as defective, but that all natures made out 
of nothing can be so conceived. 9 When pressed to 
answer in a word the question " Whence is corrup- 
tion ? " his answer is that all natures that are capable 
of corruption were not begotten by God but rather 
made by him out of nothing. 10 In one very sig- 
nificant passage where our author endeavors to trace 
all evil to its very source, he first attributes evil to 
a corrupt will, but he immediately asks whence arose 
the corrupt will itself? Whether the corrupt will 
arose in angel or man both are the good works of 
God, possessing a good and praiseworthy nature. 
Therefore evil arose out of good. 

But still Augustine must qualify this, and so he 
concludes : " Nee ideo tamen ex bono potuit oriri 
voluntas mala quia bonum factum est a bono Deo ; 
sed quia de nihilo factum est non de Deo." 1X Nature 



s Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LX. 
» Civ. Dei XII. 8. 

10 Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXVI. 41, and XXXVIII. 44. 

11 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48. 



18 THE PROBLEM 

was created good by God, and it could never have 
been depraved by vice had it not been made ex nihilo. 
Hence, it is nature because made by God, but evil 
enters into it because it was created out of nothing. 12 
" Fecit ergo Deus cuncta de nihilo : id est, omnia 
quae ut essent fecit, si eorum originem primam res- 
piciamus, ex his quae non erant fecit : hoc Graseci 
dicunt, e£ ovk 'ovtuv — non ideo potuisse oriri ex 
t>ono malam voluntatem, quia bonum factum est a 
bono Deo, sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de 
Deo." 13 

We thus see that Augustine, without in any sense 
withdrawing his belief that all nature is good, has 
placed an important qualification or condition upon 
that conception. All nature is good, but some natures 
are not equal to others. Mutable nature is unstable, 
and possesses a defective reality because it is created 
by God out of nothing. Is evil therefore inwrought 
in the world? 

PRESENCE OF EVIL. 

Thus far we have seen one side of Augustine's 
theory of the universe. God is the source of all 
life, and the creator of all being. All nature is 
good, and although we must recognize the possi- 
bilities involved in creation ex nihilo still all being 
in so far as it exists, is good. Did Augustine then 
fail to recognize the problem of evil? His volumi- 
nous writings, covering a period of over four decades 
answer an emphatic " no." Augustine faced the prob- 



12 Civ. Dei XIV. 13. 

is Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLIV. 



PRESENCE OF EVIL 19 

lem from every angle. His Confessions are sufficient 
evidence to prove that evil was the subject of much 
of his thought. He himself felt the same incon- 
sistency which any one feels who states our author's 
theory of the world as we have thus far attempted to 
do, and then turns to the realities of life. 

Consider this remarkable passage from the Con- 
fessions, which states concisely the problem as Au- 
gustine conceived it at an early period in his life : 
" Ecce Deus, et ecce quae creavit Deus, et bonus est 
Deus, atque his validissime longissimeque prsestantior ; 
sed tamen bonus bona creavit, et ecce quomodo 
ambit atque implet ea. Ubi ergo malum, et unde, 
et qua hue irrepsit? Quae radix ejus, et quod semen 
ejus? An omnino non est?} — Unde est malum? 
An unde fecit ea, materies aliqua mala erat, et for- 
mavit atque ordinavit earn, sed reliquit aliquid in 
ilia, quod in bonum non converteret? Cur et hoc? 
An impotens erat totam vertere et commutare, ut 
nihil mali remaneret, cum sit omnia potens? Pos- 
tremo cur inde aliquid facere voluit, ac non potius 
eadem omnipotentia fecit ut nulla esset omnino? 
Aut vero existere poterat contra ejus voluntatem ? " x 
This is sufficient to show that the two sides of the 
problem were clearly formulated by Augustine. He 
confesses that he pondered over these problems until 
his life was miserable and his heart was filled with 
gnawing cares. 1 

Not only did Augustine give his attention to the 
consideration of what and whence is evil, but he was 
fully conscious of the evils of life in their most un- 
mitigated forms. John Stuart Mill has portrayed for 

1 Conf. VII. 7. 



20 THE PROBLEM 

us in his most vivid fashion the evils which nature 
inflicts upon man, 2 but his portrayal seems partial 
and inadequate when compared with that of Augus- 
tine. 3 This life, if life it may be called, is filled with 
a host of cruel ills. Our bodies are threatened with 
a numberless throng of casualities. Heat, cold, 
storms, floods, lightning, hail, earthquakes, famine, 
all combine to make the life of man miserable and 
uncertain. Bodily diseases are more numerous than 
physicians suppose or know. Even the human mind 
is cursed with such profound and dreadful ignorance 
that all mankind is engulfed in error, and ekes out 
a pitiful existence full of toil, pain and fear. Human 
hearts are torn with grief and wrenched with pain. 
Sorrow, mourning and bereavement is the lot not 
only of the godless but of the righteous and per- 
fect man. Society is cursed with the evil deeds and 
crimes of wicked men. Life is marred by wars, trea- 
sons, fraud, perfidy, murders, parricides, wickedness, 
luxury, insolence, impurity and numberless unclean- 
nesses and shameful acts. A still more difficult ele- 
ment of the problem for Augustine was the fact that 
infants are subject to wasting disease, racking pain 
and the intense agonies of thirst and hunger. 4 He 
felt that it was incumbent upon him to show how it 
was compatible with justice that infants should un- 
dergo these evils through no fault of their own. It 
was not difficult to discover the purpose of evil when 
adults passed through such trials for either it was 
a test of their characters as Job well illustrates, or a 



2 Essay on " Nature," pp. 28-31. 

3 Civ. Dei XXII. 22 seq. 
*Ep. CLXVI. 16. 



MALUM AND PECCATUM 21 

punishment for their sins, as Herod's case proves. 
But neither of these purposes could apply to infants 
for they have no righteousness to be tested, nor any 
actual sin to be punished. Clearly Augustine recog- 
nized the presence of evils in the world, although in 
his theory of creation he has apparently excluded 
them. 

THE RELATION OF MALUM AND PECCATUM. 

No one can read the works of Augustine, seek- 
ing for his treatment of the problem of evil without 
soon asking this question: What is the relation of 
" malum " and " peccatum " ? Nor would we fully 
state the problem of evil as Augustine conceived it, 
if we failed to see the relation which existed be- 
tween them in his thought. To-day, evil and sin are 
two distinct conceptions, and evil is defined as disor- 
ganization. In a finite world, disorganization seems 
inevitable. Imperfection is a necessary prerequisite 
of life. Perfection would mean a dead world. Un- 
der some circumstances and in certain conditions iso- 
lation seems to be a necessary condition of self-reali- 
zation. It becomes the duty of every person to be a 
self-supporting, independent citizen. Thus society 
itself depends upon the individual regarding his own 
interests at times as of primal importance. Even 
competition seems necessary, if the best in man is 
to be brought into action. Sturdiness and vigor owe 
their existence to sharp competition and interference. 
Therefore we see the necessity of these evils as means 
to the realization of true life. Vice or sin en- 
ters when these means are transformed into ends. 
When these natural evils cease to serve as means to 



22 THE PROBLEM 

a higher life and become instead the ideal or end of 
life, then evil becomes vice or sin. Does Augustine 
recognize any similar distinction in these two terms? 

Without attempting any full analysis here of the 
conception of malum, let us ask Augustine what is the 
proper use of the word? We find an explicit answer 
in one of his writings against the Manicheans. He 
says : " Ita et malum ostenditur quomodo dicatur : 
non enim secundum essentiam, sed secundum priva- 
tionem verissime dicitur." 1 Malum then in its cor- 
rect sense is applied not to essence but to privation, 
negation or loss. It is, as we recall, only mutable 
nature that is subject to this loss, to this diminution or 
falling away. But the mutable nature which is thus 
liable to fall away by defection cannot originate its 
evil. What then is the cause of the turning to a 
lower nature ? The answer is sin. " Quapropter si 
pia fides est ut omnia bona Deus fecerit, quibus tamen 
ipse multo est excellentior longeque prsestantior, origo 
et caput mali est peccatum." 2 He follows this imme- 
diately with a quotation of I Tim. vi. 10, which in the 
Vulgate reads : " Radix omnium malorum est cupidi- 
tas." And then adds, " Si enim radicem omnium 
malorum quseris, habes Apostolum dicentem, radicem 
omnium malorum esse cupiditatem. Radicem radi- 
cis quaerere non possum." 2 

When we remember that for Augustine the scrip- 
ture was an ultimate authority to be placed along- 
side of reason and experience as a source of knowl- 
edge we can understand why he takes this dictum of 



*De Mor. Manich. IV. 6. 
2 Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 21. 



MALUM AND PECCATUM 23 

Paul 3 as final. At any rate there is no doubt but 
that Augustine regarded evil (malum) as originat- 
ing or finding its head in sin (peccatum). This he 
states very explicitly in one of his sermons. " Malor- 
um omnium nostrorum causa peccatum est. Non enim 
sine causa homines mala ista patiuntur. Justus est 
Deus — . 4 The context here seems to imply that 
" peccatum " in the sentence quoted is to be inter- 
preted as " peccatum originale " not " peccatum ac- 
tuate," for in the preceding clause he says " in uno 
peccavimus," referring to Adam. But granting that 
this is the case, it does not sever the connection be- 
tween " all our evils " and "sin." The latter is the 
cause of the former. 

This fact is so important that it must be shown 
that this is no chance statement of our author. In 
his Unfinished Work against Julianus it is stated that 
the evils of life would not exist if it were not for 
sin. " Illud potius intuere, quod mala cum quibus 
nascuntur homines, quae congenerari hominibus in 
paradisi felicitate non possent, profecto nisi de para- 
diso exisset natura vitiata, nunc eis congenerata non 
essent." 5 Here too the reference is clearly to origi- 
nal sin but in view of the fact, as we shall see in 
Chapter IV, that Augustine regarded the whole hu- 
man race as seminally or radically existent in Adam, 
the casual connection between sin and evil is not 
broken. Even in his opus magnum, The City of God, 
in the very last book, and therefore the product of his 

3 Assuming the Pauline authorship of 1 Tim. 

4 Sermo CCXL. 3. 

6 Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. XX. Cf. also VI. 21. 



24 THE PROBLEM 

mature thought, we find the belief expressed that no 
evils would have existed, if sin had not arisen. 6 
But Augustine goes a step farther. He seems almost 
at the point of breaking away from the thought of 
peccatum originale as the cause of all evils and plac- 
ing it in present action. There would have been no 
evil, if we ourselves had not committed it. " Malum 
enim nisi experimento non sentiremus, quia nullum 
esset si non fecessemus. Neque enim ulla natura 
mali est, sed amissio boni hoc nomen accepit." 7 We 
can never be quite sure when Augustine speaks in 
the first person plural, whether he refers the action 
to our present individual actions or to our action 
when we were all one in the original man. The for- 
mer meaning, however, seems to be the meaning both 
in the passage just quoted and in the following sen- 
tence. " Malum est enim nobis de nobis." 8 

Having observed the foregoing relation between sin 
and evil we are now prepared to hear Augustine 
assert unreservedly that " malum est peccatum." As 
we have already seen, the proper use of the word 
" malum " is its application to a kind of falling away. 
Now we see that this falling away is occasioned by 
a voluntary act or by sin. " Malum esse peccatum 
quod fit voluntate animse, cum diligit pro ipso Crea- 
tore creaturam; sive suo nutu, cum sit mala; sive 



8 " Quse mala omnino nulla essent, nisi natura mutabilis, 
quamvis bona, et a summo Deo atque incommutabili bono, 
qui bona omnia condidit, instituta, peccando ea sibi ipse 
fecisset. Quo etiam peccato suo teste convincitur, bonam 
conditam se esse naturam." Civ. Dei XXII. cap. I. 2. 

7 De Genesi ad Lit. VIII. 31. 

8 Sermo LVI. 3 Cf. with this : " Etenim homini unde 
malum, nisi ab homine." Sermo CCXCVII. 9. 



MALUM AND PECCATUM 25 

alterius persuasu, cum consentit malo." 8 In his dis- 
pute with Fortunatus, our author states this even 
more explicitly. He says that the only thing which is 
called evil is our voluntary sin. " Et hoc est solum 
quod dicitur malum, voluntarium nostrum pecca- 
tum." 10 This, however, seemed a little short of the 
whole truth and so Augustine hastens to add what 
he has stated elsewhere "■ that evil may be of two 
kinds. It is either sin or the punishment for sin. 
His own words that he adds to the sentence just 
quoted are : " Est et aliud genus mali, quod est 
poena peccati. Cum ergo duo sint genera malorum 
peccatum et poena peccati, peccatum ad Deum non 
pertinet, poena peccati ad vindicem pertinet." 12 We 
see this same statement together with its reference to 
freedom as the real source of the action in the words, 
" sed omne quod dicitur malum, aut peccatum esse, 
aut pcenam peccati. Nee esse peccatum nisi pravum 
liberse voluntatis assensum, cum inclinamur ad ea 
quae justitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere; id 
est, non in rebus istis, sed in usu earum non 
legitimo." 13 

We now have ample evidence that in a very real 
sense the problems of evil and sin were one to Au- 
gustine. Malum and peccatum were not distinguished 
by him as they are to-day. But why not? Simply 
because his universe was theocentric. Malum was a 
defect, an absence of being, a loss of good. It was 
caused by a turning or defection from the Creator to 



9 Cont. Secund. Manich. XVIII. 

10 Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 15. 

11 De Genesi ad Lit. Imp. Liber 3. 

12 Ibid. 15. 
"Ibid. 3. 



26 THE PROBLEM 

the creatura. It was not the object to which the will 
turned that was evil, but the turning, the defection 
in itself, was the evil. But this is sin. All evil there- 
fore is sin. Thus we see Augustine avoids relating 
evil to God. Still he must have a just God, and there- 
fore some evils exist which are " poena peccati." Au- 
gustine was not far from modern conclusions when 
he placed sin in the will, but his theological frame of 
mind, and his fundamental tendency to center all in 
God, caused him to regard all evil as sin. How shall 
we reconcile this with his clear statements of 
metaphysical imperfection? How can the natural and 
necessary evils of life, those facts which we recognize 
as the necessary means to life, be regarded as pec- 
catum? The inconsistency must have arisen from his 
general point of view and his constant tendency to re- 
late all to God as the source of all being and life, 
without whom and beyond whom there is nothing. 

Here then is our problem. A universe created by 
a good God. This universe in all its parts is good. 
Everything that exists and in so far as it exists is 
good. The matter or substance out of which God 
created the world was itself created ex nihilo. Never- 
theless life teems with evil. 14 Its presence no one can 
doubt. Evil is sin or the punishment of sin. This 
is the relation of malum and peccatum. How does 
Augustine solve this antinomy? If all is good, what 
is evil? If God is the source of all life and being, 
whence is evil? 



14 Augustine expresses this fact in most vivid fashion. " Ab 
hujus tarn miserse quasi quibusdam inferis vitae — " Civ. 
Dei XXII. cap. XXII. 4 initio. 



CHAPTER II 

QUID EST MALUM? 

Augustine, in his controversy with the Manicheans, * 
insisted that the proper mode of approach to the prob- 
lem of evil was to ask " What is evil ? " and then, after 
having determined its nature, to seek its origin. 1 It 
is more reasonable to define the object sought before 
going in search of it. The procedure of the Mani- 
cheans, when they begin with the question " Whence 
is evil ? " presents the absurd spectacle of searching 
for a thing unknown. This method of approach, 
Augustine argues, was the source of the astounding 
errors and fanciful deviations from truth into which 
Manichseus fell. 2 Before searching for the origin of 
evil, then, Augustine would have us attempt to de- 
fine it. Indeed before we can with any success ask 
" Whence is evil ? " we must inquire " What is evil ? " 3 
This then, must be our method if we would be true 
to Augustinian procedure. 

HIS MANICHEAN CONCEPTION. 

Just as in dealing with Augustine's conception of 
" natura " we found that it was evolved and definitely 
formulated in his controversies with the Manicheans 
and Pelagians, so here if we recognize the fact that 



1 De Mor. Manich. II. 2. 

2 Ibid. "82&XVI. 41. 

3 " Proinde cum quaeritur tmde sit malum, primo quaerendum 
est quid sit malum." — De Natura Boni c. Manich. IV. 

27 



\ 



28 QUID EST MALUM? 

for nine years Augustine was a Manichean and ac- 
cepted their notion of evil, we shall be able to under- 
stand better the exact formulation of his own concep- 
tion when he had repudiated Manicheism and entered 
on the path which by way of Platonism led him into 
Christianity. We only need to recall here that the 
Manichean teaching made evil a substance, coeternal 
with God and a limitation upon Him. There were 
from the very beginning, two substances separate and 
distinct from each other. One principle was called 
God, the other VA17 or Daemon. Augustine states that 
he accepted this in his early life. He imagined that 
there was some unknown substance called evil, and 
that the summum malum was not only a substance but 
life, and that, too, life not derived from God. His 
own statement concludes thus : " In ista vero divisione 
irrationalis vitae, nescio quam substantiam et naturam 
summi mali, quae non solum esset substantia, sed om- 
nino vita esset, et tamen abs te non esset, Deus 
meus, ex quo sunt omnia, miser opinabar." 4 In an- 
other passage we find even more explicit testimony 
as to his early acceptance of this dualism. He not 
only thought of evil as some kind of a substance, but 
regarded the whole universe as consisting of two 
masses, both infinite and opposing one another, but 
the evil principle less expansive than the good which 
was unbounded save where the evil mass was opposed 
to it. 5 There is no doubt then as to Augustine's 



*Conf. IV. cap. XV. 24. 

• " Huic enim et mali substantiam quamdam credebam esse 
talem, et habere suam molem terram et deformem; sive 
crassam, quam terram dicebant, sive tennem atque subtilem, 
sicut est seris corpus; — constituebam ex adverso sibi duas 
moles, utramque infinitam, sed malam angustius bonam 
grandius." — Ibid. V. cap. X. 20. 



NON SUBSTANTIA 29 

early conception of evil. It was a substantia, 6 not 
mutable but eternal. It was one of the two basal 
principles of the universe. 

NON SUBSTANTIA. 

It is now readily understood why we find Augustine 
in his Anti-Manichean writings as well as elsewhere, 
so frequently asserting that evil is not a substance 
(substantia). For example, he makes the statement, 
with which we are familiar, that all the various goods 
or natures are the workmanship of God, but the evils 
are his judgments and cannot be natures or sub- 
stances. 1 Again evil is not a substance but rather of 
the nature of a disease or a wound. 2 Still again in 
the Confessions, he states this conception of malum, 
arriving at it from the familiar line of thought that 
all nature is good, and therefore evil is not a substance, 
for if it were a substance it would be good. 3 Simi- 
larly in the same writing, he makes the statement that 
evil is perversion of the will and not a substance.* 



8 Conf. IV. XV. 24. — " Non enim noveram neque didiceram, 
nee ullam substantiam malum esse, nee ipsam mentem nos- 
tram summum atque incommutabile bonum." 

1 " Quae mala nullo modo esse naturas vel substantias non 
vident Manichaei." Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. V. 

2 " Malum non esse substantiam ; sed sicut vulnus in corpore, 
ita in substantia quae se ipsam vitiavit, esse ccepisse peste in- 
choata, atque ibi esse desinere sanitate perfecta." De Con- 
tinentia 21. 

3 " Malumque illud quod quaerebam unde esset, non est 
substantia ; quia si substantia esset, bonum esset." Conf. VII. 
cap. XII. 18. 

4 " Et quaesivi quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni substantiam 
sed a summa substantia, te Deo, detortae in infirma volun- 
tatis perversitatem, projicientis intima sua, et tumiscentis 
foras. Conf. VII. cap. XVI. 22. 



30 QUID EST MALUM? 

In other writings 5 he virtually ridicules those who 
cannot think of good and evil except under corporeal 
forms, and consequently have an anthropomorphic 
conception of God. Such persons are able to view 
evil only as a substance instead of as a falling away 
or a defection from real being. We are thus able to 
see that Augustine sets over against his youthful 
Manichean belief that evil was a substance, his mature 
conclusion, that evil is not a substance. 



VITIUM 

But what is evil? The most general and indefi- 
nite answer would be that evil is " vitium." This 
conception we shall have to examine more carefully 
when in Chapter VI we deal with " peccatum origi- 
nate " and endeavor to trace its effects in mankind. 
But here we are justified in observing for the sake 
of completeness if nothing more, that evil is " vitium " 
or that natures are evil as the result of " vitium." 
This conception also is connected closely with his 
fundamental thesis that all nature is good. Evils are 
evil not by nature but by this inherent fault or flaw. 
Also in connection with his idea that even evils are 
good (see pages 13-14) we find this thought with 
which we are dealing now. " Sunt mala, sed mutan- 
tur ; et ipsa erunt bona : quia ipsa mala, vitio sunt 
mala, non natura." x There is no question but that 
this was one of the ways in which Augustine con- 
ceived evil. It was not a substance, it had no tangi- 
ble or self-existent reality, it existed solely as a par- 



5 E.g. In Joan. Evang. Tract. XCVIII. 4. 
iSermo CLXXXII. 5. 



CONTRA NATURAM 31 

asite and by virtue of its attachment to some nature. 
Thus and thus only could its unreality transform itself 
into actuality. It was nothing of itself, but found its 
vague negativity and mock existence simply as - the 
flaw of that which was good. " Quod enim malum 
est per vitium, prof ecto bonum est per naturam." 2 
Just as good exists per naturam so evil exists per 
vitium. 



CONTRA NATURAM OR INCONVENIENTIA. 

We are now prepared to follow this last thought to 
more definite expression. In our analysis of Augus- 
tine's conception of nature we referred to the fact 
that evil was conceived as something opposed to na- 
ture. Not only malum but also vitium is thus de- 
scribed. We are told that vitium is a malum, not to 
God but to the persons who possess it. It is an 
evil to them for the sole reason that it corrupts the 
good of their nature. In other .words vitium is con- 
trary to the good of their nature. "Natura igitur 
non est contraria Deo, sed vitium. Quia quod malum 
est, contrarium est bono." 1 The same thought is 
expressed when instead of saying that vitium is op- 
posed or contrary to good, it is stated that it is con- 
trary to nature. 2 It remains to be shown that malum 



2 Cont. Advers. Leg. et Proph. I. 7. 

1 Civ. Dei XII. cap. III. There are variations in the mms. 
here but none of the readings would alter our use of the 
passage, e.g. some of the mms. have " sed vitium, quia malum 
est, contrarium est bono." 

2 Civ. Dei XI. cap. XVII. Cf. also " Vitium quippe contra 
naturam est, quia natura nocet." Cont. Adver. Leg. et 
Proph. I. 7. "Vitium autem ita contra naturam est, ut non 
possit nisi nocere naturae." Civ. Dei XI. cap. XVII. 



32 QUID EST MALUM? 

as well as vitium is thus conceived as " contra na- 
turam." It is succintly stated in one of the works 
against the Manicheans, thus : — " Nulla enim natura 
malum, si quod contra naturam est, id erit malum." 8 
And again it is stated tersely in these words: — 
"Quod autem malum, non natura, sed contra naturam 
est." 4 This same thought is expressed by the term 
" inimicum naturae." 5 

If we ask just what it was that Augustine meant 
by these terms we find some suggestion of an answer 
in the term " inconvenientia." Evil is contrary to 
nature in the sense that it disagrees with nature. 8 
It is a disagreement in the sense that it injures or 
harms nature. Augustine uses an illustration of a 
female Athenian prisoner who drank the fatal draught 
without any harm to her body. She was able to do 
so because- she had gradually accustomed herself to it 
by partaking of it at intervals. Thus she did not 
make the poison to be no evil, but rather she had done 
away with the disagreement between it and her body. 7 
The poison in itself was not evil, but the evil consisted 
in the disagreement. This, then, is one aspect of the 
definition of evil. Evil has not been given any real 
being or existence. Unless we presuppose the nature 



3 De Mor. Manich. II. 2. 

*Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXIII. 36, ibid. XXXV. 39 and cf. 
also De Mor. Manich. VIII. 11, where we read "malum est 
quod contra naturam est." 

5 " Vitium natura non est, sed naturae inimicum est." 
Sermo CLXXXII. 3. 

6 " Hoc enim et bestise illi et nobis malum est, id est i'psa 
inconvenientia, quae sine dubio non est substantia, imo est 
inimica substantiae." De Mor. Manich. VIII. 11. 

7 " Sed quia inconvenientia malum est, fecit potius ut per 
moderatam consuetudinem illud corpus suo corpori con- 
veniret." Ibid. VIII. 12. Cf. also ibid. VIII. 13. 



PRIVATIO BONI 33 

to which it is contrary, evil could not exist. But 
given a good nature, evil is that which attacks it. 
Evil is antagonistic, adverse and hostile to the nature 
upon which it preys. 

PRIVATIO BONI, CORRUPTIO, NEGATIO. 

Another aspect of evil is expressed by such terms 
as privatio, indigentia, amissio, corruptio, and negatio. 
It is not difficult to see that these terms are but the 
counterpart of those described in the section above. 
There evil was opposed to nature, here evil is the 
want or absence of good. But nature is the good. 
Therefore anything which is antagonistic to nature 
could, when viewed from the effect of its action, be 
described as the privation of good. " Non est ergo 
malum nisi privatio boni." x No nature of any kind 
whatsoever is evil. Evil is a name for nothing but 
the taking away of the good (privatio boni). 2 All 
evils arise out of goods, that is, mutable goods, and 
the evils are consequently nothing other than " pri- 
vationes bonorum." 3 In fact evil is nothing but the 
taking away of good until at the last the thing passes 
into nonexistence, and then the evil must likewise 
vanish. 4 The proper use of the word evil is to 
apply it not to being but to privation or loss (pri- 
vatio). 5 A very striking passage in which Augus- 
tine followed philosophers before him, and in turn 



1 .Cont. Advers. Leg. et Proph. I. 7. 
2 Civ. Dei XI. 22. 
s Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LX. 

4 Conf. III. 12 " Quia non noveram malum non esse nisi 
privationem boni, usque ad quod omnino non est." 
B De Mor. Manich. IV. 6. 



34 QUID EST MALUM? 

has been followed by many since, is that which oc- 
curs in the Enchiridion. Here evil is described as 
enhancing our admiration of the good. When put 
into the right relations, and regulated, it enables us 
to enjoy and value the good. For after all it is noth- 
ing but the absence of good (privatio boni). For 
just as in physical bodies, disease and wounds mean 
the absence of health, and when a cure is effected, 
the disease or injury does not go elsewhere to reside 
but actually ceases to exist, so evil has no essence 
of its own, it is not a substance but a defect or flaw 
of some good nature. Evil is but the privation of 
good. 6 

Another term, which Augustine seems to use as a 
synonym of privatio is indigentia. He follows Am- 
brose in saying that badness (malitia) is nothing 
other than the need or want (indigentia) of good. 7 
Since evils arise out of good nature, badness, Augus- 
tine tells Julianus, is nothing except the want of 
good. 8 In the term " amissio," which Augustine uses 
to express this conception, we have another synonym 
of privatio. Evil itself has no nature. It is merely 
a name which has been applied to the loss (amissio) 
of good. 9 

Another term which may be classified here but 
which seems to have a more distinct connotation than 
privatio, indigentio or amissio, is corruptio. It was 
this term which led Julian of Eclanum to charge 



6 Enchir. XL The key sentence being : " Quid est autem 
aliud quod malum dicitur nisi privatio boni ? " 

7 Cont. Jul. Pelag. I. 45. 

s Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLIV. 

9 " Neque enim ulla natura mali est, sed amissio boni hoc 
nomen accepit." De Genesi ad Lit. VIII. 31. 



PRIVATIO BON I 35 

Augustine with Manicheism. 10 There is no question 
but that this term was a common one with Augustine 
for the description of evil. In some instances he 
seems to show traces of the Greek conception that 
beauty and symmetry are good and their absence an 
evil. He argues that evil is corruption, and that by 
this he means a corruption either of the measure or 
the form, or the order that belongs to nature. 11 In 
his controversy with the Manicheans he takes up and 
deals with this definition of evil as corruption. He 
agrees with them that corruption is undeniably a 
definition of evil, but also maintains that this does 
not make it a substance as the Manicheans believed. 
Corruption is not self-existent, but is always attached 
to some substance which it corrupts. The nature to 
which it thus attaches itself is not corruption but 
rather suffers corruption. The result is a loss of in- 
tegrity and order. But corruption could not be pres- 
ent unless some good nature were present to suffer 
corruption. 12 At times he seems ready to embrace 
all evil under this one term corruptio. This is the 
evil of all things. " Quis enim dubitet totum illud 
quod dicitur malum, nihil esse aliud quam corrup- 
tionem? Possunt quidem aliis atque aliis vocabulis 
alia atque alia mala nominari : sed quod omnium rerum 
malum sit, in quibus mali aliquid animadverti potest, 
corruptio est." 13 He illustrates his meaning here by 



10 " Julian of Eclanum — insisted that the corruption of 
nature which Augustine taught was nothing else than 
Manicheism." B. B. Warfield Intro, essay on Augustine and 
the Pelag. Con. Nicene & Post-Nicene Fath. V. LIV. 

11 De Natura Boni c. Manich. cap. IV. Cf. also cont. Ep. 
Manich. XL. 46. 

12 De Mor. Manich. V. 7. Cf . also Civ. Dei XII. 3. 

13 Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXV. 39. 



36 QUID EST MALUM? 

saying that the corruption of understanding is igno- 
rance, of a just mind, injustice, and of a brave mind, 
cowardice. Likewise in the body the corruption of 
health is disease, and of beauty, ugliness. He then 
concludes: " Verum tamen videre jam facile est nihil 
nocere corruptionem nisi quod labefacit naturalem stat- 
um, et ideo earn non esse naturam, sed contra naturam. 
Quod si non invenitur in rebus malum nisi corruptio, 
et corruptio non est natura, nulla utique natura malum 
est." 14 This shows clearly how all of these varied 
aspects of his conception of evil are not discordant 
but fit together in an essential unity. Corruption is 
here said to be " contra naturam," and also his logical 
inference is that no nature is evil. The former state- 
ment is the aspect considered just previous to this 
one and the latter implication foreshadows the next 
aspect, namely, the tendency to nonexistence. 

But before we consider that phase there remains 
one term which belongs in this group. It is a term 
which might be applied to every aspect of his defini- 
tion of evil. The term to which we refer is " ne- 
gatio." " Defectus vero utriusque generis non posse 
alteros alteris anteponi : privant enim tantum, et non 
esse indicant, quod usquequaque eandem vim habent, 
sicut ipsse negationes." 15 Here too, we see a com- 
bining of the aspects of privation, nonexistence and 
negation. The total impression which they convey 
is that if any one term would characterize Augus- 
tine's conception of evil it is this term " negatio." 



i* Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXV. 39. 

16 De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. VI. 7. 



NON ESSE 37 



NON ESSE. 



We come now to a group of terms which seem to 
indicate Plato's influence over Augustine. At any 
rate there is a striking similarity of thought between 
Plato's to firj *6v and Augustine's whole conception 
of malum, and especially that aspect of it which de- 
fines it as nonexistence. This aspect of Augustine's 
definition of evil begins with the idea that evil is 
diminution and culminates in the denial of the ex- 
istence of a summum malum. Any lessening of being 
is evil. 1 This idea of diminution finds abundant ex- 
pression. It is everywhere linked with his conception 
of nature which we have already analyzed. That 
fatal flaw which is described as contrary to nature is 
so described because it harms nature, but this harm 
consists in lessening or diminishing its good. 2 Ex- 
istence or being continues only as the good of that 
being continues. Destroy the good of the being and 
you destroy the being. Therefore evil consists in 
diminution of good. 3 

In one passage in which he is dealing with the 
Manicheans he ventures to say that there is no evil 
except this diminution of the good of any nature. 
The point assumes significance for the Manicheans 
because it makes evil to consist in the lessening of 



1 " Quidquid autem minus est quam erat, non inquantum 
est, sed inquantum minus est, malum est. Eo enim quo 
minus est quam erat, tendit ad mortem." De Vera Relig. 
26. 

2 " Nee (vitium) noceret, nisi bonum ejus minuerit " Cont. 
Advers. Leg. et Proph. I. 7. 

3 " Sed bonum minui malum est ; quamvis, quantumcumque 
minuatur, remaneat aliquid necesse est (si adhuc natura est) 
unde natura sit." Enchir. XII. 4. 



38 QUID EST MALUM? 

being. As the evil increases the nature to which it 
has attached itself, diminishes, and just as the Mani- 
chean would lay hold of his evil substance it crumbles 
into nothingness. 4 It is only another phase of this 
thought which says that all evil tends to nonexistence. 
It is viewing evil, not in its process but in its result. 
Evil is diminution, the inevitable outcome of which 
is nonexistence. Defects or privations indicate non- 
existence. 5 In dealing with God's relation to evil, 
Augustine asks how He who is the author of all 
being, could at the same time be the cause of not- 
being. 6 This suggests what Augustine says of him- 
self while still a Manichean. During that period of 
his life he did not know, he says, that evil was noth- 
ing but a privation of good, and culminates in the 
complete extinction of the thing to which it clings. 7 
When speaking of evil as a disagreement (incon- 
venientia) with nature and as having no substance of 
its own he raises the question " Whence then is it ? " 
He answers by asking one to observe the end to which 
it leads. This end is nonexistence. 8 This is like- 
wise the outcome of corruption. For it causes enti- 
ties to fall way from their being. This means that 
they are brought to noncontinuance and noncontinu- 
ance is nonexistence. 9 This corruption in fact comes 



4 De Natura Boni c. Manich. XVII. " Non ergo mala 
est, in quantum natura est, ulla natura; sed cuique naturae 
non est malum nisi minui bono. Quod si minuendo ab- 
sumeretur : sicut nullum bonum, ita nulla natura relinquere- 
tur." 

5 De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. VI. 7. 
6 De Mor. Manich. II. 3. 

7 Conf. III. 12. KtvjvuT" 

8 " Non esse enim cogit omne quod periunt." De Mor. 
Manich. VIII. n. 
9 De Mor. Manich. VI. 8. 



NON ESSE 39 

from nothing. For the increase of corruption leads 
to nonexistence and anything which is nonexistent is 
nothing. 10 All life which by a voluntary choice falls 
away from its Creator, preferring to enjoy the works 
of God rather than God himself, tends to nothing. 11 
Very early in his literary career Augustine recognized 
that " Malum nihil esse." 12 As we have already 
noticed in connection with Augustine's conception of 
natura, he carries this thought of the nonexistence of 
evil so far that he argues that the devil and all the 
evil angels are good in so far as they exist. They 
are evil only in so far as they are nonexistent. 13 Evil 
cannot exist, unless it arises out of and is attached 
to some good nature. 14 Evil itself is absolutely non- 
existent, it is nihilum, for the moment that any nature 
is deprived of all its good it no longer exists. 15 

These statements find expression from a slightly 
different point of view when our author maintains 
that nothing false exists. Falsity is that which tends 
to be and is not. 16 This thought has a Platonic ring. 
It is equaled by the statement that " quia quidquid 
est, verum est." 17 But if all that exists is true, then 
nothing false exists anywhere. 18 In short nothing has 



10 Cont. Ep. Manich. XL. 46 — " Si quis autem non credit 
ex nihilo esse corruptionem, proponat sibi hsec duo, esse 
et non esse — corruptio vero aucta cogit non esse, et constat 
quod non est, nihil esse." 

n«Vergit ad nihilum"— De Vera Relig. XI. 

12 Solil. I. 2. 

13 Cf. statement of A. H. Newman, Nic. and Post-Nic. 
Fath. IV. 29. 

1* Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CXIV. and I. LXVI. 
15 Conf. VII. 18. 
is Solil. II. 16. 
" Ibid. II. 8. 
18 Ibid. II, 15. 



40 QUID EST MALUM? 

existence, unless truth inheres in its very being. 19 
All of these statements enable us to understand that 
evil must be relegated to the realm of mock existence 
and empty negativity. If God is the supreme ex- 
istence, and the only being that truly is, then the 
nature which is contrary to Him does not exist, or 
in other words it is no nature. For nonentity is the 
contrary of that which truly is. Thus there is no 
being contrary to the supreme being, and the Mani- 
chean evil principle and race of darkness must vanish 
into nonexistence. 20 Another formulation of this 
statement is that there is no summum malum. The 
moment that being is totally consumed by vitium or 
corruptio, then the corruption itself must cease to 
exist. 21 Vice cannot exist in the highest good, and 
on the other hand, if it exists at all it must exist in 
some good. Things wholly good therefore can exist, 
but things solely evil cannot. 22 God then is the sum- 
mum bonum. He rules the universe absolutely and 
without any limitation. Summum malum there is 
not. " Summum ergo malum multum modum habet ; 
caret enim omni bono. Non est igitur." 23 

DEFECTUS. 

But must we stop here? Is there nothing upon 



19 Solil. I. 25. 

20 Civ. Dei XII. cap. II. " Ac per hoc ei naturae, quae 
summe est, qua faciente sunt quaecumque sunt, contraria 
natura non est, nisi quae non est. Ei quod quippe est, non 
esse contrarium est." 

21 Enchir. XII. " Quae si corruptione consumitur nee ipsa 
corruptio remanebit." 

22 " Sola mala," see whole passage Civ. Dei XII. 3. 

23 Liber de Diver Quaest. LXXXIII. VI. 



DEFECTUS 41 

which we may put our finger and say this is evil? 
Must our thought be satisfied with this array of 
negatives ? We have endeavored to outline the varied 
aspects of the conception of evil as Augustine has 
described it. We have seen that as he emerged from 
Manicheism, he attacked its doctrine of an evil sub- 
stance with the conception that evil is not a substance 
but rather some indefinite flaw of nature. This flaw 
is opposed and hostile to nature. It disagrees with 
nature. Or again evil is expressed by such terms 
as the absence, want or loss of good. Taking on a 
more active connotation, evil is conceived as cor- 
ruption, but all these terms are summed up in " nega- 
tio." Evil is a negation. Another aspect of the idea 
is expressed by the thought of diminution or a 
tendency to nonexistence. Thus evil followed to its 
ultimate nature is nothing. There is no such thing 
as intrinsic evil. 

But if this is so, what is this something which 
seems to float between being and non-being? The 
only answer with any positive content is found in the 
word " defectus " when applied to the will, and makes 
evil consist not in any being, not even that being 1 
to which the will turns when it falls away from its 
Creator, the only true and immutable essence, but in 
the act of the will itself. The turning of the will 
from a higher to a lower order of nature, this is 
evil. 2 It must not be inferred from this that Augus- 
tine always used " deficere " in its application to the 
will. " Defectus " and " deficere " are common terms 
in his description of evil, and are applied by him to 



1 Cont. Secund. Manich. XI. 

2 Civ. Dei XII. 6. 



42 QUID EST MALUM? 

all being and nature. He is very explicit in his state- 
ments that God is not the author of this falling away. 3 
In his writings against the Manicheans he defines 
evil as that which falls away (deficere) from essence 
and tends to nonexistence. 4 He uses the noun " de- 
lectus " as a definition of evil, stating that evil is a 
certain deserting or falling away of mutable natures 
from the immutable nature. 

It is interesting to observe just how our author 
defines " deficere " and to notice how its connotation 
harmonizes with all the other aspects of evil which 
have been described. " Deficere autem non jam nihil 
est, sed an nihilum tendere. Cum enim ea quae magis 
sunt, declinant ad ea qu3e minus sunt, non ilia in 
quae declinant deficiunt, et minus esse incipiunt quam 
erant : non quidem ut ea sint ad quae declinaverunt, 
sed pro suo genere minus." 5 No clearer statement 
of Augustine's conception of deficere could be de- 
sired. Now this falling away is the essence of both 
malum and peccatum. " Cum superiora ad inferiora 
declinant, ubi est omne peccatum et omne quod dicitur 
malum." c Thus by means of the conception of 
" peccatum " we pass naturally to the relation of this 
idea of " defectus " to the will. We have this ex- 
plicitly and unmistakably stated in the sentence : 
" Et quaesivi quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni sub- 



3 " Omne autem quod deficit, ab eo quod est esse deficit, 
et tendit in non esse. Esse autem et in nullo deficere bonum 
est, et malum est deficere. At ille ad quern non esse non 
pertinet non est causa deficiendi, id est, tendendi ad non 
esse." Liber de Diver. Qu;est. LXXXIII. XXI. 

4 " Idipsum ergo malum est — deficere ab essentia et ad 
id tendere ut non sit." De Mor. Manich. II. 2. 

6 Cont. Secund. Manich. XL 

« Ibid. X. 



DEFECTUS 43 

stantiam: sed a summa substantia, te Deo, detortse 
in infima voluntatis perversitatem." 7 Similarly 
Augustine declares that the goodness of God is the 
sole cause of all good, and that " falling away " is the 
cause of all evil. 8 

Here then we may conclude our endeavor to state 
Augustine's answer to the question, " What is evil ? " 
In this last aspect, we seem to have found something 
which in a measure satisfies the demand for a defi- 
nite answer. This is not the place to enter into a full 
discussion of that phase of the conception of evil, for 
it properly belongs to the treatment of freedom. 
There we must investigate his conceptions, " Causa 
efficiens " and " causa deficiens." But here we may 
rightly point out that this aspect of the question 
places evil in an act of the will. Evil is utter nega- 
tivity and sham existence. It is the absence of re- 
ality and the negation of being. It is the turning of 
the will away from the highest Being to some inferior 
nature. 

We may properly raise the question here, whether 
evil is so unreal as this definition would lead us to 
imagine. Evil is just as unreal or we may better say 
real, as it is to the man who lies suffering upon a bed 
of pain, or to the sinner as he sits in remorse, brood- 
ing upon his evil deeds. 9 Yet at the same time, evil 



7 Conf. VII. 22. 

8 " Rerum quae ad nos pertinent bonarum causam non 
esse nisi bonitatem Dei ; malarum vero ab immutabili bono 
deficientem boni mutabilis voluntatem, prius angeli, hominis 
postea." Enchir. XXIII. 

9 " I regard evil as a distinctly real fact, a fact just as real 
as the most helpless and hopeless sufferer finds it to be when 
he is in pain." Royce, Studies of Good and Evil, p. 16. 



44 QUID EST MALUM t 

does have its negative characteristic. Evil is dis- 
organization. Evil is suicide. Taken as an ideal, evil 
does lead to nonexistence. The solution of these con- 
flicting statements lies in a clearer discrimination and 
more accurate distinction in the various kinds of re- 
ality. Metaphysically, evil is a negation. Ethically, 
evil is positive and real. 

But, if evil is what our author has defined it to be, 
if it has no existence of its own but is ever attached 
to some nature, and if the most positive statement 
that can be made is that only by this attachment to 
some being can evil transform its unreality into act, 
whence is it? and who is its author? " Unde est 
Malum ? " This is the question which now demands 
treatment. 



CHAPTER III 

UNDE EST MALUM? 

We now have a right, according to Augustine's 
own order of procedure, to ask " Whence is evil ? " 
Now that we know what it is that we seek we may 
with reason search for its origin. 

REJECTS EVIL PRINCIPLE OF MANICH^US. 

Manicheism had taught Augustine that evil arose 
from a principle contrary to God. Evil as a sub- 
stance, was in rebellion against God at the instigation 
of this evil principle. God could only resist this re- 
belling evil substance and conquer it by blending part 
of his own nature and substance with it, and thus 
suffer contamination in a part of his being. 1 Thus 
Augustine brought from this experience of his youth 
ideas and conceptions which might readily . have led 
him to place the origin of evil in some eternal princi- 
ple, unoriginated and independent of God. But Au- 
gustine's mind could not be satisfied with this dualism. 
It seemed sacrilegious to him that Manichaeus should 
advocate that God's nature suffered contamination 
rather than to think that evil was committed by 
man. 2 The thought that man sinned when the nature 
of evil in him prevailed over the nature of God 



1 De Continentia 14. 

2 Conf. VII. 4. 

45 



46 UNDE EST MALUM? 

seemed ridiculous. 3 He characterizes the Manichean 
tenets regarding the origin of evil as impious follies a 
and blasphemous fancies. 4 p -^f «****«• &«**> M*** "*J 

Augustine was a monist/ The word " unity " pos- 7 
sessed a charm for him. Our failure to see the7>U^ 
harmony of nature and the universe is what leads us 
to regard the natural phenomena which operate in 
utter disregard of man's welfare, as the work of 
some evil principle. Augustine did not minimize 
the evils of life. He could set them in array as force- 
fully as any modern pessimist but when he sought 
for their origin he was not willing to recognize an es- 
sential rift in the universe. God is the sole Author 
and Maker of all that is. 5 It is unnecessary to elabo- 
rate upon this fact. Reference to Chapter I where 
Augustine's conception of God is set forth will give 
ample testimony to the fact that our author was not 
j. ^/zidualist. God is the source of all life and being. 
^U^^He himself is the supreme existence, and all else owes 

>its origin to Him. There is no place left for any evil 
principle. If there was any one thing which Au- 
gustine repudiated more than another it was the be- 
lief of the Manicheans in an evil principle. Augus- 
tine was too much of a Platonist to find any room in 
his philosophy for dualism. 



s De Continentia 14. 

* Cont. Faust. XXXII. cap. XX. 

5 " Tanta est vis et potentia integritatis et unitatis, ut etiam 
quae multa sunt bona tunc placeant, cum in universum aliquid 
conveniunt atque concurrunt. Universum autem ab unitate 
nomen accepit. Quod si Manichsei considerarent, laudarent 
universitatis auctorem et conditorem Deum;" De Genesi c. 
Manich. I. 32. 



COD'S RELATION TO EVIL 47 

god's relation to evil. 

If then Augustine's thought was essentially mo- 
nistic and if God is the center and source of all that is, 
must we regard Him as the cause of evil? If not, 
what is his relation to evil? Here too we find no 
uncertain answer. Augustine cannot be too emphatic 
in his denial of the charge that God is the cause of 
sin. This protest is found everywhere in his writ- 
ings. Even while a Manichean he says that it seemed 
more fitting to believe that God created no evil than 
to believe that evil as he then conceived it came from 
God. 1 It must be admitted that in an earlier passage 
in the Confessions he says that he believed God was 
compelled to err instead of acknowledging that he 
himself had done evil voluntarily. 2 But when once 
Augustine had shaken off his Manichean fetters, he 
could not.be too severe with their deterministic be- 
liefs. To attribute the cause of sin to the inevitable 
decree of heaven and to release proud man in his cor- 
ruption from all blame, this was absurdity, 3 Against 
the Manichean belief that God was corrupted by a 
rebelling evil substance, he maintained that in no way, 
by either chance or necessity could corruption mar 
the nature of God. 4 He is good, and all that he wills 
is good. 4 

Augustine was a staunch defender of the omnipo- 
ence of God, but he did not hesitate to declare that 
it was impossible for God to sin and that He never 



1 Conf. V. 20. 

2 Ibid. IV. 26 fin. 
8 Ibid. IV. 4. 

4 Ibid. VII. 6. 



48 UNDE EST MALUM t 

wills any evil. 5 Even the suggestion of the possi- 
bility that God is the author of evil calls forth from 
him the ejaculatory utterance, "Heaven forbid!" 6 
But if God is the Creator of man, is He not also the 
originator of his sin? Augustine asserts the former 
but denies the latter. " Quoniam tu fecisti eum, et 
peccatum non fecisti in eo." 7 God's relation, then, 
to evil men is simply this: He creates their nature 
and all nature is good. Whatever evil or sin is in 
man is due to his own disobedience. The very fact 
that man is a human being shows that he is a good. 
The fact that an original taint, due to the bad use of a 
free will, clings to all men is no evidence that God 
caused evil. 8 The very fact that God is declared to 
be the source of all life and being excludes the possi- 
bility of his being the author of evil, for how could He 
who is the author of the being of all things, be at 
the same time the author of non-being, or in other 
words the cause of their tending to nonexistence. 9 

Augustine deals with this problem very succintly in 
the words : " At ille ad quern non esse non pertinet 
non est causa deficiendi, id est, tendendi ad non esse; 
quia, ut ita dicam essendi causa est: boni igitur tan- 
tummodo causa est : et propterea ipse summum bonum 
est. Quocirca mali auctor non est, qui omnino quae 
sunt auctor est, quia in quantum sunt, in tantum bona 
sunt." 10 This same position is strongly indicated in 



6 De Symbolo 2. 

« De Spir. et Lit. 54. 

7 Conf. I. 11. Cf. also Sermo XC. 9. 

8 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 32. Cf. also De Utilitate Credendi 
36. 

9 De Mor. Manich. II. 3. 

10 Liber de Diver. Qusest. LXXXIII. XXI. Vide Retract. 
I. 26, also De Gratia Christi 26, 



GOD'S RELATION TO EVIL 49 

one of the Letters. Augustine was much troubled 
with the problem of the origin of souls. In his en- 
deavor to solve it he had offered four explanations for 
their origin. He says that in doing this his object 
was to treat them in such a way that, whatever one 
of the four theories might be true, it would in no way 
be a handicap to him in contending with all his might 
against those who were attempting to make God the 
author of evil and sin. 11 This complete rejection of 
the thought that God was the author of evil finds its 
most radical expression in the declaration that the 
Creator is in no way responsible for the faults and 
blemishes of the creature. If responsibility is to at- 
tach to metaphysical imperfection it would seem un- 
just to attribute it to the creature, and still Augustine 
will not attribute it to the blameless and inviolable 
nature of the Creator. 12 Unmistakably then, God was 
not the cause of evil. 

But does evil exist in the universe in complete in- j 
dependence of God ? Is it out of all relation to Him ? . _. 

Augustine would not admit that. God is not the ! 
" auctor," but he is the " ordinator " of evil and sin. K 
" Et tamen peccabam, Domine Deus, ordinator et^ 
creator rerum naturalium, peccatorum autem tantum*^ 
ordinator." 13 Augustine told the Manicheans that 
there was but one solution for the question of good ; 
and evil. That solution consisted in regarding God 
as the author of all things in so far as they exist, 
while all desertion of being is not to be attributed to 




f^^P^ 



11 Ep. CLXVI. 7. Cf. De Lib. Arbit. III. 21. )&&,. ;**** 

12 Ep. CLXVI. 7. Cf. De Lib. Arlit. III. 21. fe*4 ^ ^ ^ 

13 Conf. I. 16. The text as here quoted seems to be the 
best reading, especially as the meaning finds ample support 
in other passages. 



50 UNDE EST MALUM ? 

God but still is to be considered as always regulated 
by divine providence so as to preserve the harmony 
of the universe. 14 Thus Augustine permits nothing 
to get out of relation to God. The universe is a unit 
and God is its center and source. He does not origi- 
nate but He regulates the evil of the world. All 
the privations of good are so arranged that they ful- 
fil some good purpose. 15 God has made the day, and 
by simply passing over certain times and places, and 
not illuminating them, he has disposed the night. 15 

Augustine illustrates this doctrine by the case of 
Judas. By an evil will Judas chose to be evil. 
Hence, although God had controlled this evil, he did 
not cause it. 16 Augustine thus formulates this con- 
ception when writing against Faustus. " Nee auctore, 
sed tamen ordinatore etiam peccatorum ut ea quae 
peccata non esset, nisi contra naturam essent, sic 
judicentur et ordinentur, ne universitatis naturam 
turbare vel turpare permittantur, meritorum suorum 
locis et conditionibus deputata." 17 Our author also 
applies this term to the will, and while he would deny 
that God is the cause of the evil will, nevertheless 
He is its regulator, 18 The motive which underlies 
this conception is doubtless the unwillingness of Au- 
gustine to admit that anything exists out of relation 
to God, and especially against his all-embracing will. 



14 De Mor. Manich. VII. 10. 

15 De Natura Boni c. Manich. XVI. 

16 Sermo CXXV. 5. 

17 Cont. Faustum XXII. LXXVIII. 

18 " Deus sicut naturarum bonarum optimus Creator est, ita 
malarum voluntatum justissimus ordinator." Civ. Dei XL 17. 
For further ref. see Lectiones variantes Conf. I.. 16, espe- 
cially De Prsedest. Sanct. 16. 



GOD'S RELATION TO EVIL 51 

On the other hand he can not conceive of God as the 
author or cause of evil. Therefore he denies that 
God is in any sense the author, creator or originator 
of evil, but when it has once been originated, He ad- 
justs, arranges and regulates it for the best purposes 
of his all-wise government. 

What then shall we say of the divine permission of 
evil? If God does not create it, does He permit it? 
We can readily infer that Augustine would grant 
this. His theocentric universe surely could not con- 
tain anything which God did not either create or per- 
mit. God permits evil, Augustine declares, because 
He judged it better to utilize it for the sake of the 
good than not to permit its existence. 19 God does not 
lead man into sin but suffers him to be lead thither. 20 
When Augustine reaches such a juncture as this in 
his thought, we see evidences of his early tendency 
to agnosticism.^ That God permits man to be lead 
into sin is difficult for Augustine to understand. He 
only adds that it must be done in accordance with the 
most secret plans of God and the most just deserts of 
man. 21 In dealing with the Fall, Augustine is very 
emphatic in his declarations that God did not cause, 
but only permitted the evil choice. 22 This is espe- 
cially important when we recall the marked and central 
significance which Augustine attaches to this first 
evil choice of original man. 



" Enchir. XXVII. 

20 De Sermone Dom. in Monte II. IX. 30. 

21 De Sermone Dom. in Monte II. IX. 30. 

22 " Modus autem iste quo traditus est homo in diaboli 
potestatem, non ita debet intelligi, tanquam hoc Deus fecerit, 
aut fieri jusserit, sed quod tantum permiserit juste tamen." — 
De Trin. XIII. 16. 



52 UNDE EST MALUM? 

In the preceding chapter we saw that Augustine de- 
fined evil as corruption. It was something which 
had the power to oppose and diminish nature or 
being. Doubtless the query at once arose, but what 
is this corruption which seems to be so trans- 
formed that it has the power to attack and diminish 
being? Our only positive answer was found in the 
defection of the will. It is in connection with the 
divine permission of evil that Augustine recognizes 
this same pertinent query. He asks the very ques- 
tion : " Why does corruption take from nature what 
God has given it ? " His answer is that corruption 
takes nothing from nature without the permission of 
God. 23 And just as the definition of evil concludes 
with a consideration of the term " defectus " whose 
connotation seems to place evil in the defection of the 
will from a higher to a lower creation, so this divine 
permission of evil seems to find its best expression in 
those passages where the possibility of evil is placed 
in man's endowment with freedom. 

To Augustine it seems absurd to raise the issue 
whether it was not in God's power to prevent both 
angels and men from falling into evil. 2 * The real so- 
lution of the question lies in the wisdom of God who 
preferred to leave the possibility of good and evil in 
the power of man and thus proclaim both what man's 
pride could bring upon him and what God's grace 
could accomplish. 25 It was one of the natural out- 



23 " Cur ergo inquis, quod naturae Deus dedit, toilet cor- 
ruptio? Non tollit nisi ubi permittit Deus." Cont. Ep. 
Manich. XLI. 47. 

24 Civ. Dei XIV. 27. 

25 Ibid. XIV. 27. 



GOD'S RELATION TO EVIL 53 

flowings of God's omnipotence to permit the existence 
of evils, arising from the freedom of man. 26 As we 
shall see in Chapter V when dealing with freedom, 
Augustine found no rational objection to maintaining 
at one and the same time, God's foreknowledge and 
man's freedom. Cicero could not do this, but Augus- 
tine had no scruples in declaring that God foreknew 
that some of his creatures, the evil angels, would 
through their self-exalting pride fall from their happy 
estate, and yet God deemed it more worthy of his 
power to permit this defection than to prevent the 
evil from coining into existence. 27 The evil came, but 
it came because they brought it upon themselves, with 
God's permission as expressed in his conferring upon 
them freedom of will. 27 

God then is not the cause, but He is the regulator <| p*****i 
and permitter of JJvil,^ Our treatment of God's rela- 
tion to evil will not be complete, however, until we 
ask Augustine how the evils of human life are re- 
lated to the life of God. Granted that He does use 
and adjust them, that they do exist only because of 
divine permission, are the evils of life entirely sepa- 
rate from God, does He sit aloft, unmoved by human 
misery and separate from man and his life? It is 
difficult here to formulate Augustine's answer and 
relate it to recent discussions of the problem of evil, 
for almost all that he says on this particular aspect 
of the question is aimed at Manichean tenets. One 
passage in the Confessions suggests unmistakably that 



26 " Jam intelligunt ad omnipotentiam Dei potius id perti- 
nuisse, ut ex libero arbitrio voluntatis venientia mala esse 
permitteret." De Continentia 15. 

27 Civ. Dei XXII. 1. 




54 UNDE EST MALUM f 

Augustine does not conceive God as sharing in our 
trials and sufferings. God abides in himself, while 
man is tossed about in numberless trials. 28 When we 
come to his Anti-Manichean statements, we find most 
emphatic declarations against any possibility of suf- 
fering on the part of God. Fanciful fabrications are 
those teachings of the Manicheans to the effect that 
God is corruptible and changeable, that He is liable 
to injury, and experiences want, weakness and mis- 
ery. 29 Equally absurd is the belief that the soul is a 
part of God. Man is not a fragment of the Infinite. 
Furthermore God could by no possibility have suf- 
ered. 30 One reason for Augustine's formulation of 
his belief here is the fact that to him all evil is sin 



28 Conf. IV. cap. V. 10. " An tu, quamvis ubique adsis, longe 
abjecisti a te miseriam nostram? Et tu in te manes; nos 
autem in experiments volvimur." 

29 De Mor. Manich. XL 20. 

30 " Sic confitemur ambo, sic nobis concedimus esse incor- 
ruptibilem et inviolabilem Deum, et nihil pati potuisse." Acta 
seu Disp. c. Fort. 7. Contrast with this Royce's thesis : " The 
true question then is : Why does God thus suffer ? The sole 
possible, necessary and sufficient answer is, because without 
suffering, without ill, without woe, evil, tragedy, God's life 
could not be perfected. This grief is not a physical means 
to an external end. It is a logically necessary and eternal 
constituent of the divine life. It is logically necessary that 
the Captain of your salvation should be perfect through suf- 
fering. No outer nature compels him. He chooses this be- 
cause he chooses his own perfect selfhood. He is perfect. 
His world is the best possible world. Yet all its finite regions 
know not only of joy but of defeat and sorrow, for thus 
alone in the completeness of His eternity, can God in his 
wholeness be triumphantly perfect. This I say is my thesis. 

" In the absolute oneness of God with the sufferer, in the 
concept of the suffering and therefore triumphant God, lies 
the logical solution of the problem of evil." Studies of Good 
and Evil. Prob. of Job, p. 14. 



ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE 55 

or the punishment of sin. The relation between " ma- 
lum " and " peccatum " as Augustine conceived it, we 
have already endeavored to trace. 31 But eliminating 
this false indentification from the problem, it becomes 
quite evident that Augustine has put before himself 
an insoluble problem in separating God from the suf- 
ferings and evils of man. In the last analysis, all ex- 
istence and all life, if it is to be real life, must be full 
of tension and strain. Natural evil is a necessity, if 
growth and development and victory are to follow. 
Eliminate imperfection, isolation and interference, and 
life ceases to be life. The world would be perfect but 
dead. This fact, however, does not maintain that vice 
is a necessity. It only makes it a possibility. In that 
respect Augustine is right. He recognized the possi- 
bility of sin as involved in God's permission of it 
through the gift of freedom. We cannot justify his 
separation of God from the evils and miseries of hu- 
man life. ^ ffZ&jSbh* £4MsY^¥*f< 

ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE. '^tiui 

Thus far, then, in our search for the origin of evil 
our results are mainly negative. We have seen that 
Augustine completely rejects all thought of an evil 
principle as the source and origin of evil. Likewise 
evil cannot be referred to God as its cause. Our au- 
thor is equally emphatic on both of these positions. 
We must abandon then the realm of the infinite in 
our search for an answer to the question whence is 
evil. If its source is not in an evil principle, nor in 
God, then it must lie in the creature, or in some re- 




81 Chap. I. pp. 21-26. 



56 UNDE EST MALUM ? 

m 

lationship existing between Creator and creature. 
Hither then reason urges us. In the last analysis we 
may find ourselves emerging with the same fact that 
we did when we considered his definition of evil, and 
his idea of God's relation to it, namely, freedom. 

In our search for Augustine's answer to the ques- 
tion, " Whence is Evil ? " as it is especially related 
to the creature, our thought must follow along two 
main lines. In the first instance Augustine seems 
to place the origin of evil in metaphysical imperfec- 
tion, due to creation ex nihilo. In the second instance, 
when he endeavors to go back to the very source of 
sources, he emerges with the conclusion that freedom 
of will is the source of evil. In this chapter we shall 
not attempt a discussion of the problem of freedom. 
That subject we reserve for Chapter V. In this and 
the next chapter we aim to lead up to this theme and 
to show that in it Augustine finds his ultimate con- 
clusion. 

Metaphysical Imperfection. 

In our statement of the problem of evil in Chapter 
I, we regarded it essential to Augustine's conception 
of the problem not only to state his doctrine of God 
as the sole source of all being and as the Creator of 
all nature, which in so far as it is nature is good, but 
also to refer to his doctrine of creation ex nihilo and 
its logical implication of the possibility of evil. It 
would have been unjust to his system not to have rec- 
ognized that aspect of it, at that time. We are now 
prepared to see the significance of that phase of his 
metaphysics when we come to answer the question as 
to the source of evil. It has arisen because all created 



ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE 57 

being was formed out of "nothing. At any rate that 
hypothesis accounts for the possibility of the exist- 
ence of evil. 

It is unnecessary to repeat here Augustine's idea 
that evil can arise only out of good and that its un- 
reality is only present when some nature exists to 
which it may be attached. 1 If there were no good, 
there could not possibly be any evil. 2 In fact when 
we speak of an evil or faulty being, all we mean is 
that what is good has evil attached to it. 2 In short, 
nothing can be evil unless it is good. 2 The only source 
of any evil nature is a good nature. " Ex bonis igitur 
mala orta sunt, et nisi in aliquibus bonis non sunt; 
nee erat alias unde oriretur ulla mali natura." 3 This 
is somewhat striking and paradoxical. 

How does Augustine account for it? By his doc- 
trine of creation ex nihilo. All natures, from the 
highest to the lowest, were formed by God out of 
nothing. 4 God is the one unchanging and unchange- 
able good, but all other natures are mutable because 
of creation ex nihilo. 5 Hence evil has arisen, Because 
this capacity for change, this mutability of nature, 
has involved the possibility of this nature falling away 
and tending to nonexistence. Augustine states em- 
phatically that nature could not have been corrupted, 
if it had not been made out of nothing. 6 Because it is 




1 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48, 50. Cf. Cont. Jul. Pelag. I. 38, 
and Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLIII, XLIV. 

2 Enchir. XIII. 
s Ibid. XIV. 

4 Cont. Ep. Manich. XXV. 27 et passim. 

5 Civ. Dei XII. I. et passim. Cf. pp. 5-18 of this work. 
« Ibid. XIV. 13. 



/ 



58 UNDE EST MALUM? 

the creation of God we call it nature, but because it is 
fashioned out of nothing, we must recognize its ca- 
pacity for diminution. Evil can arise in man because 
he is made from nothing. 7 This is supported by 
abundant references in his Anti-Manichean writings. 8 
Hence it is very clear that one answer which Augus- 
tine returns to the question " whence is evil ? " is that 
it arises out of the defective and mutable being of 
finite and created natures. The inequalities of being 
are due to the finiteness of created things. Thus does 
Augustine reconcile the presence of evil in the world, 
with his rigorous doctrine of creation. 9 
a A most interesting aspect of this conception is that 
which attributes an evil will to creation from nothing. 
Interesting because we find Augustine's thought grad- 
ually but rigorously leading us to the conception of 
freedom as the key to our whole problem and the cen- 
ter of his own system. In one passage, after recogniz- 
ing that evil works arise out of an evil will, he pro- 
pounds the question, " Whence arose the corrupt will 
itself?" His answer after some deviation is that it 
is due to the fact that the will was created out of 
nothing. 10 The importance, then, of this conception 



7 Op. Imp. c. Jul. XXX.-XXXIX. repeatedly. 

8 Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXVI. 41. " Primo enim brevissime 
respondere potest quaerentibus unde corruptio est, cum dicitur, 
ex eo quod hse naturae quae corrumpi possunt, non de Deo 
genitae, sed ab eo de nihilo factae sunt." 

9 Vide Ueberweg's Hist, of Phil. I. 339 (Eng. trans, by 
G. S. Morris), and Windelband's Hist, of Phil. 280 (Eng. 
trans, by J. H. Tufts). 

10 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48. Cf. also, " Cum itaque dici- 
mus, non ideo potuisse oriri ex bono malam voluntatem, quia 
bonum factum est a bono Deo sed quia de nihilo factum est, 
non de Deo." Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLIV. 



ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE 59 

is apparent. We have here the metaphysical basis 
for his answer to the question as to the origin of evil. 
That answer is founded in the imperfection attach- 
ing to all derived being. His emphasis on " ex ni- 
hilo " is but the fruit of his own time and environ- 
ment. It is doubtless the product of his opposition 
to the Manichean principle of evil. To avoid their 
conception of evil matter and compulsory creation, 
Augustine declares a doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 

Does this make evil and sin necessities? It makes 
evil necessary and sin possible. Of course, no such 
distinction as this is found in Augustine. He never 
adequately separates the two notions. His thought, 
however, is so distinct that it is most apparent that his 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo is a clear recognition of 
metaphysical imperfection and the necessity of evil. 
But to Augustine evil was sin, and to the question re- 
garding the necessity of sin he has given a definite 
answer. Julianus was not slow in charging Augustine 
with this idea. He immediately converted his doc- 
trine of creation " ex nihilo " into a doctrine advocat- 
ing the necessity of sin. In his frequent replies to 
this, Augustine is very clear and explicit in his dis- 
tinctions between the possibility and the necessity of 
sin. 

Julianus' charge is worded thus : — * Nam si ideo 
exortum est in homine malum, quia de nihilo factus 
erat, a necessario autem habuit homo ut de nihilo 
fieret; sine dubio malum non a possibili, sed a neces- 
sario recepit." al To this Augustine most fittingly re- 
sponds : " Non tibi dicitur, necessitatem peccandi 



11 Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LX. Also Cf . V. XXXI. 



60 UNDE EST MALUM? 

habuit homo, quia de nihilo factus est, sed tu tibi hoc 
dicis. Prorsus ita factus est, ut peccandi possibilita- 
tem haberet a necessario, peccatum vero a possibili : 
Verum tamen nee ipsam peccandi possibilitatem ha- 
beret, si Dei natura esset; immutabilis enim profecto 
esset, et peccare non posset. Non igitur ideo peccavit, 
sed ideo peccare potuit, quia de nihilo factus est." 12 
Here then in concise form, is Augustine's first answer. 
It is that the origin of evil lies in the creation of finite 
things out of nothing. This involves the necessity of 
evil and the possibility of sin. He is right. Evil is 
necessary to a finite world and to real life, but to 
transform these evils into ideals, to convert means 
into ends, this is sin and is not a necessity. 

Freedom. 

We approach now the other phase of Augustine's 
solution of the origin of evil. Here we find that Au- 
gustine has taken the problem and receded into the 
uncertainties and difficulties of that pre-existent world 
where he conceives evil to have originated. He 
has taken our question and mounted into the air. But 
we must follow him. It need not disturb our thought 
for we only have to conceive of the problem as placed 
one stage farther away. He has merely entered 
another room with it and if we follow him there, the 
question will be none other than if he had let us solve 
it in the arena of this life. He will use conceptions 
which our day has outgrown. He will deal with be- 
ings whose existence we need not accept. The use 
of these tools, different from our own, need not deprive 






12 Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LX. Cf. also V. XXXVIII, XXXIX, 
LV, LX. 



ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE 61 

us of the truth of his result. If his thought is freed 
from the trappings of his own age, it may reward us 
with conclusions which are at once sound and true. 

The first being upon which we come, and which is 
significant for our thought is that of " diabolus." 
This creature is the handiwork of God. " Initium 
ergo ejus (diaboli) figmentum est Domini." 13 In 
fact there is no nature, from the highest to the lowest 
which is not the work of God. 13 Thus Augustine is 
unwilling to grant to the Manicheans that even this 
being is derived from some primitive evil substance. 14 
He may be the most evil being in existence, but he 
had his beginning in God. 15 This " diabolus " is the 
author of that fatal flaw (vitium) which pervades all 
human nature. 16 Of this we cannot see the full sig- 
nificance until in Chapter IV we trace fully his concep- 
tion of the origin of evil in primitive man. Men in 
so far as they are men are God's creation, but in so 
far as they are evil are they under the control of the 
devil. 17 This hypothetical being is occasionally de- 
scribed as the origin of sin. 18 He is in no sense the 
author of nature, that is always and unreservedly the 
work of God, but he is the author of sin. 19 In other 
passages in which he is likewise denied the power to 
originate nature or being he is described as the author 
of blame or fault. 20 Still again he is described as the 



13 Civ. De ; XI. cap. XV. 

14 Civ. Dei XI. cap. XIII. 

15 Civ. Dei XI. cap. XVII. 

16 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 21, 43 fin., 49. 

17 Contra duas Ep. Pelag. I. 36. 

18 De Nat. et Grat. 33, and De Nupt. et Concup. I. 26. 

19 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 11. 

20 "Non enim naturae auctor est, quae Dei bonitate in 



62 UNDE EST MALUM? 

author of death. 21 His control over mankind is held 
through lust. 22 Augustine's whole thought of this 
being then could be summed up in the one title, 
" princeps peccatorum." 23 

We are now at the very source of sources. This be- 
ing was himself a work of God. He was originally 
good. Nay, more than this, evil was absolutely non- 
existent, it was nowhere, it had never been known or 
heard of in the universe until this being originated it. 24 
Augustine has now taken us back into that pre-existent 
timeless state and pointed to this being and said, " Evil 
was never known until this good being caused it." 
But how? If he answers that question then he an- 
swers our problem. In his times of meditation Augus- 
tine tells 25 us that he was accustomed to ponder over 
the evil propensities which clung to him and to ask 
himself whence they came. If he answered " from 
the devil," then instantly the query arose as to the 
origin of this devil, and if he by the perversity of his 
own will changed his angelic nature into that of a 
devil, what was the cause of that evil, seeing that the 
nature of every angel was the work of God? 

In these meditations Augustine has sounded the 



homine conditur ; sed culpse cum qua homo ex propagine vitia- 
torum primorum hominum de parentibus nascitur." Op. Imp. 
c. Jul. IV. LXXXIII. Cf. Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. u. 
" Quoniam diabolus culpae auctor est, non naturae." 

21 Enar. in Ps. XLIX. 2. 

22 De Agone Christiano I. 

23 De Symbolo 2. 

24 " Nonne opus diaboli quando primum in angelo, qui dia- 
bolus f actus est ortum est, in opere Dei ortum est? Qua- 
propter si malum quod omnino usquam erat, in Dei opere oriri 
potuit." De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48. 

25 Conf. VII. 5. 



ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE 63 

bottom of the problem as it shaped itself for him. If 
it was by free will that this strange and hypothetical 
being, good by nature, originated evil, then what was 
the cause of that bad will? That is the interesting 
question to which Augustine gives the answer of 
" causa deficiens " and which must be reserved for 
the chapter on freedom (V). Here our purpose is 
to make sure that Augustine did place the origin of 
evil in freedom. How then did this good being, be- 
fore whom no evil had existed, cause or originate it? 
We are ready to listen intently, for although our au- 
thor has taken us into another world and surrounded 
us by strange beings, nevertheless the answer, if 
learned, can be brought back and applied to this world. 
He does not shrink from giving us his reply. He be- 
came the author of evil when through pride, he chose 
to turn from the highest Being to himself. 26 He be- 
came the devil by the fault of his own perversity. 
" Sed cum diabolus vitio perversitatis suae factus sit 
amator potential, et desertor oppugnatorque justi- 
tiae." 27 But we need not be satisfied with these 
answers. He asserts without qualification that evil 
arose in the will of the devil. " Denique angeli 
quidam, quorum princeps est qui dicitur diabolus 
per liberum arbitrium a Domino Deo refugaa facti 
sunt." 28 And again in that work which is the very 
best product of his thought : " diabolus institutione 
illius (Dei) bonus voluntate sua malus." 29 This 
" diabolus " then was good by the creation of God, 



2 6 Enar. in Ps. XLIX. 2. 

27 De Trin. XIII. XIII. 17. 

28 De Cor. et Grat. 27. 

29 Civ. Dei XI. cap. XVII. 



64 UNDE EST MALUM ? 

but evil by his own will. In the freedom of this 
being, we find the very source of all evil By the 
act of his will evil was inaugurated. 

But this being is only one of a whole group of crea- 
tures who became evil. Their presence raises some 
very interesting questions. Inasmuch as Augustine 
has ushered us into these strange realms we may 
wisely let him shed any further light that he can on 
our question. We are satisfied in the feeling that he 
has taken us at once to the source and center of the 
whole problem, but what of these other creatures? 
In the first place they have natures, which like all na- 
ture is good. In dealing with his race of fallen 
angels, Augustine is very careful to make it clear that 
they are in no way related to the Manichean race of 
darkness which derived its origin from some source 
other than God. 30 The very fact that it was injury 
and punishment for them not to be with God, is ample 
evidence that their original nature was good. 31 If the 
fault of these beings was that they did not remain at- 
tached to their Creator, it is most evident that to re- 
main so attached was the natural and normal condi- 
tion of their nature. 31 Therefore, these evil beings, 
like their princeps, were originally good. 

Furthermore these beings were originally endowed 
with freedom. 32 But now an exceedingly interesting 
question emerges and clamors for recognition. Were 
these beings which fell, originally different from those 
which did not fall? Was evil inwrought in the very 
make of these beings, or were all the creatures in this 



30 Civ. Dei XII. 2. 
si Civ. Dei XII. 1. 
32 De Catech. Rudibus XVIII. 30. 



ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE 65 

timeless state equal ? The impression, that one inevit- 
ably gains from a careful perusal of those passages 33 
in which our author deals most elaborately with this 
question, is that he is inclined to believe that they were 
originally different, but after considerable wavering he 
comes out with the conclusion that they were orig- 
inally alike but places one important qualification upon 
this statement. In one passage 3 * he shows that there 
is doubt in his own mind upon the question, because 
he distinctly recognized the possibility of their in- 
equality and on that hypothesis tries to account for 
the difference in their choices. He does this by sup- 
posing one group to have received more of God's 
grace than the other group. 

In another passage 35 we see this doubt in a more 
pronounced form. The difference in the two 
groups is here distinctly stated. It is not made to 
consist in any difference in nature, but a difference in 
wisdom. The character of this wisdom was supposed 
to be such that it rendered the life of those beings 
which possessed it truly blessed because it gave them 
the certainty of eternal felicity. Now the two groups 
of angels are said to differ in this respect, for the fal- 
len angels could never have possessed any such wis- 
dom, while the good angels may have had the assur- 
ance which such wisdom provides. His conclusion of 
this interesting passage is this : — "In ejus tamen 
participatione sequales fuisse istos illis, qui propterea 
vere pleneque beati sunt, quoniam nequaquam de suae 
beatitudinis aeternitate falluntur quomodo dicturi 



33 Civ. Dei XII. cap. VI. VII, XI and cap. XI. seq. 
s* Ibid. XII. cap. IX. 
35 Civ. Dei XI. cap. XI. 



66 UNDE EST MALUM? 

sumus? Quando quidem si aequales in ea fuissent, 
etiam isti in ejus seternitate manissent pariter beati, 
quia pariter certi." 36 But this pronounced doubt as 
to the original difference of these two groups of be- 
ings passes into reasonable certainty in another pas- 
sage. 37 Here he states that reason bids us conclude 
that the fallen angels did not possess, even before their 
fall, that blessedness which comes from the certainty 
that present felicity will be eternal. The good angels 
did possess this happiness. We would seem then to 
find Augustine fully concluding that there was this 
clear distinction between the two groups of beings 
in their original state. But it hardly satisfied his 
" rigor and vigor." To be consistent, Augustine was 
conscious that these beings must be originally equal. 
But at the same time he must account for their dif- 
ferences. To do this, that is, to recognize at the same 
time these two sides of the problem, he asserted that 
there was no difference in their natures and origins, 
but only in their wills and desires. " Angelorum 
bonorum et malorum inter se contrarios appetitus non 
naturis principiique diversis, cum Deus omnium sub- 
stantiarum bonus auctor et conditor utrosque crea- 
verit, sed voluntatibus et cupiditatibus exstitisse, 
dubitare fas non est.'* 38 

We emerge here then with the same result as in 
the case of the devil. Not only the chief but all these 
evil beings are evil not by nature but by will. This 
is the secret of their wickedness. 89 We have, then, 



86 Ibid. XI. cap. XI. 

87 Ibid. XI. cap. XIII. 

88 Civ. Dei XII. cap. I. 2. 
ss Ibid. XI. cap. XIX 



ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE 67 

in this world to which Augustine has conducted us, 
two orders of created beings. These orders are dis- 
similar and contrary to each other. They are both 
good by nature and creation, but one group possesses 
upright wills, the other depraved wills. 40 One natu- 
rally inquires regarding the actual freedom of these 
beings. If, in any sense they were different, or un- 
equal, could the evil beings have been expected to 
choose the good? Augustine repudiates the idea that 
they did not possess absolute freedom. Evil was in 
no sense inwrought in their being, there was no ef- 
ficient cause of their falling away. One might as well 
ask to see darkness or hear silence as to know the 
cause of their defection. 41 With the following words 
he asserts their unconditioned freedom : " illi ab ea 
deficiendo mutati sunt, mala scilicet voluntate, hoc 
ipso quod a bona defecerunt: a qua non defecissent, 
si utique noluissent." 42 

Unmistakably then, evil originated in the will. In 
his discussion of the cause of the blessedness of the 
good angels and the cause of the unhappy lot of the 
fallen angels, he uses 43 the illustration of two men 
exactly alike in temperament and disposition 
being placed in the same identical environment 
but making opposite choices. The significance of 
this illustration lies in the implication that the two 
groups of angels were originally equal and placed in 
identical environments and in its clear purpose to 
show that the secret of the contrary choices lies in 



4 ° Ibid. XL cap. XXXIII. et seq. 

41 Ibid. XII. cap. VII. init. 

42 Civ. Dei XII. cap. VIII. The variant reading here would 
not alter the use of this quotation. 

« Ibid. XII. cap. VI. 



68 UNDE EST MALUM? 

the will alone and not in any cause or chain of causes 
lying back of that choice. This we say is the sig- 
nificance of this illustration here. It helps us in our 
present purpose which is to make sure that Augustine 
placed the origin of evil in the will and not else- 
where. One can hardly agree that two men with 
identical endowments and previous experiences, 
placed in identical environments would make opposite 
choices. If they were exactly alike in every particu- 
lar, causation would seem to demand the same choice 
on the part of each. Be that as it may, we are now 
ready to return to terra firma. Augustine has shown 
us that for his thought, evil originated in the will of 
that hypothetical being called " diabolus." That be- 
ing was created by God and was originally good. In 
that pre-existent state no evil was known anywhere 
until of his own free will, for which there was no ef- 
ficient cause, he chose not to adhere to God, the su- 
preme existence, and to fall away to an inferior order 
of being. That act of his will was the origin of evil. 
It may perhaps be thought that this chapter is not 
complete until we have returned to this world, and set 
forth the thought of Augustine regarding the origin 
of evil in man. Man is certainly to be numbered 
among created beings. We have been tracing the 
source of evil in the creature and have followed two 
lines of thought. We have seen in metaphysical im- 
perfection the necessity of evil and the possibility of 
sin. We have found Augustine gradually leading us 
from different points of view to the recognition of the 
fact that in freedom as the endowment of the creature 
is to be found the source of evil. We have been led 
by him into another world where he has related this 
to created beings in a timeless state. In our next 



ITS SOURCE IN THE CREATURE 69 

chapter which is logically a part of this, we will fol- 
low this same question in relation to man. It seems 
natural to divide our thought at this juncture. We 
only need to add that it is to be expected that the 
answer to our question " Whence is evil ? " will be as 
true for this world as for the one into which our 
author has led us. 



CHAPTER IV 

UNDE EST MALUM? (Continued)" 

The origin of evil in man cannot appear so catastro- 
phic as it did in the realm from which we have just 
emerged. Having penetrated into the mysteries of an 
unseen and unknown world and postulated there th« 
source of evil in the will of a hypothetical being, hav- 
ing thus broken the charmed circle of a perfect uni- 
verse which was the direct product of the creative 
power of the sole source of all being, it will not now 
be difficult to account for the origin of evil in the hu- 
man race. Having once originated this blemish of all 
creation, it can never again be so difficult to explain 
its presence in any part of the universe. It must not 
be inferred from this, however, that Augustine did not 
grapple with this same puzzle in regard to man. In 
fact, so much of his thought deals specifically with 
this aspect of the problem that it has seemed wise to 
separate it from the preceding chapter. Here again we 
shall find our author dealing with conceptions which 
our age has rejected. Evolutionary thought has 
played havoc with many spheres of knowledge, dis- 
proving hypotheses and casting various conceptions 
into an unending oblivion. So in dealing with the 
thought of Augustine we need not be surprised to 
find the same results. His anthropology is antiquated. 
His conception of primitive man, perfectly harmo- 
nious with that tendency of all peoples to look back 
upon the past and idealize some far distant period 
into a golden age, must be set aside. But, just as 

70 



REJECTS PRE-EXISTENCE 71 

in the last chapter, when dealing with the conceptions 
and being's of that strange land into which our author 
conducted us, we endeavored to overcome the impedi- 
menta of ideas alien to our own times and to sift out 
the truth, so here we may well disregard the trappings 
which hinder us and attempt to find the truth which 
lies imbedded in our author's answer to the question 
" Whence is evil ? " We naturally carry with us as 
our main purpose here, the endeavor to ascertain 
whether or not the expectations aroused in the pre- 
vious chapters will be confirmed by the investigations 
of this aspect of the problem. There we saw unmis- 
takably that Augustine conceived evil to have origi- 
nated in the freedom with which the creature was en- 
dowed. Will the same position be defended here? 
Did evil originate in man's freedom? This now is- 
our task and if we can establish in this chapter the 
conclusion that evil originated in an act of the will,, 
we shall then be prepared to deal fully with his treat- 
ment of freedom. 

REJECTS PRE-EXISTENCE THEORY. 

In our last chapter we said that we were now ready 
to return to terra firma. But, alas, just as we are 
about to realize this promise, our author makes 
another excursion into the pre-existent world for the 
sake of emerging with a negative conclusion. No 
writer living in Augustine's day and familiar with 
the writings of Plato could fail to deal with the ques- 
tion of the pre-existence of souls. In his Meno and 
Phcedrus, Plato laid the basis for this doctrine. In 
an age when it was easy to emphasize the literal to 
the exclusion of the symbolical significance of these 
passages, when Plato the poet was overshadowed 



72 UNDE EST MALUM f 

by Plato the philosopher, this doctrine was naturally 
emphasized. We need not chide Augustine for deal- 
ing with this theory in his attempt to answer the puz- 
zle of the source of evil in mankind. Origen, before 
him, had advocated this belief in a pre-existent state 
as the explanation of evil in man, while the greatest 
> dogmatic monograph 1 of the nineteenth century, after 
a most illuminating treatment of the whole problem 
of evil and sin, concludes that evil originated in the 
:hoice of the will, while man still lived in a pre-ex- 
istent and extra-temporal state. 

It is not surprising then to find Augustine dealing 
with this question. It is rather encouraging to find 
that he faced this problem and formed a conclusion 
more sound than that of either Origen or Julius Miil- 
ler. In the Confessions we find him raising the ques- 
tion of his own pre-existence but reaching no positive 
conclusion. 2 Augustine evidently found himself early 
in life swinging away from a full acceptance of the 
theory of pre-existence. He was revolving this prob- 
lem in his mind and found that the reasons presented 
for its acceptance did not fully satisfy him. In a 
much later passage of the Confessions 3 in dealing 
with the question concerning the origin of our knowl- 
edge of a happy life, he hints at this doctrine, recog- 
nizing it as one of several possibilities. Because we 
all know and seek a happy life, we must have some 



1 Die christliche Lehre von der Sunde, by Julius Miiller. 

2 "Die mihi utrum jam alicui setati mese mortuse successerit 
infantia mea : . . . Quid ante hanc etiam, dulcendo mea, 
Deus meus ? Fuine alicubi, aut aliquis ? Nam quis mihi dicat 
ista, non habeo; nee pater nee mater potuerant, nee aliorum 
experimentum nee memoria mea." Conf. I. g. 

s Ibid. X. 29. 



REJECTS PRE-EXISTENCE 73 

memory of it, and therefore must have been happy 
once. Whether this happy state was enjoyed by us 
individually or only as we existed potentially or 
seminally in the first man in his original state of per- 
fection, he is unable to decide. This clearly reveals 
Augustine's wavering attitude to the Platonic reminis- 
cence theory. 

His hostile attitude finds abundant expression. No 
philosopher claimed so fully the approval and praise 
of Augustine as did Plato, but his recollection theory 
is rejected. In his work On the Trinity 4 Augus- 
tine takes up this theory and endeavors to answer 
Plato. He refers to Plato's use of a boy to prove that 
knowledge of geometry is innate and acquired not by 
learning but by remembrance. His answer is that if 
Plato's theory were true then all of us must have been 
geometricians in that pre-existent state, but the facts 
of this life contradict that hypothesis. Rather we must 
believe, says Augustine, that the mind acquires a 
knowledge of these things by some unique inner light. 
Again, Augustine refutes the theory, that each one 
suffers in this body for the evil he did previous to this 
life, by an appeal to scripture. By a mistaken ex- 
egesis of a passage of Romans 5 he finds a direct con- 
tradiction to this theory. We must remember that 
for Augustine the scripture presented a final authority 
back of which reason could not go. We cannot un- 
derstand how a thinker to whom self-certainty had 
such weight, and to whom reason was such a servant, 
could have persuaded himself to set aside his reason 



* XII. cap. XV. 24. 
5 Rom. IX. 11, 12. 



74 UNDE EST MALUM? 

the moment he entered the sacred writings. But such 
was the case. This argument from scripture was 
doubtless the concluding proof for our author. 6 

Still again he rejects the idea of pre-existence as an 
explanation of the origin of sin, because he does not 
believe that men yet unborn have committed any act 
which will determine their moral deserts in this life. 7 
Yet he strangely asserts in the same sentence that he 
is equally certain that every individual bears the evil 
effects of the sin of the first man. In one of the 
Epistles 8 he gives three reasons why he rejects and 
protests against this reminiscence theory. In the first 
place, it is abhorrent to him to suppose that after a 
certain number of cycles the soul must return again to 
the life of flesh and endure punishment. In the sec- 
ond place, he fails to see what is to prevent the soul 
from sinning after leaving the body, if it sinned prior 
to its entrance into the body. And thirdly, in a tone 
almost of ridicule he asserts that it is one thing to have 
sinned in Adam, but to have sinned in some unknown 
realm, and then to have been thrust into Adam, that 
is, into this body, because of that sin, this is absurd and 
inconceivable. 

Furthermore, in replying to a writing of Vincentius 
Victor, Augustine boldly maintains that we will never 



6 " Neque enim sicut nonnulli secundum Platonicos opina- 
tur, hoc unius cujusque infantis animae redditur, quod ante 
istam vitam sua voluntate commisit, cum haberet ante hoc 
corpus vel bene vel male liberum vivendi arbitrium : Cum 
Paulus apostolus apertissime dicat, nondum natos nihil egisse 
boni vel mali." De Pec. Orig. 36. Cf. De Pec. Mer. et Remis. 
I. 31, and De Anima et ejus Orig. III. 9. 

7 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 33. 

8 Ep. CLXVI. 27. 



REJECTS PRE-EX1STENCE 75 

be able to know whether the soul in a pre-existent 
state chose good or evil, nor indeed can we demon- 
strate that it even existed in any such state. " Neque 
enim dicere debuit, ' quod anima meruerit peccatrix 
esse per carnem,' cujus nee bonum nee malum meritum 
reperire poterit ante carnem." 9 And, again : " an 
forte audebis earn dicere ante carnem bene vixisse, 
quam non potes ostendere vel fuisse ? " 10 We are 
now prepared to hear Augustine utterly reject the 
theory. In one passage he refers to it as " the now 
exploded and rejected opinion." X1 When dealing with 
the question of the origin of souls, he is unwilling to 
advocate any one theory as the sole truth, but he does 
not hesitate to reject completely the doctrine which 
maintains that the soul out of some pre-existent state 
is thrust into this body as the punishment for some 
action of which nothing is known. 12 Augustine's po- 
sition, then, is clear. He will not search for the origin 
of evil in man in some pre-existent state. 

In this we believe that he is wise. To postulate, 
as Julius Miiller does, a pre-existent world in order 
to account for the first evil choice, is only to carry the 
problem one stage farther away from us. It only 
shrouds the whole problem in greater obscurity and 
mystery. For if we grant the existence of this pre- 
existent world, and even if we are willing to place the 
origin of evil in some act of the will there, that leaves 
the problem just where it was when we started. To 
recede, therefore, into this unknown realm, is to take 



9 De Anima et ejus Orig. II. 12. 

10 Ibid. III. 9. 

11 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 31. 

12 Ep. CLXIV. 20. Cf. also De Anima et ejus Orig. I. 6 
and 34. 



76 UNDE EST MALUM? 

our problem and " jump overboard with it." The prob- 
lem is lost, not solved. Consequently we accept Au- 
gustine's conclusions here. But one cannot fail to ap- 
ply this same line of reasoning to that world of crea- 
tures into which our author introduced us in Chapter 
III. Both realms must vanish together. The very 
arguments that Augustine has marshaled against the 
implications and theories based on the Platonic doc- 
trine of reminiscence apply with equal force to his 
own " diabolus " and evil angels. Of course, Au- 
gustine's answer is not far to seek. He would find 
his sole and final reply in the authority of scripture, 
for it must be recognized as a source of knowledge 
alongside and even in precedence of reason and ex- 
perience. 

But not only does Augustine's rejection of the pre- 
existence theory involve him in the contradiction just 
set forth, but also it raises the question as to whether 
he has not virtually adopted this theory when he has 
made Adam the whole human race in potentiality, and 
made every individual responsible for Adam's evil 
choice. This aspect of our problem will be more 
fully developed in the positive portion of this chapter. 
At any rate, there is an apparent contradiction in 
Augustine's rejection of the theory of reminiscence 
and his defense of the pre-existent world of angels 
as well as his elaborate conception of the representative 
capacity of the first man. Thus far we have seen 
that Augustine does not find the origin of evil in 
man in any act committed in some pre-existent world, 
as a consequence of which the soul was thrust into the 
body. His opposition does not lie so much in a re- 
jection of the idea of freedom in that pre-existent 
state or of the origin of evil in some act of the will, 



REJECTS FLESH THEORY 77 

(for this we are finding to be his own explanation of 
the problem), as it does in a denial of any such state 
of existence whatever and especially of our knowledge 
of it. 



REJECTS FLESH THEORY. 

Reason forces us, then, to abandon these specula- 
tions regarding unseen and unknown realms, and to 
search for the origin of evil in man in the world and 
life which lie about us. We have now cleared away 
every possible hypothesis and are driven out of pre- 
temporal and eternal worlds into this world of sense 
and change. If man's evil did not originate out of 
this life it must have originated in it. But before we 
can come to Augustine's positive contribution we must 
observe that there are other prominent theories of the 
origin of evil in man which he rejected. Not only 
did Augustine refuse to receive the idea of the origin 
of evil in man in a pre-existent state, but he also de- 
nied the theory that evil originated in man's sensuous 
nature. There is need of careful discrimination at 
this point. We are now searching for the origin, not 
the seat nor instrument of evil. No little confusion 
has arisen in regard to Augustine on this very point. 
It would doubtless startle some to read the statement 
that Augustine did not place the origin of evil in the 
flesh. A casual reading of almost any writing of 
Augustine's would lead one to suppose that there is 
just where he did place it. The experience of his 
own early life influenced all of Augustine's later 
thought and he never failed to portray the evils of the 
flesh. His constant use of the word " concupiscentia " 
as a description of sin shows how he emphasized the 



78 UNDE EST MALUM? 

class of sins due to our sensuous nature and accounts 
for the false interpretation which has often been placed 
upon his theory. For example, Baumgarten Crusius x 
has advocated the idea that Augustine regarded the 
flesh as the origin of evil. 

In order to make clear our contention here, it will 
be necessary briefly to set forth how Augustine did 
conceive of the apparent connection between the flesh 
and sin. It would be equally unjust to Augustine to 
maintain that he regarded man's body as a negligible 
quantity in the problem of evil and sin. In the life 
of the individual to-day, his physical body is a very 
potent factor in his moral life. But, argues Augus- 
tine, we must carefully avoid the logical fallacy of in- 
terpreting the effect as the cause of sin. This is ex- 
actly the error of those who suppose that Augustine 
placed the origin of evil in man's sensuous nature. As 
a Manichean, there is no question but that Augustine 
regarded the flesh as necessarily involving defilement. 2 
But after he had passed over to the acceptance of 
Christianity, this notion was repudiated. Fairness 
compels us to recognize that our author did regard 
the body as a burden to the soul. 3 Here his thought 
is clearly traceable to the book of Wisdom* where 
our corruptible body and earthly frame is regarded as 
a weight upon the soul and mind. In his Anti- 
Pelagian writings where we find so much discussion 
of the possibility and actuality of a perfectly sinless 



1 Lehrbuch der Sittenlehre, p. 220. 

2Conf. V. 20. 

3 " Corpus enim quod corrumpitur aggravat animam. Per 
quod fit etiam saepe ut invicte delectet quod non licet." De 
Diver. Qusest. I. 13. Cf. De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 12. 

4 Wisdom of Solomon IX. 15. 



REJECTS FLESH THEORY 79 

life, our author goes so far as to state that, although 
man's nature is good, it is impossible for it to be 
free from evil so long as the soul is hampered by the 
body. 

It is perfectly clear, as we shall see in the next 
section of this chapter, that Augustine held stoutly 
to the possibility of perfection, but to the denial of 
its actuality. The cause of the failure to realize this 
possibilty is the body. 5 Similarly we find him main- 
taining that no matter how perfect a man's life may 
become and how sure he may be of his eternal felicity, 
nevertheless he carries about a corrupt body which 
weighs down his soul and conditions all his actions. 6 
We find this aspect of his doctrine of the flesh carried 
to its fullest expression in the assertion that so long 
as man is in the flesh, certain light sins are necessary. 
" Quia non potest homo quamdiu carnem portat, nisi 
habere vel levia peccata." 7 The peccati lex in mem- 
bris, which is so easily interpreted as the origin of 
sin, he regards merely as the weight or burden of 
mortality. 8 At another time he interprets it as a 
certain charm or allurement of the flesh. 9 But the 
significant point here is this. This law of sin in the 
members is for Augustine not the origin but the pun- 
ishment of sin; it is not the cause but the effect of 
evil. " Quod in potestate non est ne concupiscat, 



5 " Respondemus, et naturam hominis bonam esse, et earn 
malo carere posse. Nam ideo clamamus, Libera nos a malo: 
quod non perficitur, quamdiu corpus quod corrumpitur, ag- 
gravat animam." De Perf. Just. Horn. VI. 14. 

6 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 12. 

7 In Ep. Joan. Tract. I. 6. 

8 " Legem appellat in membris suis, onus ipsum mortahtatis 
in quo ingemiscimus gravati." De Diver. Quaest. I. 13. 

9 De Genesi ad Lit. X. 21. 



80 UNDE EST MALUM? 

quamdiu inest peccatum in membris, id est violentia 
qusedam carnis illecebra in corpore mortis hujus, ven- 
iens de vindicta, illius peccati, unde propaginem duci- 
mus — ." 10 The evils of the flesh are due to originale 
peccatum and consuetudo, and are not originated by 
the body. These evils are the results not the causes 
of sin. 11 We see then that Augustine recognizes the 
potency of the flesh for evil, but that so far as our 
search now is concerned there are clear and indubita- 
ble indications that he did not regard our sensuous 
nature as the source of evil. 

But we need not rest content with the statement that 
the evils of the flesh are the effects and not the cause 
of sin. Our author passes on into a positive defense 
of the flesh. This we could easily anticipate as a 
natural corollary of his metaphysical conception that 
all things in so far as they exist are good. Conse- 
quently he repudiates the Manichean notion that flesh 
is inherently evil. 12 Instead of attacking as did the 
Manicheans, he defends marriage. 13 In one of the 



10 De Genesi ad Lit. X. 21. 

11 " Quod si quaerit aliquis unde hoc scit, quod dicit habitare 
in came sua non utique bonum id est peccatum : unde, nisi 
ex traduce mortalitatis et assiduate voluptatis? Illud est ex 
poena originalis peccati, hoc est ex poena frequentati peccati. 
Cum illo in hanc vitam nascimur, hoc vivendo addimus. 
Quae duo, scilicet, tanquam natura et consuetudo, conjuncta, 
robustissimam faciunt et invictissimam cupiditatem, quod 
vocat peccatum, et dicit habitare in carne sua, id est, domina- 
tum quemdam et quasi regnum obtinere." De Diver. Quaest. 
I. 10. 

12 " Quo igitur, non dico, errore, sed prorsus furore, Ma- 
nichaei carnem nostram nescio cui fabulosae genti tribuunt 
tenebrarum, quam volunt suam sine ullo initio malam semper 
habuisse naturam." De Continentia 22. 

13 De Bono Conj. passim. Also De Nupt. et Concup. II. 38. 



REJECTS FLESH THEORY 81 

Letters 14 he objects to death being considered a 
separation of good and evil. For if this is the case, 
then God who united (commiscuit) the body and soul 
is either evil or controlled by the fear of one who is 
evil. But this is absurd. On the contrary Augustine 
contends that both the spirit and the flesh are good. 16 
The flesh is classed among the changeable goods of 
creation, but this only means that in its own degree 
it is good. In the City of God we read : " Non 
igitur opus est in peccatis vitiisque nostris ad Creatoris 
injuriam carnis accusare naturam, quse in genere, 
atque ordine suo bona est." 16 This whole passage, 17 
to which we shall have further occasion to refer, deals 
with the point now under consideration and leaves no 
possibility of doubt regarding Augustine's defense 
of the flesh. 

We are now interested to learn how Augustine will 
reconcile the statement that the body is a burden to 
the soul and makes some forms of sin necessary, with 
the assertion that the flesh is a good. This he does 
in a way entirely consistent with his whole theory of 
evil. In Chapter II we saw that evil existed only be- 
cause it attached itself to some good nature. Thus 
alone can it transform its negativity and sham exist- 
ence into seeming reality. So here the flesh was 
originally good. 18 Of this we shall see the indubitable 



14 Ep. LXXIX. 

15 " Prorsus ista duo ambo sunt bona ; et spiritus bonum 
est, et caro bonum; et homo qui ex utroque constat, uno 
imperante, alio serviente, utique bonum est, sed mutabile 
bonum." De Continentia 18. 

16 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. V. init. 

17 Ibid. cap. II. to V. 

18 De Continentia 21. 



82 UNDE EST MALUM ? 

evidence when our author's conception of the first 
man is delineated in the positive portion of this chap- 
ter. The fact that there is conflict between the flesh 
and the spirit, argues Augustine, is due not to the 
supposed union of two natures or hostile principles, 
but rather to internal strife within one nature due to 
the first sin. This condition did not exist in the first 
man before he had made choice of creatura instead of 
Creator. 19 Our author claims that originally the 
flesh was good and the inner discord and strife be- 
tween the flesh and the spirit is the effect and not the 
cause of sin. 

What then does give the flesh its seeming potency 
for evil? Every person is conscious that in some 
very marked way the body is related to sin. Au- 
gustine endeavors to answer this by saying that it is 
not the flesh but its corruption that gives it such 
driving power in the moral realm. We may well note 
that his negative idea of evil is assuming a distinctly 
active connotation. When the power of the flesh for 
evil is placed not in the flesh but in its corruption, then 
this blemish, this vitium, has been metamorphosed 
into an active principle. But that this is his explana- 
tion needs proof. In that short treatise from which 
we have already quoted we find this significant state- 
ment : " Non igitur mala est caro, si malo careat, id 
est, vitio quo vitiatus est homo, non factus male, sed 



19 " Quod ergo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, quod 
non habitat in carne nostra bonum, quod lex in membris 
nostris repugnat legi mentis, non est duarum naturarum ex 
contrariis principiis facta commixtio, sed unius adversus se 
ipsam propter peccati meritum facta divisio. Non sic fuimus 
in Adam, antequam natura suo deceptore audito ac secuto, 
suum contempsisset atque offendisset auctorem." De Con- 
tinentia 2\, 



REJECTS FLESH THEORY 83 

ipse faciens." 20 The evil of the flesh then consists in 
that flaw or fault which is the result of man's own 
action. More significant still is this statement taken 
from our author's best work. " Quod si quisquam 
dicit, carnem causam esse in malis moribus quorum 
cumque vitiorum, eo quod anima carne affecta sic vivit, 
profecto non universam hominis naturam diligenter 
advertit. — Et aggravamur ergo corruptibili corpore, 
et ipsius aggravationis causam, non naturam sub- 
stantiamque corporis, sed ejus corruptionem scientes, 
nolumus corpore exspoliari, sed ejus immortalitati 
vestiri. — Verum tamen qui omnia animae mala ex 
corpore putant accidisse, in errore sunt." 21 The 
statement could not be more explicit. Our soul is 
weighed down with a corruptible body, but the cause 
of that burdensomeness is not the nature of the body 
but its " corruptio." But we must remember that 
for Augustine this corruption is the result, effect, or 
punishment, of the first sin, and therefore we must 
avoid the error of supposing it to be the origin of 
sin. 

It is of interest to note some of the arguments put 
forth by Augustine to substantiate his defense of the 
goodness of the flesh in itself. He points to the es- 
sential sinlessness of Jesus as an evidence that real 
flesh does not cause sin. 22 The admonition of St. 
Paul that Christians should seek for that peace typi- 
fied by the relationship of the various members of 
the body would be absurd if the body were totally 
evil. 23 Furthermore if we attribute to the flesh all 



20 De Continentia 20. 

21 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. III. 

22 De Continentia 24. 

23 Ibid. 24. 



84 UNDE EST MALUM ? 

the sins and vices of this life then we permit that 
" diabolus " to go free of all these evils for he has no 
flesh. 24 And finally, there remains no doubt about 
our author's position when he asserts that both spirit 
and flesh will continue forever. 25 This is especially 
significant when we bear in mind that existence is 
synonymous with goodness. 

It now remains to show how adroitly our author 
transfers this whole idea of the flesh as the origin 
of sin over into a region which makes it entirely com- 
patible with his own explanation of the origin of 
evil. He so interprets the term " caro " that he brings 
this whole doctrine into line with his theory of the 
origin of evil in freedom. Flesh, Augustine argues, 
means self. " Se itaque dicit esse carnem suam. 
Non ergo ipsa est inimica nostra : et quando ej us 
vitiis resistitur, ipsa amatur, quia ipsa curatur." 26 
But not only when explaining the words of scripture 
as in the quotation just given, but when describing 
his own experiences he interprets the prompting of 
flesh as originating in self. 27 Furthermore he says 
that the inner discord in his heart was only self against 
self. 28 Finally, our author describes the inner battle 
against the flesh as a conflict with self. 29 All men 



z* Civ. Dei XIV. cap. III. 

23 " Sed permanebunt in seternum substantia bonse spiritus 
et caro, quas Deus bonus et immutabilis bonas, quamvis muta- 
biles condidit." De Continentia 21. 

26 De Continentia. 19. 

27 " Sic intelligebam, meo ipso experimento, id quod legeram 
quomodo caro concupisceret adversus spiritum, et spiritus ad- 
versus carnem. Ego quidem in utroque." Conf. VIII. cap. 
V. 11. 

28 " Ista controversia in corde meo, non nisi de me ipso ad- 
versus meipsum." Conf. VIII. cap. XL 27. 

29 De Continentia 29. 



REJECTS FLESH THEORY 85 

since Adam have struggled against the flesh, but the 
first man is described as free from the conflict of self 
against self. 30 Man assumes an evil character not 
because he has flesh but because he lives according 
to himself. 31 

Again, in direct line with this interpretation of 
flesh as self, we find Augustine maintaining that it 
is the sinful soul that makes the flesh evil. " Nam 
corruptio corporis quae aggravat animam, non peccati 
primi est causa sed poena ; nee caro corruptibilis animam 
peccatricem, sed anima peccatrix fecit esse corrupti- 
bilem carnem." 32 Not only do we find in this asser- 
tion that Augustine regarded the corruptible body as 
the punishment of sin, but also that it is the soul that 
has caused this very corruption. In fact, the flesh 
serves as the means by which the soul lusts. 33 It is 
the soul } then, that lusts and not the flesh. Augustine 
has thus led us around from the idea of the sensuous 
nature as the source of sin to the conception that sin 
originates in self. We have seen that in the first 
place he interpreted flesh as self and then pointed out 
that it is the soul that lusts by means of the flesh. 
It is, therefore, only a natural inference to assert that 
evil originates in self. All things that man possesses 
come from God. Sin alone is man's creation. 34 
Whatever good we have comes from the Creator, 
whatever of evil, from one's self. 35 The fact that 



30 De Cor. et Grat. 29. 

3i Civ. Dei XIV. cap. III. 

32 Conf. XIV. cap. III. 

33 " Non enim caro sine anima concupiscit, quamvis caro 
concupiscere dicatur, quia carnaliter anima concupiscit." De 
Perf. Jus. Horn. VIII. 19. Also De Continentia 19. 

34 Enar. In Ps. CII. 4 and CXLII. 5. 

35 Sermo CLXXVI. 6, 



86 UNDE EST MALUM? 

all men and all beings were created good, shows that 
they must go astray of themselves. 36 When men 
yearn to be free from evil they simply seek deliver- 
ance from self. 37 Self then is the origin of sin. Au- 
gustine is very emphatic about this. He exclaims, I 
myself, neither fate, nor chance, nor the devil com- 
pelled me, but / consented to my sin. 38 He exhorts 
his listeners to fear no enemy from without. Con- 
quer thine own self, and thou hast mastered the 
world. 39 Both body and soul were created good, and 
all the evil is the result of man's own action. 40 We 
are evil then, through our own making. 

While our main purpose at this point is to show 
that Augustine rejected the notion that sin originated 
in man's sensuous nature, we may well observe that 
our author's main conclusion here is sound. To be 
sure much that he has said about the flesh seems 
beside the point. He approached the problem from 
a point of view entirely different from that of present 
day thinkers. When, in his effort to recognize the 
power of the sensuous nature without making it the 
origin of sin in man, he draws the distinction that 
fleshy passions and impulses are the effects and not the 
causes of the first sin, he resorts to an argument 
which becomes meaningless in the light of evolution- 



36 De Bapt. c. Donat. IV. 9. 

37 " Quid est quod clamasti, Libera nos a malo ? Certe non 
est malum? Responde illi; ego suum malus; et si liberaverit 
me a malo, ero de malo bonus : liberet me a me, ne incurram 
in te." Sermo CLXXXII. 4. Cf. also ibid. 5. 

38 Enar. in Ps. XXXII. 17. 

ss Sermo LVII. 

40 "Ex utraque enim parte, id est, et anima et corpore a 
bono Deo factus bonus, ipse fecit malum quo factus est 
malus." De Continentia 20. 



REJECTS FLESH THEORY 87 

ary thought. But when he argues that the flesh is 
not the cause of sin, we must agree with him. While 
he contends that the flesh was originally good, we 
must hold that the body with all its passions and in- 
stincts was originally neither good nor bad. It was 
neutral. It was the material out of which the de- 
veloping individual by the use of freedom made either 
a good or a bad life. This difference, however, does 
not vitiate his main contention that the origin of evil 
cannot be placed in the flesh but must be referred to 
the ego. For him to have placed the origin of evil 
in man's sensuous nature would have introduced a 
note of discord into his whole theory of evil, and would 
have been inconsistent with his entire metaphysical 
conception of being and creation. If sense were the 
origin of evil, then all sensuous existence involved 
evil. He has wisely interpreted " caro " to mean self 
and has thereby transferred this whole doctrine into 
the realm of freedom. The evils of the flesh are 
recognized, but for Augustine they are the effect and 
not the cause or origin of sin. By this devise, Au- 
gustine has accounted for the power of the body and 
at the same time resorted to no theory which will 
be inconsistent with his own answer to the question 
of the origin of evil in. man. By placing the origin 
of evil in self, he has left the way open to answer his 
question just as he did when dealing with the pre- 
existent world of angels. He can still explain the be- 
ginning of evil in man by his use of freedom. We 
therefore emerge from his discussion of the theory 
which would place the derivation of evil in man's 
sensuous nature, with another negative conclusion. 
Evil in man, argues our author, did not originate 
either in a pre-existent state from which the soul has 



88 UNDE EST MALUM? 

been thrust, as a punishment, into a body of flesh, 
nor can it be explained by an appeal to this same 
sensuous nature. 



REJECTS CONTRAST THEORY. 

There remains one more historic explanation of 
the derivation of evil with which we must deal be- 
fore we pass on to the endeavor to establish our main 
contention, namely, that Augustine placed the origin 
of man's evil in freedom. Thus far in this chapter 
our conclusions have been chiefly negative. We have 
seen that in his later thought Augustine completely 
discarded the pre-existence theory, and while recog- 
nizing that man's sensuous nature could not be as 
summarily dismissed as an explanation of the origin 
of evil, he so transformed the meaning of the term 
" caro " that the whole theory was brought into line 
with his own explanation. In other words, we found 
that before he gave his negative conclusion against 
the flesh theory, certain qualifications or interpreta- 
tions were necessary. Interpreters of Augustine are 
not wanting who advocate the theory that man's 
sensuous nature was regarded by him as the source 
of evil. But if in dealing with the flesh theory, we 
found it necessary to advance somewhat fully our 
evidence for believing that Augustine rejected it as an 
explanation of the origin of evil, in our treatment of 
the theory now to be discussed we will find ourselves 
upon even more doubtful ground. But here, too, we 
contend without qualification that Augustine rejected 
this theory. Having established this contention, we 
will then be prepared to pass on to the final and con- 
structive section of this chapter, and will then be face 






REJECTS CONTRAST THEORY 89 

to face with his whole treatment of the problem of 
freedom. 

The theory to which we refer is that which finds 
an explanation of the origin of evil in the contrasts of 
individual life. A cursory glance at the world, says 
this theory, suggests at once that all life arises from 
contrasts. This suggestion finds further support in 
the varied contrasts of nature. Light and darkness, 
cold and heat, sound and silence, each acquires dis- 
tinctness and meaning in its opposite. It is to be ex- 
pected, therefore, that in the moral sphere the same 
contrast will be apparent. Evil will exist as the foil 
of the good. Goodness will find its vigor and reality 
because of the presence of evil. Evil will exist for the 
sake of the good and as its necessary contrast and 
correlate. Just as the beauty of the picture depends 
upon the distribution of light and shade, so man's 
moral life comes to full expression only in the con- 
trast of good and evil. This is the purpose of evil, 
to serve as a mirror in which moral good is reflected. 
When the artist portrays a scene he paints the shade 
and darkness not for the sake of the darkness itself, 
but in order to put the light in its proper setting. 

So evil is the necessary concomitant of good. In 
the individual life, the attainment of virtue is impos- 
sible, without the presence of evil. It exists to be 
overcome, to be subordinated, to be resisted, and in 
this struggle the individual acquires sturdiness of 
virtue and strength of character. This theory is 
elaborately stated by Dr. Julius Miiller. 1 So elabo- 
rately and with such fairness, indeed, that one of his 
hasty critics supposed that it was Dr. Miiller's own 



1 Die christliche Lehre von der Sunde B. II. C. IV. 



go UNDE EST MALUM? 

doctrine. The theory demands recognition here be- 
cause Dr. Muller finds elements of it in the writings 
of Augustine, but does not offer any full statement 
or final decision as to our author's position. Dr. 
Muller rejects the contrast theory because it makes 
evil a necessity. His treatment is somewhat vitiated 
by the fact that he constantly interprets evil as sin 
and rightly insists that we cannot admit the necessity 
of sin. This same confusion of terms in Augustine 
renders it difficult to pronounce upon his position, but 
we believe sufficient proof can be given to show that 
he did not accept this theory as an explanation of the 
origin of evil in the individual. 

Fairness compels us to recognize the presence of 
that element in the thought of Augustine which has 
led some to regard him as a supporter of this theory. 
When Prin. Fairbairn says of Augustine, " So he 
argued, as the Stoics had done, that evil is needed 
to enhance the beauty and the glory of the world," 2 he 
states a view which may be supported by citations from 
certain writings of our author, but which is very 
liable to give a false impression of his doctrine as a 
whole. Let us then, endeavor to trace Augustine's 
real position regarding this contrast theory. In the 
City of God he points out that contrasts and antitheses 
in speech are regarded by rhetoricians as the most 
beautiful ornaments of language. So, too, argues 
Augustine, the existence of evil in the world is used 
by the Creator to embellish the course of the ages. 
Thus the life of the world may be compared to a 
beautiful poem, whose beauty lies in the opposition 



2 The Phil, of the Chr. Relig. p. 101. 



REJECTS CONTRAST THEORY 91 

of contraries and whose eloquence consists not in the 
antitheses of words, but of things. 3 

In another passage we find this idea given even 
more definite expression. 4 It is explicitly stated that 
when evil is put in its proper place, it only increases 
our admiration of the good and enables us, by com- 
parison with itself more fully to enjoy and value the 
good. In fact Augustine himself uses the illustration 
drawn from art. Just as the shade increases the 
beauty of the picture, so too, the presence of sinners 
in the universe renders it more beautiful to those who 
have the skill to see it. 5 This, however, is not to be 
so interpreted as to minimize the fact that sin and 
its adherents are -the blemish of creation. Closely 
similar to this comparison is the statement that just 
as darkness cannot be seen but is thought of in com- 
parison with light, so sin cannot be distinguished by 
the intellect, but is made clear by the light of right- 



3 " Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico Angelorum, sed vel 
hominum crearet, quern malum futurum esse praescisset, nisi 
pariter nosset quibus eos bonorum usibus commodaret, atque 
ita ordines sseculorum tanquam pulcherrimum carmen ex 
quibusdam quasi antithetis honestaret. Antitheta enim quae 
appellantur, in ornamentis elocutionis sunt decentissima, quae 
latine appellantur opposita, vel quod expressius dicitur, con- 
traposita. . . . Sicut ergo ista contraria contrariis opposita 
sermonis pulchritudinem reddunt; ita quadam, non verborum, 
sed rerum eloquentia contrariorum oppositione saeculi pul- 
chritudo componitur." Civ. Dei XL cap. XVIII. 

4 " In qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum 
et loco suo positum, emmentius commendat bona, ut magis 
placeant et laudabiliora sint dum comparantur malis ? " En- 
chir. XL 

5 " Quoniam sicut pictura cum colore nigro, loco suo posita, 
ita universitas rerum si quis possit intueri, etiam cum pecca- 
toribus pulchra est, quamvis per se ipsos consideratos sua 
deformitas turpet." Civ. Dei XL cap. XXIII. 1 fin. 



93 UNDE EST MALUM ? 

eousness. 6 These ideas do, without question seem to 
suggest the theory with which we are now dealing 
and are doubtless responsible in part for the belief that 
he used this theory to explain the origin of evil. 

Closely allied to these ideas, moreover, is the con- 
ception put forth in the Confessions, 7 that to God 
nothing whatsoever is evil. What we account to be 
evil is only that which fails to harmonize with its sur- 
roundings ; whereas if we only were aware of it this 
supposed evil does harmonize with other things and is 
therefore good. Consequently of these evils, Augustine 
will not say that they ought not to exist. " Et absit jam 
ut dicerem, non essent ista." 8 But he does not pause 
here. His universe is theocentric. Nothing is here 
contrary to the will of God. We cannot doubt but 
that God's permission of evil serves some good pur- 
pose. Consequently, although evil in so far as it is 
evil cannot be called a good, nevertheless the existence 
of evil must be a good otherwise it would not be 
permitted by omnipotent goodness. 9 The existence of 
evil then is made to serve some good purpose. 

We must observe carefully that in no sense has our 
author said that this is the explanation of the origin 
of evil. It is only the effort, after evil is once here, 
to find some meaning in its existence. It is the fail- 



6 Prop. ex. Ep. ad Rom. Exp. XLII (in VII. 15, 13). 
7 Conf. VII. 19. 

8 Conf. VII. 19. This suggests the statement of Professor 
Paulsen that " evils are not things that ought absolutely not 
to be." System of Ethics, E. T. p. 322. 

9 " Quamvis ergo ea quae mala sunt, in quantum mala sunt, 
non sint bona; tamen ut non solum bona, sed etiam sint et 
mala, bonum est. Nam nisi esset hoc bonum, ut essent et 
mala, nullo modo esse sinerentur ab omnipotente bono." En- 
chir. XCVI. 



REJECTS CONTRAST THEORY 93 

ure to observe just this distinction that has led to a 
false interpretation of Augustine at this point. Now 
to apply this theory to man would mean that no one 
in this life is without evil. Consequently, when in 
his controversy with Pelagianism he asserted repeat- 
edly that no one in this life is without sin, 10 it is easy 
and natural to suppose that we have the confirmation 
of this theory. At times, it seems that Augustine is 
willing to commit himself to a belief in the necessity 
of sin. In one passage, for instance, he says that the 
very fact that we are men makes it impossible for us 
to say that we have not sinned. 11 For the mere fact 
that we are in this life, vitiated by the evil choice 
of primitive man, makes it impossible for us not to 
sin daily. 12 

We now have before us all the material which 
could be cited in defense of the hypothesis that Au- 
gustine endeavored to account for the origin of evil 
in man by an appeal to this contrast theory. This 
material is sufficient to enable us to understand readily 
why our author has been so interpreted. Should we 
pause here, however, we would fail to understand why 
Augustine has made these statements. We may grant 
that this theory did appeal to Augustine for in it there 
is a truth which must be recognized, but that truth 
does not demand that we place here the origin of evil. 
In fact as we have already suggested, and especially 
in the light of what remains to be said, the foregoing 



10 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 8 init. "Si autem quod 
secundo loco posueram, quaeratur utrum sit, esse non credo." 
Cf. also ibid. II. 18, 25, 47. Also, De Spir. et Lit. 1, 2, 65. 
De Nat. et Grat. 45. Enchir. LXIV. Sermo CLXXXI. 2. 
Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. L. et passim. 

" De Cons. Evang. II. XXV. 

12 Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 28. 



94 UNDE EST MALUM? 

statements of Augustine were made in the endeavor to 
see some purpose and meaning in evil, after it has 
assumed its place in the universe. There is no in- 
tention here to account for the origin of evil in man. 
We see Augustine's real attitude to this theory in 
a striking passage in his work On the Trinity}* In it 
he states both his belief as to the origin of evils and 
also his conception of their purpose in the life of man. 
Here in the compass of a few sentences we see him 
declaring that evils exist for the sake of the good, 
for the development of character and the exercise 
of virtue, but that they have come into existence as 
the punishment of sin, and especially of original sin. 
These evils then, Augustine here expressly declares 
do not owe their origin to the necessity of the moral 
contrast of good and evil but are instead, the direct 
deserts of sin. The origin of evil then must be ac- 
counted for by some other theory. But when once 
present these evils have remained to be resisted, con- 
quered and cast down. We see here a peculiar blend- 
ing of truth and error, but for the present our con- 
cern is this : to establish the contention that Augus- 
tine did not derive evil from the contrasts of life. 13 
But our evidence need not be based solely on this 
passage. It is used simply because it shows clearly 
how Augustine reconciled what might otherwise seem 



13 " Quamvis enim et ipsa mors carnis de peccato primi 
hominis originaliter venerit, tamen bonus ejus usus gloriosissi- 
mos martyres fecit. Et ideo non solum ipsa, sed omnia 
saeculi hujus mala, dolores laboresque hominum, quamquam 
de peccatorum, et maxime de peccati originalis meritis veniant, 
unde facta est et ipsa vita vinculo mortis obstricta, tamen 
et remissis peccatis remanere debuerunt, cum quibus homo 
pro veritate certaret, et unde exerceretur virtus fidelium." 
De Trin. XIII. XVI. 20. 



REJECTS CONTRAST THEORY 95 

contradictory elements of his thought. 14 This citation 
must be given great weight because in it he is dealing 
at one and the same time with both the origin of evil 
and this contrast theory, and consequently has placed 
them in their true relationship for his thought. We 
now see that the multitudinous references in which 
Augustine recognizes the purposes of evils can in no 
sense be interpreted as efforts to account for the 
origin of evil. So when Augustine declares that evils 
exist to show how God could make good use of them, 16 
or for the purpose of training, 16 of testing/ 7 of teach- 
ing, 18 of cleansing, 19 and of developing 20 mankind, 
he is only endeavoring to find meaning in what already 
exists and not to account for its derivation. 

Any doubt which may now remain as to Augus- 
tine's rejection of this theory as an explanation of the 
origin of evil in man will be dispelled by again re- 
ferring to his metaphysical conceptions of good and 
evil. In Chapter II when dealing with our author's 



14 That our author regarded evils as the deserts or punish- 
ments of sin has been amply set forth in the first chapter 
of this work. Vid. pp. 21-26. 

15 Civ. Dei XIV. n, Ep. CLXVI. 15, De Nat. et Grat. 27. 
On this point of Augustine's thought, A. H. Newman says : 
" God would not have permitted evil unless by his own su- 
preme power he had been able to make good use of it. He 
(Augustine) attempts, with some success, to show the advan- 
tages of the permission of evil in the world." Nicene and 
Post-Nicene Fath. IV. p. 30. 

16 Enar. in Ps. XXXVII. 24, Sermo XV. 5, 9. 

« De Perf. Just. Horn. XI. 26, De Trin. XIII. XVI. 20, 
In Joan. Evang. Tract. VII. 7, Ep. CXXXI. 

18 De Cor. et Grat. 24, Conf. II. 4. 

"Sermones LXII, LXXXI. 7, Civ. Dei I. 8, De Agon? 
Christ. 8. 

20 Sermo LXXX. 8, De Perf. Just. Horn. XI. 27, De Grat. 
et Lib. Arbit 41, Civ. Dei XXII. 23, Ep. CXXX. 26. 



96 UNDE EST MALUM ? 

definition of evil we saw unmistakably that evil has 
no real existence of its own. Evil cannot exist with- 
out good. 21 Its seeming reality finds expression only 
as it is attached to some good. This in itself completely 
contradicts the theory under consideration which de- 
mands evil in order to give vigor and reality to the good. 
The theory, however, is completely driven from the 
field by the assertion of our author that although evil 
cannot exist without the good, good on the other 
hand can exist without evil. " Bona tamen sine malis 
esse possint." 22 

It only remains to show that our author made simi- 
lar statements regarding man and extended these ab- 
stract metaphysical conceptions until the same princi- 
ple was asserted to hold good in the life of the indi- 
vidual, in order to establish our contention that Au- 
gustine rejected the contrast theory. We have al- 
ready pointed out and cited ample references to show 
that Augustine in his Anti-Pelagian writings insisted 
that no man lives a sinless life. This, however, did 
not preclude the assertion on the part of our author 
that there is the possibility 23 of a sinless life. If that 
is so then our author did not find in evil the necessary 
correlate of good. 



21 " Mala vero sine bonis esse non possint, quoniam naturae 
in quibus sunt, in quantum naturae sunt, utique bonae sunt." 
Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XL i. 

22 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XI. i. Cf. also Enchir. XIV : " Cum 
autem bona et mala nullus ambigat esse contraria, non solum 
simul esse possunt, sed mala omnino sine bonis et nisi in 
bonis esse non possunt, quamvis bona sine malis possint." 

23 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 7. " Si a me quaeratur, utrum 
homo sine peccato possit esse in hac vita ; confitebor posse 
i^er Dei gratiam et liberum ejus arbitrium." Same thought 
in De Spir. et Lit. 66 and De Perf. Just. Horn. VII. 16. 



REJECTS CONTRAST THEORY 97 

Here then we emerge from another discussion with 
a negative conclusion. We cannot with justice fail 
to recognize that in this contrast theory there is a 
large element of truth, but that truth does not relate to 
the phase of our problem now under investigation: 
viz., the origin of evil. If Augustine had clearly dis- 
tinguished evil and sin, if he had seen the necessary 
logical implication of his metaphysical conception of 
creation ex nihilo, he would have reached different 
results in dealing with the theory now under dis- 
cussion. But for him evil was sin, and he could not 
acknowledge the necessity of sin. If on the other 
hand, he had separated these two conceptions and had 
recognized in evil the necessary means of real life, 
he would have approached nearer to the truth. If 
we should eliminate from life all the evils of dis- 
organization, such as imperfection, isolation, and in- 
terference, we would not have a real world. It would 
be perfect but dead. 2 * These evils, then, we con- 
ceive as necessary to all real life. They are the means 
by which man acquires virtue and character. Profes- 
sor Palmer has stated this truth thus : " We do not 
act till we find something within or about us un- 
satisfactory. If contemplating myself in my actual 
conditions I could pronounce them all good, creation 
for me would be at an end. To start it, some sense 
of need is required." 25 



24 " Take away all evils," says Professor Paulsen, " and you 
abolish life itself." System of Ethics, E. T. p. 322. 

25 Nature of Goodness, page 98. Cf. also this significant 
sentence from the same author : " ' Is ' has no other applica- 
tion to a person than to mark how far he has advanced along 
his ideal line. Were he to pause at any point as if com- 
plete, he would cease to be a person." Ibid. p. 133. Cf. 
Royce, Studies of Good and Evil, pp. 24-5. 



98 UNDE EST MALUM? 

This does not imply the necessity of sin. Sin enters 
when we convert these means into ends. When these 
necessary evils of life are set up as ideals and sought 
as the end of life, sin is present. If Augustine had 
drawn such a distinction he would not have regarded 
all the evils of life as the punishments of sin. Here 
then is that peculiar blending of truth and error to 
which reference was made above. The error lies in 
the endeavor to regard all the evils of life as sin, 
and therefore not necessary. The truth lies in the 
recognition of the fact that evil exists to be overcome 
and is the means of moral development. Augustine, 
with different premises, reaches a result similar to that 
of Professor Royce, who says : " The justification of 
the presence in the world of the morally evil becomes 
apparent to us mortals only in so far as this evil 
is overcome and condemned. It exists only that it 
may be cast down." 26 With remarkable insight Au- 
gustine has found the truth in this theory. He sees 
the purpose of moral evil in the world. His error 
lies in the failure to distinguish clearly between evil 
and sin. His rejection of the theory as an explana- 
tion of the derivation of evil, we accept. He has 
thus left the way clear to realize for us the expecta- 
tions with which we entered this chapter, namely that 
the origin of evil must be found in freedom. Thus 
far we have only cleared away certain theories. His 
rejection of all three of these theories together with 
the effort to be fair to the elements of truth in them, 
only carries us nearer to that explanation of the origin 
of evil, which we are gradually finding to be the key 
to our author's thought. We are now done with ne- 



26 Studies of Good and Evil, p. 28. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM gg 

gations and are prepared for our author's positive and 
constructive ideas. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM. 

Just as we found at the close of Chapter III that 
Augustine, while dealing with the world of angels, 
placed the origin of all evil in the freedom of the 
creature, so here, if he is to be consistent, we expect 
to find that this is his explanation of the origin of evil 
in man. We have now reached that point where we 
must state fully our author's conception of primitive 
man. Perhaps no single idea of Augustine has had 
a more significant history than his conception of Adam. 
It is so central in his system and involves such fun- 
damental errors that here we shall confine ourselves 
even more than heretofore to a statement of his 
thought, reserving criticism for our concluding chap- 
ter. 

It is only as we remember Augustine's idea of 
man's original condition that we are in a position to 
see how he accounted for the origin of evil. Like 
all ancient peoples, the Hebrew nation looked back 
into the remote past and placed there a golden age. 
This tradition was preserved in the story of the garden 
of Eden, and received all the embellishment that the 
imagination of man could form. As a part of the 
Hebrew Canon, this story was accepted in its most 
literal form by Augustine, and served as the source 
of his anthropology. Man's condition was originally 
perfect. As the creation of God, he was free from 
all evil, and endowed with every good gift. He knew 
no want, and was so fashioned that time could make 
no ravages upon his body. He was destined to live 



ioo UNDE EST MALUM? 

eternally. In his physical body, there was no cor- 
ruption, no possibility of disease or accident. Per- 
fect health of body and undisturbed peace of soul were 
his. He was entirely exempt from all vicissitude. 
All the evils of life including sorrow, pain and want 
were unknown and his whole existence was one cease- 
less round of joy and gladness. 1 

The matter of chief interest here, however, con- 
cerns Adam's will. Augustine does not hesitate to 
describe the freedom of Paradise. He asserts that the 
soul of the first man, before he had sinned, controlled 
his body with perfect freedom of will. 2 Again in 
contrasting man's condition before and after the Fall, 
he describes the latter state as not possessing that 
absolute freedom which man at first enjoyed. 3 But 
we ask instantly what was this perfect or absolute 
freedom ? Augustine's answer can only be grasped by 
recalling that in the Pelagian controversy he insisted 
repeatedly that man's freedom was not sufficient to 
enable him to do good. Pelagius and Ccelestius con- 
tended that man could by free will live a sinless life. 
Augustine on the other hand insisted upon the neces- 
sity of " gratia Dei." 

Augustine's own early experience, in which he found 
it seemingly impossible to overcome sin without some 
external aid, exercised a permanent influence over his 
thought. Man cannot do good by his will alone. Of 
this he was absolutely sure. Therefore he constantly 
and repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of God's grace 
if man is to choose and do good. The point then is 



1 This description of Adam is based on Civ. Dei XIV. cap. 
26. 
2 Ep. CXLIII. 
3 Ibid. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM 101 

this, he must endow Adam with perfect freedom, 
and yet he is entirely unwilling to eliminate the idea 
that Adam needed the aid of his Creator. Conse- 
quently we find this perfect and absolute freedom of 
Adam qualified in certain important respects. Now 
Adam was created with free will but ignorant of his 
future sin. Consequently, he was happy, because he 
had no thought other than that his life was to be an 
eternal and unbroken span of felicity. If now he had 
chosen by his own free will to continue in his happy 
estate and had not sinned, he would never have known 
death or misery, and as a result of his faithful con- 
tinuance in his perfect condition he would have re- 
ceived the reward of the unfallen angels, namely, 
the absolute impossibility of falling into sin and the 
joy of knowing this with all certainty. 4 Here then 
is a fundamental distinction between the freedom of 
the unfallen angels and that of Adam. It was im- 
possible, argues Augustine, for those perfect beings 
to fall, but Adam had both possibilities of continuing 
in perfection or falling. 5 His will could have enabled 
him never to sin. " Quod adjutorium si homo ille 
(Adam) per liberum non deseruisset arbitrium, sem- 
per esset bonus." 6 Adam then could have persevered 
if he had wished. Why then did he fall ? Simply be- 



4 De Cor. et Grat. 28. " In quo statu recto ac sine vitio, 
si per ipsum liberum arbitrium manere voluisset, profecto 
sine ullo mortis et infelicitatis experimento, acciperet illam, 
merito hujus permansionis, beatitudinis plenitudinem, qua et 
sancti Angeli sunt beati, id est, ut cadere non posset ulterius, 
et hoc certissime sciret." 

5 In all that is said regarding Adam's freedom it must be 
remembered that the possibility of sinning is always pre- 
supposed and that the significant feature lies in the other 
possibility of not sinning. 

6 De Cor. et Grat. 31, 



102 UNDE EST MALUM? 

cause of a free will which was so constituted that he 
was able to choose either good or ill. 7 

The distinction that Augustine draws then between 
Adam's will and that of the angels is this : Adam's 
liberty consisted in being able not to sin (posse non 
peccare). That is, he possessed the possibility of be- 
ing free from sin. The liberty of the unfallen be- 
ings consisted in not being able to sin (non posse 
peccare). 

That is, they had reached that stage where they 
possessed the certainty of choosing only the good. 8 
We cannot be too emphatic here in stating exactly 
how Augustine conceived Adam's freedom. Before 
his fall he was able not to sin. In other words, he 
could have continued in his perfect state, had he willed 
it. But he did not will it and so he lost for him- 
self and all mankind, the ability to do good unaided? 
The " gratia Dei " which as a consequence all men 
need, was in Adam's case, just this endowment of 
freedom which involved the ability to do good, if he 
would. 10 This is what Augustine means when he says 
that man lost the freedom of his will when Adam 
sinned. 11 He lost this " posse non peccare." He lost 
what was Adam's gratia. He lost freedom in the 



7 " Posset enim perseverare si vellet : quod ut nollet, de 
libero descendit arbitrio; quod tunc ita liberum erat, ut bene 
velle posset et male." De Cor. et Grat. 32. 

8 Ibid. 33 : " Prima ergo libertas voluntatis erat, posse non 
peccare; novissima erit multo major, non posse peccare." 

9 Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. II. 9. 

10 De Cor. et Grat. 31. " Nee ipsum (Adam) ergo Deus 
esse voluit sine sua gratia, quam reliquit in ejus libero ar- 
bitrio." 

11 Enchir. XXX. " Ita cum libero peccaretur arbitrio, vic- 
tore peccato amissum est liberum arbitrum." 



DEFENDS FREEDOM 103 

sense that now, since Adam's fall man is free to sin. 12 
He lost the power to do good without external aid^J 
Thus it becomes clear how Augustine defended his 
doctrine of grace even in the case of Adam. He did 
it simply by regarding Adam's freedom as " gratia 
Dei." When Adam fell he lost that part of his free- 
dom which enabled him to do good without aid. 

There is one other aspect of man's original condi- 
tion which must not be disregarded. It follows as a 
natural corrollary of what has already been said. Its 
significance lies in the fact that Augustine placed so 
much emphasis upon " concupiscentia " and regarded 
it as one of the immediate results of Adam's fall. 
The aspect to which we refer is that Augustine re- 
garded sex to be originally devoid of all lust 13 and 
subject to the perfect control of the will. 14 The sense 
of shame was unknown before the Fall. 15 This phase 
of man's original endowment is dwelt upon frequently 
and fully. 16 

This material is sufficient to help us to understand 
how Augustine conceived of man's original condition. 
Adam lived a perfect life, enjoyed a freedom of the 
will that might have enabled him to continue his 
happy lot and was free from the lust and passion of 
the body. How then did sin enter? Once again our 
author has taken us into a strange place and set 
before us a perfect being. In Chapter III he led us 
out of this world into a realm peopled with the perfect 



12 Ibid. XXX. " Ac per hoc ad peccandum liber est, qui 
peccati servus est." 

13 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 53 et passim. 

14 De Pec. Orig. 40. 

15 Ibid. 41. 

16 Vide De Nupt. et Concup. I. 18, II. 17, 18, 26, 37, and 
especially Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XXVI. 



104 UNDE EST MALUM? 

creatures of God, and pointed to one and said that 
evil originated in the act of his will. We now con- 
front a similar situation. Only two differences are 
manifest. In the first place we are supposed to be 
dealing with the first historic man upon this earth, 
and secondly, the crisis here cannot be as critical be- 
cause evil has already gained its entrance into the 
circle of a perfect universe. Once originated, it never 
again is as difficult to account for its origin. But 
strange to say we do not find so much emphasis placed 
upon this fact as one might suppose. Instead, we 
seem to confront the whole problem again upon 
another arena. Everything is evidently fresh from the 
hand of the Creator. " Perfection " is written large 
over every detail of the scene. Man's perfect life and 
freedom are postulated and then by some strange, 
startling and catastrophic act, evil enters. 

To be sure, the Fall-story has its Serpent. Au- 
gustine's " diabolus " is present and is recognized, 
but in no such way as to relieve man of the responsi- 
bility of an evil choice. A terrible wound was in- 
flicted upon the human race by the devil at the fatal 
moment of the Fall, but nevertheless it was the first 
man who sinned. 17 In every individual there is origi- 
nal sin, the source of which seems to be two-fold, 
namely, the subtlety of the devil who deceives, and 
the will of man who yields to his deception. 18 The 
conclusion to be drawn in regard to the devil then is 



17 " Persuasit malum diabolus tanquam peccatum, non 
creavit tanquam naturam. . . . Hoc autem valde tunc 
majus atque altius diabolus inflexit, quam sunt ista hominibus 
nota peccata." De Nupt. et Concup. II. 57. 

18 De Pec. Orig. 43. Cf. also De Trin. XIII. cap. XII. 16. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM 105 

this, he is recognized as the originator of evil in that 
pre-mundane world, but his influence in Adam's first 
choice of evil, while recognized, does not free man of 
the responsibility of the act. 

If, then, we have thus disposed of the possibilities 
involved in the origin of evil previous to Adam's ex- 
istence, it remains to be shown definitely and positively 
that Augustine placed the origin of evil in an act of 
Adam's will. And this he does in terms unqualified 
and unmistakable. Man's first sin was disobedience, 
which consisted simply in doing his own will in prefer- 
ence to that of his Creator. 19 An evil will (malam 
voluntatem) is referred to in these words : " Hoc 
est omnino peccatum primi hominis, unde in homines 
mali origo descendit." 20 Man's disobedience of God 
is due to his depravity, but this in turn was caused 
by his own evil will, 21 by falling from the perfection in 
which his Creator placed him. Adam loosed himself 
from bondage to his Creator's commands by an evil 
use of his free will. 22 In fact it was by badly using 
his free will that man destroyed both his freedom and 
himself. 23 Even original sin is regarded as voluntary 
because Adam was free when he sinned. 24 In en- 
deavoring to account for the simultaneous generation 



19 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XII. Also De Cor. et Grat. 28. 

20 Op. Imp. c. Jul. II. cap. XVII. 

21 De Cor. et Grat. 9. 

22 Enchir. XXVII. 

23 Ibid. XXX. " Nam libero arbitrio male utens homo, et 
se perdidit et ipsum." 

24 " Non enim et hoc esset peccatum quod originale trahere- 
tur, sine opere liberi arbitrii, quo primus homo peccavit, per 
quern peccatum intravit in mundum et in omnes homines per- 
transiit." Cont. Jul. Pelag. VI. 28. 



io6 UNDE EST MALUM? 

in each person of a good nature and nature's flaws, 
Augustine refers the origin of the former to the will 
of the supreme Creator, the latter to the depraved 
will of Adam. 25 Nothing could be more explicit than 
the following sentence written in reference to the 
" originale peccatum." " Origo tamen etiam hujus 
peccati descendit a voluntati peccantis." 26 In writing 
against Julianus he insists that his doctrine of original 
sin does not contradict the position that no sin is 
possible without free will, for original sin likewise 
found its source in freedom. 27 Hence he does not 
hesitate to pass on to the assertion that original and 
voluntary actual sin of any individual belong in the 
same genus for they both owe their origin to free- 
will. 28 If any further question could remain as to 
whether he placed the origin of evil in man's freedom, 
it would be completely answered by a statement made 
in the Retractions. We have seen that he regarded 
all original sin as voluntary. The full significance of 
this becomes apparent and all further doubts are com- 
pletely dispelled when we find the assertion that it is 
not absurd to call even the original sin of infants 
voluntary, because it is contracted from the evil will 
of the first man. 29 Unquestionably, then, Augustine 



25 De Pec. Orig. 38. 

26 Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. XLVII. 

27 " Nee ideo tamen, ut dicis, nostrum dogma consumitur, 
cum asserimus esse originale peccatum: quia et ad hoc pec- 
cati genus ex libera voluntate perventum est, non ejus propria 
qui nascitur, sed ejus in quo omnes originaliter fuerunt, 
quando communem naturam mala voluntate vitiavit." Op. 
Imp. c. Jul. IV. XC. 

28 Op. Imp. c. Jul. II. CXI. 

29 Retract. I. cap. XIII. 5. " Et illud quod in parvulio dici- 
tur originale peccatum, cum adhuc non utantur arbitrio vol- 
untatis, non absurde vocatur etiam voluntarium, quia ex 



DEFENDS FREEDOM 107 

placed the origin of evil in man in that first evil choice 
of Adam. In an act of his will sin originated. 

But what of the origin of sin in any individual since 
Adam? Can we establish the same contention here 
that sin originates in the life of each person through 
the use of his will ? This, we maintain, is Augustine's 
position which we will now endeavor to set forth. 
To do so, however, throws us back again into the 
life of Adam, for Adam held a very unique relation 
to every individual of the human race. Augustine 
conceived of the whole human race as a mass. Every 
individual has in some curious fashion existed first 
in that bulky something called human nature, and 
later has been given his particular individual form. 
" Ex eadem namque massa omnes venimus." 30 More- 
over this mass of human nature (massa universa) is 
under condemnation. 31 This has been its condition 
from the moment that sin entered the world. When 
Adam fell, the whole mass of our nature was ruined. 32 
By his evil choice Adam condemned the entire mass 
of the human race. 33 The man who first sinned made 
all men evil for he corrupted the whole mass of human 
nature. 34 This corruption of the whole race is fre- 
quently expressed by the term, mass of perdition 
(perditionis massa). 35 That this thought of con- 
demnation applies to every member of the human 



prima hominis mala voluntate contractum, factum est quo- 
dammodo hsereditarium." Cf. also ibid. I. cap. XV. 2, 4. 

30 Conf. XII. 36. 

31 De Nat. et Grat. 9. Cf. also Enchir. XXVII. 

32 De Pec. Orig. 34. 

33 Civ. Dei XXI. 12. " Hinc universa generis humani massa 
damnata." 

34 Sermo XCVI. 6. 

35 De Cor. et Grat. 12, 16, 25. 



108 UNDE EST MALUM ? 

family is made evident by the assertion that infants 
are. worthy of punishment because they belong to the 
ruined mass and are justly regarded as born of Adam. 36 
This first man then has assumed remarkable im- 
portance. In fact he is the whole human race. 37 

This relationship of Adam to the race finds ex- 
pression in a slightly different figure when he is called 
the root of the race. All posterity were in Adam as 
in a root, and every individual is therefore guilty of 
the first sin. 38 All our evils have come forth out of 
a " radix peccati." s9 All men are born with this root 
of evil. 40 Adam's sin was of such a heinous character 
that in him all the human family was radically con- 
demned. 41 Out from him as the root of the race 
flowed the corruption which mars every life. 42 All 
human offspring are consequently involved in radical 
ruin. 48 Even infants, though they have committed no 
evil of their own, are nevertheless ruined in their 
root. 44 In other terms the only sin that can be at- 
tributed to the new born child is original sin derived 
from Adam as its source and fountain. 44 



86 De Pec. Orig. 36. " Unde ergo recte infans ilia per- 
ditione punitur, nisi quia pertinet ad massam perditionis, et 
juste intelligitur ex Adam natus." 

37 " In primo igitur homine per f eminam in progenium 
transiturum universum genus humanum fuit." Civ. Dei XIII. 
cap. III. 

38 Civ. Dei XXI. cap. XII. 

89 Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CLXII. "Quae omnia mala absit 
ut essent in ilia felicitate paradisi ; ac per hoc non pullulave- 
runt nisi de radici peccati." 

40 Civ. Dei XXII. cap. XXII. 1. " Verum hsec hominum 
sunt malorum, ab ilia tamen erroris et perversi amoris radice 
venientia, cum qua omnis films Adam nascitur." 

41 Enchir. XLVIII. 

42 Ibid. XXVI. Also Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XV. 

43 De Pec. Orig. 43. 

44 Sermo CXV. 4. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM 109 

Again, with but a slight change in the figure, Adam 
is called the seed (semen) of the race. 45 Everyone 
while yet unborn was in Adam. 46 Consequently it is 
right to insist that original sin is not only another's 
but ours, 47 for in Adam there was already present the 
seminal nature, from which we were to spring. 48 

Augustine seemingly not quite satisfied with these 
comparisons pushes the relationship between Adam 
and his posterity until it becomes almost identity. 
Adam was not only all human nature, conceived in 
its bulk, nor only the root or seed of the race. We 
were all in him. 49 The whole race existed seminally 
and potentially in him. 50 " In illo erant omnes" 51 
And when he acted, all his offspring acted. 52 But this 
is hardly sufficient for our author and so instead of 
saying we were in Adam, he makes the identification 
complete, and insists that we were all that one man 
Adam. " Omnes ille unus fuerunt." 53 "Et hi omnes 



« Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. cap. CIV. 

46 Ibid. I. XL VIII. " In lumbis Adam fuisse omnes qui ex 
illo fuerant per concupiscentiam carnis orituri." 

47 Ibid. I. XLVIII. " Sed peccatis, inquis, alienis non 
utique perire debuerunt. Aliena sunt, sed paterna sunt. Ac 
per hoc jure seminationis atque germinationis et nostra sunt." 

48 Civ. Dei XIII. cap. V. Cf. Conf. XIII. 28. 

49 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. III. 14. " Sed quidquid erat in 
futura propagine vita unius hominis continebat." Cf. also 
ibid. III. 15. 

50 De Cor. et Grat. 28. " Quae in illo adhuc posita tota cum 
illo peccaverat." Cf . Sermo CCXL. 3, which reads : " In 
uno peccavimus et omnes ad corruptionem nati summus." 
Also Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. 7. 

51 Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. 7. 

52 De Cor. et Grat. 9. " Peccata quidem ista originalia 
ideo dicuntur aliena, quod ea singuli de parentibus trahunt, 
sed non sine causa dicuntur et nostra quia in illo uno omnes, 
sicut dicit Apostolus peccaverunt." 

53 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 15. 



iio UNDE EST MALUM? 

unus ille erant." B4 These are typical expressions and 
show clearly the fact that Augustine regarded every 
individual as actually present in Adam. If we were 
all actually present in Adam, and if sin originated in 
an act of his will, then sin has likewise originated for 
all of us in freedom. 

Here then, we seem to have established our point 
and to have accounted for the origin of evil in every 
member of the human race. Nevertheless Augustine 
is compelled to recognize 55 that the particular indi- 
vidual existence of each person is different from his 
existence in Adam, and so he sets to work to show 
how that evil originated in Adam and is transmitted 
to us. This opens a new phase of the question and to 
it Augustine was compelled by his opponents, espe- 
cially the Pelagians, to give not a little of his thought. 

How then, did Adam's sin gain an entrance to the 
actualized individual existence of each person? The 
Pelagians found their answer in the doctrine of im- 
itation (imitatio). This doctrine asserted that the 
only way in which Adam's sin affected mankind was 
by the influence of a bad example. 56 If men follow 
his path and imitate his sin, then by the power of 
example Adam has transmitted his sin to them. Au- 
gustine attacks this Pelagian doctrine and rejects it 
because it sets up the wrong offender as an example 
for imitation. His chief argument, frequently reit- 
erated, is that if sin is transmitted to the individual 
solely by imitation, then the devil 57 and not Adam 



54 Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. cap. CIV. Cf. De Pec. Mer. ei 
Remis. III. 14, 15 and Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XV. 

55 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. III. 14 and Civ. Dei XIII. XV. 

56 De Pec. Orig. 16. Also De Nupt. et Concup. II. 45 and 
De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 9. 

57 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 18. " Hoc unius delictum, si 



DEFENDS FREEDOM in 

should be accused of this influence. But the Pelagians 
do refer the doctrine specifically to Adam, and there- 
fore argues Augustine, the only other alternative is 
the principle of propagation. 68 To " imitatio," then, 
Augustine opposes " propagation 

Adam's sin is transmitted to each individual by 
natural generation. 59 Among the results of the dis- 
obedience of Adam and Eve was concupiscence which 
has been transferred to all their offspring by natural 
descent. 60 We are guilty of original sin, not through 
our own individualized act, but by propagation. 61 
The whole human family has sprung from Adam. His 
sin has passed by natural descent (propagatione 
transisset) to all mankind. 62 In other words, original 
sin is transmitted to each person by physical birth. 63 
We participate in Adam's sin because we are born of 
the union of the sexes. 64 No man is born without this 
inherent defect for which also he is liable to punish- 
ment. 65 Because birth comes through conjugal union 
we share in the sin of Adam, whose fault attaches to 
all his posterity. 66 That good nature which he re- 



imitationem attendamus, non erit nisi diaboli. Sed quia mani- 
festum est, de Adam, non de diabolo dici; restat intelligenda, 
non imitatio, sed propagatio peccati." Cf. also ibid. I. 10, Op. 
Imp. c. Jul. II. cap. XLIX. LII. 
58 De,Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 18. 

59 De Dono Persev. 3. 

60 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 59. 

61 Cont. Jul. Pelag. CI. 28. " Parentum autem peccata 
modo quodam reperiuntur et nostra : aliena quippe proprietate 
sunt actionis, nostra sunt autem contagione propaginis." 

62 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 9. 

es Op. Imp. C. Jul. II. cap. XLIX. LII. 

64 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 15. 

65 Enar. in Ps. LI. 10. 

66 De Trin. XIII. cap. XII. 16. " Peccato primi hominis in 
omnes utriusque sexus commixtione nascentes originaliter 



H2 UNDE EST MALUM? 

ceived at his creation, being vitiated by the evil use 
of his free willj has in this deteriorated condition, 
passed on and still continues to pass on, by natural 
descent to all mankind. " Naturaliter concurrit et cur- 
rit." 67 

This crass materialism is most striking coming from 
one who must be classed as an idealist. He has here 
committed himself to traducianism for he would be 
the first to reject the idea that the flesh in itself was 
evil. The sin attaches to the soul. It is the soul, as 
we have seen, 68 that lusts by means of the flesh. 
Nevertheless when Augustine comes to consider the 
origin of the soul as a separate and specific question, 
he outlines four theories 69 and declines to settle upon 
any one of them, but seems to favor creationism. 70 
At any rate he declares that he has no objection to this 
theory. 71 In another passage he emphatically declares 
that the soul is derived either by natural descent or is 
created by God out of nothing. 72 The total impres- 
sion that one gathers from a study of Augustine's 
writings is that he never was able to fully make up his 
own mind upon this question. 73 He clearly inclined 
to creationism, but his doctrine of original sin to 
which he held so rigorously, demanded, as we have 
pointed out, that Adam's sin be transmitted to the 



transeunte, et parentum primorum debito universos posteros 
obligante." 

67 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 20 fin. 

68 Vide pp. 77-78 of this chapter. 
6» Ep. CLXVI. 7. 

70 De Anima et ejus Orig. I. 4, II. 5, 21. 

71 Ibid. I. 33. 

72 Ibid. I. 24. 

7,3 Ep. CXLIII. 5, 6, where the four theories are stated and 
his attitude of indecision indicated. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM 113 

individual members of the race by natural generation 
or propagation. 

We have now seen that sin originated in each in- 
dividual when he was still in some mysterious way 
an unindividualized part of the mass of human nature, 
and that this sin reached his actual individualized self 
by natural propagation. It only remains to point out 
that in addition to this original sin, each man com- 
mits sins of his own. What now is the origin of this 
actual sin? Augustine confesses that he committed 
many sins over and above the burden of original sin. 74 
By our evil living we constantly add to the sin with 
which we are born. 75 That Augustine makes a dis- 
tinction 76 between " peccatum actuale " and " pecca- 
tum originale " we will show in Chapter VI. Here 
we only need to indicate that this actual, as well 
as original sin, was referred to the will as its source. 
The only reason that man does not live that perfect 
life, whose possibility our author maintains, is that 
he is unwilling to do so. " Quid homines nolunt." 77 
He is unwilling either because of ignorance or in- 
firmity, but nevertheless it is his will to which re- 
sponsibility attaches. 78 We come then upon the ques- 
tion of man's freedom and find that whatever else 
Augustine may have held concerning free will, he did 
insist that every person since Adam is free to sin. 



" Conf. V. 16. 

75 Sermo XCVI. 6. 

76 Vide De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 16, 20. De Perf. Just. 
Horn. XIX. 42 and Enchir. XXXIII. 

77 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 26. 

78 Ibid. II. 26. " Ignorantia igitur et infirmitas vitia sunt, 
quae impediunt voluntatem ne moveatur ad faciendum opus 
bonum, vel ab opere malo abstinendum." 



114 UNDE EST MALUM ? 

" Ac per hoc ad peccandum liber est." 79 " Quoniam 
liberum arbitrium ad malum sufficit, ad bonum autem 
parum est." 80 However we may regard man, whether 
we think of the first man alone, or of each individual 
as potentially or seminally present in Adam, or as 
living his own individualized and actualized existence, 
whether we contemplate original or actual sin, the 
origin of evil is in every instance placed in an act of 
free will. " Non igitur nisi voluntate peccatur." 81 
Our next task is to enter into that jungle of psycho- 
logical intricacies and entanglements, and endeavor to 
state our author's treatment of freedom. 



™ Enchir. XXX. 

80 De Cor. et Grat. 31. This aspect of freedom will receive 
proper recognition in the next chapter. 

81 De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. X. 12 init. 

It seems unnecessary to cite further evidence for this point 
which in the next chapter (pp. 1 17-123) is supported by 
abundant material. 



CHAPTER V 

FREEDOM 

The thought of mankind, in its endeavor to ac- 
count for the origin of evil, has always revolved about 
a few representative theories. One type of mind is 
satisfied with a dualistic explanation of the universe, 
and like the Manicheans, is willing to account for the 
presence of evil in the world by referring it to some 
evil principle. Others, recognizing the finiteness of all 
created being, place the origin of evil in metaphysical 
imperfection. Since the days of Plato, or even earlier, 1 
the pre-existence of souls has been a favorite doctrine, 
and has led to the theory that sin originated in some 
evil choice of the individual in that pre-temporal state. 
Man's fleshy nature, until the days of evolution, was 
widely regarded as the flagrant source of man's evil 
and sin. The suggestive contrasts of life have in- 
duced others to find the origin of evil in its necessary 
existence as a foil to good. Freedom of the will like- 
wise, while serving as an integral part of other theo- 
ries, has been frequently used to explain the source 
of evil. Until the time of evolutionary thought, these 
six theories seem to embrace all explanations of the 
problem. In the preceding chapters we have found 
that all of these historic explanations of the origin of 
evil were dealt with by Augustine, and that he re- 
jected all of them, with the exception of metaphysical 



1 Plato refers to the reminiscence theory as Socrates' favor- 
ite doctrine. 

115 



n6 FREEDOM 

imperfection and freedom. Even these two are related 
in a most interesting fashion. We naturally turn, 
therefore, at this juncture to our author's treatment of 
freedom. 

This, however, is no easy task, for we find that the 
exigencies of philosophical and theological controversy 
forced Augustine into contradictory statements. 
Against the fatalism of the Manicheans, he advocated 
perfect freedom of the will. 2 Later, in his contro- 
versy against Pelagius and Coelestius, who laid such 
stress upon the power of the will, he was compelled to 
qualify and restate his thought about freedom in order 
to defend his doctrine of grace. 3 One specific illus- 
tration of this change in his thought will be sufficient 
here, for the material that follows in the next section 
will illustrate the same truth in a more general way. 
In writing against the Manicheans about the year 
391 A. D., he argued that sin existed nowhere but in 
the will, for otherwise it would be unjust to hold the 
sinner guilty. 4 Here everything points to the idea of 



2 Ph. Schaff, referring to Augustine's Anti-Manichean 
writings, says: "In them he afterwards found most to re- 
tract, because he advocated the freedom of the will against 
the Manichean fatalism." Nicene and Post-Nic. Fath. Vol. I. 
16. 

3 A. H. Newman says on this point : " The fact is that in 
the Anti-Manichean time he went too far in maintaining the 
absolute freedom of the will and the impossibility of sin apart 
from personal will in the sinner; while in the Anti- Pelagian 
time he ventured too near to the fatalism that he so earnestly 
combated in the Manicheans." Nicene and Post-Nic. Fath. 
Vol. IV. p. 102, n. 1. 

4 " Quibus concessis colligerem, nusquam scilicet nisi in 
voluntate esse peccatum : cum mihi auxiliaretur etiam illud 
quod justitia peccantes tenet sola mala voluntate, quamvis 
quod voluerint implere nequiverint." De Dua. Anim. c. 
Manich. X. 12 fin. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM 117 

personal will. But the Pelegians pounced upon this 
assertion and used it with telling effect against the 
doctrine that infants are guilty of original sin be- 
fore they have made any evil choice. Consequently, in 
his Retractions, 5 written in 428 A. D., he explains how 
this passage must be interpreted and transfers the 
whole affair back into the will of Adam. Thus he 
shifts his own doctrine in order to make it impossible 
for the Pelagians to place undue emphasis on the will 
of the individual. These two passages, then, one of 
which is an attempted explanation of the other, show 
how, during the last thirty years of his life, and espe- 
cially as a result of the Pelagian controversy, Au- 
gustine changed the formulation of his thought on 
freedom. In order to adequately fulfill our task, 
therefore, we must set down the differing aspects of his 
doctrine, although they may reveal glaring contradic- 
tions. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM AGAINST MANICHEISM. 

That Augustine, especially in his earlier writings, 
advocated freedom of the will, scarcely needs mention 
at this time. The preceding chapters have given fre- 
quent reiteration of that belief. Nevertheless, it will 



5 " Item quod dixi, ' nusquam ' scilicet, ' nisi in voluntate 
esse peccatum/ possunt Pelagiani pro se dictum putare, prop- 
ter parvulos, quos ideo negant habere peccatum quod eis in 
Baptismate remittatur, quia nondum arbitrio voluntatis utun- 
tur. Quasi vero peccatum quod eos ex Adam dicimus orig- 
inaliter trahere id est reatu ejus implicatos, et ob hoc pcense 
obnoxios detinere usquam esse potuit nisi in voluntate, qua 
voluntate commissum est, quando divini praecepti est facta 
transgressio." I. cap. XV. 2 init. Cf. also De Lib. Arbit. 
and Retract. 



n8 FREEDOM 

be well to show that he repeatedly made unqualified as- 
sertions of man's freedom. 6 

It is unnecessary to repeat here Augustine's con- 
ception of the first man. 7 It will be recalled that he 
was endowed with perfect and absolute freedom. It 
was within his power to resist (posse non peccare) 
or to yield to sin. 8 Hence we are prepared for the 
assertion that original sin found its source in freedom. 
The will was the originator of evil. 9 All the evils 
with which we are born owe their origin to man's 
freedom. 10 The great error of the Manicheans, argues 
x-\ugustine, was that they failed to see that all sins 
arise from free will and that all evil, both human and 
angelic, must be traced to this source. 11 Unmistaka- 
bly, then, Augustine asserts the freedom of the will 
in connection with original sin. " Sed peccatum sine 
quo nemo nascitur, crevit voluntatis accessu, originale 
concupiscentia trahente peccantis assensum." 12 Adam, 
being endowed as he was, willed not to abide in his 
state of perfection. 13 Freedom is repeatedly asserted 
in connection with man's vitiated and fallen state, 
" Man was lost by free will." 14 By the use of his 



6 The material here given will also serve as further evi- 
dence for the contention made at the close of Chapter IV 
that our author places the origin of evil in freedom. 

7 See Chapter IV. pp. 99-114. 

8 De Natura et Grat. 25. 

9 Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XV. 

10 Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. 5- 

11 " Non autem accipiunt (Manichsei) quod Veritas dicit, a 
libero arbitrio exordium sumpsisse peccatum, et ex illo esse 
omne vel angeli vel hominis malum, quia mali naturam 
semper malam et Deo coaeternam nimis a Deo exorbitantes 
credere maluerunt." Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. III. 25. 

12 Op. Imp. c. Jul. II. CCXXI. 
is De Cor. et Grat. 32. 
i*Sermo CLXXIV. 2. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM 119 

own freedom, man is corrupted. 15 The evil which 
man contracts at birth proceeds from the will. 16 By 
original sin man inherits an impure spirit. The spirit 
in itself is good, but its impurity emanates from man's 
own will. " Ex propria voluntate." 17 Pelagius di- 
rected his polemic against this doctrine and denied 
that original sin could be voluntary. " ' Suum enim 
non est,' inquit, ' si necessarium est. Aut si suum est, 
voluntarium est: et si voluntarium est, vitari potest.' 
Nos respondemus : suum est omnino." 18 Without 
any question, therefore, Augustine asserted freedom in 
connection with original sin. 

But the question of greater import is this : Since the 
will of the whole race was injured by the Fall of Adam, 
does our author still maintain freedom in connection 
with the actualized individual existence of each per- 
son? In the conclusion of the last chapter we en- 
deavored to show that Augustine placed the origin of 
actual sin in the life of each individual in the freedom 
of the will. The evidence there cited would indicate 
that our author did defend the freedom of the indi- 
vidual and that indication is amply borne out by many 
passages. In his early writing Concerning Free Will, 
his purpose was to advocate freedom. This work was 
undertaken with the definite aim of overwhelming 
the Manichean idea of the origin of sin, and to es- 
tablish the belief that all evil is to be traced to a free 
choice of the will. We fortunately are not left to 



1B "Sponte depravatus," Civ. Dei XIII. XIV. 

16 " Sed ex humana voluntate venientem in originis labe 
contraxit." De Pec. Orig. 46. Cf. also De Nupt. et Concup. 
I. 26. 

17 De Pec. Orig. 46. 

18 De Nat. et Grat. 34. 



; 



120 FREEDOM 

our own interpretation of this writing. In the Re- 
tractions 19 he himself declares clearly that this was 
the purpose of that discussion. Consequently we find 
that the turning of the will from the immutable to a 
mutable good is described as " voluntarium." 20 The 
sins that vitiate nature come from the will of those 
who sin. 21 " Quisque malus sui malefacti auctor 
est. 22 Sin exists by virtue of free will since man 
sins if he wills it. 23 We are forced to one of two con- 
clusions : either we must deny that sin is committed 
or we must confess that it is committed by the will. 24 
Voluntary sin can alone be called sin. 25 No sin can 
be actually committed without free will. 26 Evils owe 
their existence to the voluntary sin of the soul 



27 



19 « Propter eos quippe disputatio ilia suscepta est, qui 
negant, ex libero voluntatis arbitrio mali originem duci, et 
Deum, si ita est, creatorem omnium naturarum culpandum 
esse contendunt : eo modo volentes secundum suae impietatis 
errorem (Manichsei enim sunt), immutabilem quamdam et 
Deo coaeternam introducere mali naturam." I. cap. IX. 2. 

20 " Propterea, quid opus est quarere unde iste motus ex- 
istat, quo voluntas avertitur ab incommutabili bono ad com- 
mutabile bonum, cum eum nonnisi animi, et voluntarium, et 
ob hoc culpabilem esse fateamur." De Lib. Arbit. III. 2. Cf. 
also III. 29. 

21 De Natura Boni c. Manich. 28. 

22 De Lib. Arbit. I. cap. I. 1. 

23 " Fit enim ut sit peccatum per liberum arbitrium, cum 
homo peccat, si velit." Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. CI. 

24 " Quare aut negandum est peccatum committi aut f aten- 
dum est voluntate committi. . . . Voluntate ergo pecca- 
tur." De Vera Relig. 27. On this passage he says in the 
Retractions: " Et alibi: 'usque adeo, inquam peccatum vol- 
untarium malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit 
voluntarium.' Potest videre falsa haec definitio ; sed si de- 
ligentur discutiatur, invenietur esse verissima." I. XIII. 5. 

25 Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 15, 20. 
A 26 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 65. 

27 Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 20. 



DEFENDS FREEDOM 121 

Even that passage in Romans vii. 19 (Non enim quod 
volo, hoc ago; sed quod nolo, hoc facio), about which 
so much controversy waged, he declares must not be 
so interpreted as to take away free will. 28 Likewise 
it is maintained that sins of ignorance are committed by 
the will. 29 Moreover, all laws are subverted, all dis- 
cipline useless, and all praise and blame without sig- 
nificance, unless the evil acts of man are attributed to 
the will. 30 Again, sin consists in an act of the will. 
" Quod si scelus est dicere, neminem natura sua cogit 
ut peccet. Sed nee aliena. Non enim quisquis dum 
id quod non vult patitur invitus, sed in eo pec cavil 
quod ita fecit volens, ut quod nollet jure pateretur. 
Si autem in juste patitur, quomodo peccat? Non enim 
in juste aliquid pati, sed in juste aliquid facere peccatum 
est. 31 Finally in one passage 32 where sin and origi- 
nal sin are openly distinguished, Augustine affirms 
that both kinds proceed from the will. 

Furthermore, in certain passages, Augustine not 
satisfied with mere affirmations of man's freedom, 
passes on to a denial of necessity. 33 Our wills are 



28 " Sed cavendum ne quis arbitretur his verbis auferri 
nobis liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quod non ita est." Exp. 
quar. Prop. ex. Ep. ad Rom. I. XLIV. (In VII. 19, 20.) 

— J 2 9 Retract. I. XIII. 5, XV. 3. 
-4?« Ep. CCXLVI. 2 and De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. 2. 

^ *si De Lib. Arbit. III. 46. 

32 " ' Si peccatum ' inquit, ' ex voluntate est, mala voluntas 
quae peccatum f acit : si ex natura, mala natura.' Cito re- 
spondo, ex voluntate peccatum est. Quserit forte, utrum 
et originale peccatum. Respondeo, Prorsus et originale 
peccatum : quia et hoc ex voluntate primi hominis seminatum 
est, ut et in illo esset, et in omnes transiret." De Nupt. et 
Concup. II. 48. 

x 33 Cont. Faust. XXII. 22. Cf. also De Sermone Dom. in 

Monte I. XII. 34. 



122 FREEDOM 

under no necessity, for we do many things which we 
would not do, unless we willed them. 34 The idea 
that the stars influence the choices of men is opposed 
by the avowal that the will of man is under no con- 
straint of necessity. 35 He expresses the conviction 
that man fell into sin through no necessity of either 
divine or human nature, but solely through free will. 36 
God has in no sense compelled sin (non cogente 
Deo) 37 but man has sinned simply because he willed 
it. 38 He even denies the truth of the charge brought 
against his doctrine of original sin, that all people are 
thus forced into sin by the necessity of their fleshly 
nature. His reply is that we retain the sin by our 
own will. 39 To affirm that man sins by necessity is to 
do away with sin entirely. 40 " An tanta fallacia est. 
ut caveri omnino non potest? Si ita est, nulla pec- 
cata sunt. Quis enim peccat in eo quod nullo modo 
caveri potest? Peccatur autem; caveri igitur po- 
test." 41 It becomes evident therefore, that Augustine 
maintained the freedom of the will against those who 
sought to excuse their sins by belief in external com- 
pulsion or necessity. Thus far we have seen that 
aspect of his doctrine which was developed principally 
in opposition to the tenets of Manicheism. He will 



s* Civ. Dei V. 10. 

35 Cont. Faust. II. 5. 

36 Ep. CLXVI. 

37 Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LXIII. 

38 " Utrique igitur Manichaeo resistimus, dicentes a bono 
et justo Deo non sic hominem factum esse, ut ei esset 
necesse peccare ; et ideo peccasse quia voluit, qui posset et 
nolle." Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. LXIV. 

39 Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 7. 

40 Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 17. 

41 De Lib. Arbit. III. 50. 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE 123 

not permit its fatalism to encroach in any way upon 
man's freedom. 



ASSERTS BOTH FREEDOM AND GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

Another aspect of his doctrine closely allied to the 
preceding, is the affirmation of both man's freedom 
and God's foreknowledge of man's choices. This sub- 
ject receives detailed treatment in The City of God. 1 
Without in any sense withdrawing or qualifying his 
affirmations of the perfect freedom of Adam, he main- 
tains that God foreknew that evil would arise out of 
good, because in his secret judgment God knew that 
it would be better to regulate evil than not to allow it 
to exist. 2 God, therefore, foreknew, contends Augus- i 
tine, that man would sin, thus bringing death upon 
himself, and that he would propagate men doomed to 
mortality. The Creator knew likewise that sinful man 
would so give himself over to evil that his condition 
would be less secure and happy than that of irrational 
animals. 3 Nevertheless this must not be so in- 
terpreted as to suppose that man sins because God 
foreknew it. There is unquestionably no doubt, 
argues Augustine, that it is man himself who sins. 
Whether man does or does not will to sin, God fore- 
knows it. 4 It is a fundamental doctrine with Au- 
gustine, as we shall see later, that both the beginning 
and the continuance in a good life are the gifts of 
God. Man, since Adam, has not the ability to do 
good without this external aid. Now, of these gifts, 



1 Civ. Dei V. IX.-X, 

2 De Cor. et Grat. 27. 

3 Civ. Dei XII. XXII. 

4 Civ. Dei V. X. 



124 FREEDOM 

Augustine affirms that God foreknew upon whom he 
would bestow them. 5 It is perfectly clear that our 
author was unwilling to give up either man's freedom 
or God's prescience. " Nos adversus istos sacrilegos 
ausus atque impios, et Deum dicimus omnia scire ante- 
quam fiant, et voluntate nos facere, quidquid a nobis 
nonnisi volentibus fieri sentimus et novimus." 6 Our 
author then embraces both man's freedom and God's 
foreknowledge. 7 

In this aspect of Augustine's thought upon freedom, 
we recognize difficulties. We are inevitably forced to 
ask, what is freedom? In what does a free act con- 
sist ? If by a free act we mean the reduction of a dual 
or multiple future possibility to a single actual re- 
sult, then it seems impossible for even omniscience to 
know our future choices. Omnipotence cannot per- 
form the impossible nor can omniscience know the un- 
knowable. If our free choices are foreknown accord- 
ing to Augustine's thought, and if this position rests 
upon anything more than a desire to avoid religious 
scruples, then we find here an inadequate conception 
of freedom. We must reserve judgment until we 
have put before ourselves his further thought upon 
the subject. 

INFLUENCE OF THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY. 

It now becomes necessary to trace the influence of 



5 " Omnia porro dona sua, et quibus ea fuerat largiturus, 
Deum prsescisse negare non possunt." De Dono Persev. 66. 

6 Civ. Dei V. IX. 3 init. 

1 " Quocirca nullo modo cogimur, aut retenta prasscientia 
Dei tollere voluntatis arbitrium, aut retento voluntatis ar- 
bitrio Deum (quod nefas est) negare praescium futurorum 
sed utrumque amplectimur." Ibid. V. IX. 2. 



PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY 125 

Pelagianism upon our author's thought, and see how 
his unqualified assertions of freedom gradually as- 
sume a different formulation and how the ardent 
libertarian, although perhaps unconsciously, is by 
degrees transformed into the determinist. The whole 
Pelagian controversy centered about the discussion of 
the will. Pelagius had never felt the chains of sinful 
habit as Augustine had in his early years. Conse- 
quently Pelagius did not feel the need of external aid 
that Augustine did. 1 In the actual life of these two 
men we find the beginnings of their conflicting doc- 
trines. Pelagius argued that man can avoid sin by 
free will alone. 2 All men therefore may be sinless if 
they choose, 3 the race has not been ruined by the Fall 
of Adam, and there is no need of grace in the Au- 
gustinian sense. 4 Here we see an attack upon the 
very foundations of Augustine's system, 5 and this at- 
tack consists in an emphasis of the very thing for 
which Augustine himself has contended so strongly 
against the Manicheans. 

(It was Ccelestius the disciple of Pelagius, who boldly 
pushed the system to its logical conclusions. He it 



1 Pelagius' doctrine of grace was only another expression 
of his belief in free will. God's assistance consisted chiefly 
in free will. Vide Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. 11; De Grat. 
et Lib. Arbit. 23, 26; De Spir. et Lit. 4; De Grat. Christi 3. 

2 De Grat. Christi 29, where Augustine quotes the words 
of Pelagius. 

3 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 8. 

4 De Nat. et Grat. 46. Cf. also De Grat. Christi 29, 30, 
44, 46, where Augustine objects strenuously to Pelagius' 
phrase "more easily," which implies that in any case man 
can save himself by free will. 

5 For a concise statement of the leading tenets of Pelagian- 
ism, see " Introductory, Essay on Augustine and the Pelagian 
Controversy." Nic. and Post-Nic. Fath. Vol. V. 



126 FREEDOM 

was who put forth the following contentions : ( i ) 
Adam was created mortal and would have died even 
if he had not sinned; (2) Adam's sin injured only 
himself and not the race; (3) The law as well as the 
gospel leads to salvation; (4) Men lived sinless lives 
before the coming of Christ; (5) New-born infants 
are just as perfect as Adam before his fall; (6) Man- 
kind did not die in Adam nor rise in Christ. 6 It is 
evident that we have here a denial of the central tenets 
of Augustinianism. Consequently our author imme- 
diately attacks their doctrine of freedom, 7 and in doing 
so furnishes some perplexing material for formulating 
his thought upon the subject. 

We begin now to hear of a certain necessity of sin- 
ning which attaches to every person since Adam. This 
doctrine, of course, is aimed directly at the contention 
of Pelagius that every man can live a sinless life if he 
chooses. Augustine's thought is formulated in various 
ways but the underlying idea is always the same. 
There is a certain necessary tendency to sin (qusedam 
peccandi necessitas) 8 due to the flaws which have 
vitiated our nature. A most interesting qualification 
of this idea, however, is that this necessity may be 
removed by the assistance of grace, and full liberty 
again bestowed. 9 Thus by the introduction of alien 



6 De Gest. Pelag. 23. Cf. the statement of 16 breviates of 
Ccelestius and Augustine's answers thereto in De Perf. Just. 
Horn. I.-VII. in toto. The five points of Pelagianism which 
Aug. attacked are also stated in Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. I. 
et seq. 

7 " Sunt enim quidam tantum prsesumentes de libero hu- 
manae voluntatis arbitrio, ut ad non peccandum nee adjuvan- 
dos nos divinitus opinentur, semel ipsi naturae nostrae concesso 
liberae voluntatis arbitrio." De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 2. 

8 De Nat. et Grat. 79. 

9 De Nat. et Grat. 79. 



PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY 127 

interference Augustine attempts to maintain both his 
doctrines of freedom and grace against the Pelagians. 
Necessity has been produced out of original liberty as 
a penalty for sin. 10 " Ad hanc autem jam pcenalem 
peccandi necessitatem non utique pervenisset, nisi prius 
libera voluntate, nulla necessitate peccasset." " Ac- 
cording to this statement the necessity under which 
we now live is the penal consequence of sin committed 
with perfect freedom. 

The doctrine then is this. There is a necessity of 
sinning which is the punishment for sin committed 
without necessity. " Multum erras, qui vel necessita- 
tem nullam putas esse peccandi, vel earn non intelligis 
illius peccati esse pcenam, quod nulla necessitate com- 
misum est. 12. Occasionally 13 our author seems to 
plunge into bald necessity but these passages are only a 
vigorous statement of the same idea. It is very evident 
that the qualification which Augustine has here placed 
upon his statements of freedom is a direct reply to 
Pelagianism. Augustine had no desire to deny free- 
dom. His sole aim was to refute the idea that by 
sheer strength of his own will man could live a right- 
eous life. For Augustine this belief struck at the 
very heart of his religion and its tenets therefore 
must be vanquished. Therefore, without in any sense 
destroying man's freedom, he sought to so qualify it 
that the necessity of external aid (gratia dei) would 
be recognized. But we ask, if every man, since Adam, 



10 De Perf. Just. Horn. IV. 9. 

11 Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLVII. Cf. also ibid. I. CV. and 
V. LIX. 

12 Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CV. Cf. also ibid. I. CVI. LXII, De 
Nat. et Grat. 80 and De Perf. Just. Horn. 9. 

13 Ibid. VI. 13, Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 22 and Op. Imp. c. 
Jul. V. L. 



128 FREEDOM 

lives under this " qusedam necessitas " and can only be 
liberated by an alien power, can his condition properly/ 
be described as free? ~""\/ 

The converse of the notion that there is a certain 
necessity of sinning is expressed by our author's idea 
that all good choices are the direct result of God's 
control of man's will. From the sinful state into 
which all mankind has fallen, no individual is able 
by his unaided will to rise and return to God. 14 Each 
person does it as God awakens and helps him. 15 
Augustine seems almost to set aside free-will in the 
assertion that without God's aid, man is utterly in- 
capable of ruling himself. 16 Man performs no good 
deed which God does not cause him to do. 17 Both 
good and bad wills are at the complete disposal of 
God, who turns them whithersoever and whensoever 
he wills. 18 That interesting group of people whom 
Augustine supposed to possess what he called the 
gift of perseverance, only chose the good because 
God worked in them to will such choices. 19 In short, 
it is God who makes them good. " Ipse ergo illos 
bonos facit, ut bona faciant." 20 Such statements as 
these, uttered no doubt with the desire of emphasiz- 



14 " Quia peccatum sine gratia Dei vinci non posset." De 
Diver. Quaest. I. 2. 

15 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 31. Cf. also ibid. II. 5. 

16 " Ut sine rectore Deo prsecipitatus, non se a se ipso regi 
potuisse, poenis experiretur." De Gest. Pelag. 7. 

17 " Quapropter multa Deus facit in homine bona, quae non 
facit homo nulla vero facit homo, quae non facit Deus ut 
faciat homo." Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. II. 21. Cf. ibid. I. 
7. and Conf. X. 5. 

18 De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. 41. Cf. also De Dono Persev. 12. 
is De Cor. et Grat. 38. 

20 Ibid. 36. 



PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY 129 

ing man's dependence upon God, and for the purpose 
of undermining the Pelagian exaltation of will, are 
not compatible with his former declarations regard- 
ing man's freedom. In reality, can it be said, in the 
light of these assertions, that Augustine has left free- 
dom for man in the true sense? He has not en- 
tirely excluded the element of personality but he has 
made man's good choices dependent upon the will of 
God. Has not the libertarian become the determinist? 
It now remains to be shown that Augustine, re- 
gardless of how we may interpret the foregoing state- 
ments, still clings to the declaration that man is free. 
His thought, therefore, takes the form of asserting, 
at one and the same time, both man's freedom and the 
need of God's grace. He would not permit the Pela- 
gians to exclude him from the use of the conception 
of freedom, nor would he allow them so to emphasize 
freedom that a righteous life becomes possible without 
the help of grace. Consequently, he boldly welds 
the two ideas into one doctrine and openly defends 
both sides of the antithesis. There is no call at this 
time to show that he asserted separately either free- 
dom or the need of grace. That has already been 
done. The task here is to show that he attempted to 
affirm both at once. Augustine's favorite illustration 
of the need of both freedom and grace is afforded to 
him by the eye. When it is enveloped in darkness 
and no attempt is being made to use it for purpose of 
sight, the eye is self-sufficient. But to be of use the 
eye needs the aid of external light. 21 This is exactly 
what Augustine means by grace. It is the external 
aid which our wills receive from God, if they are to 



21 De Gest. Pelag. 7. 



130 FREEDOM 

make any good choices. 22 In one of the Letters 23 
our author urges his correspondent to believe both 
that man's will is free and that it is aided by God's 
grace without which progress is impossible. He ex- 
plicitly states that the purpose of one of his works is 
to defend man's freedom against those who deny it for 
the sake of God's grace, and at the same time to answer 
those who wrongly suppose that free will is destroyed 
when God's grace is defended. 24 " Proinde arbitrium 
voluntatis humanse nequaquam destruimus, quando Dei 
gratiam qua ipsum adjuvatur arbitrium, non superbia 
negamus ingrata sed grata potius pietate prsedica- 
mus." 25 This combination of grace and free will is 
the secret of a happy life, 26 but it must not be so in- 
terpreted as to excuse man from all effort. In fact 
no one is aided who does not put forth some effort 
in his own behalf. 27 Good results do not ensue with- 
out our will. 28 The neat balance in which Augustine 
endeavored to keep these two conceptions is revealed 
in the following sentence : " Non quia hoc sine vol- 
untate nostra agitur, sed quia voluntas non implet quod 
agit, nisi divinitus adjuvetur." 29 It becomes evident, 
therefore, that Augustine, in order to combat Pelagian- 



22 De Grat. Christi 52. Cf. also De Bono Vid. 22 and De 
Cor. et Grat. 2. 

2 3 Ep. CCXIV. 

24 " Sed quoniam sunt quidam, qui sic gratiam Dei defend- 
unt, ut negent hominis liberum arbitrium ; aut quando gratia 
defenditur, negari existiment liberum arbitrium; hinc aliquid 
scribere ad vestram Charitatem." De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. I. I. 

25 De Bono Vid. 21. Cf. also Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. IV. 3. 

26 " Hoc arbitrium liberum adjuvatur per Dei gratiam, ut 
quod naturaliter volimus, hoc est beate vivere, bene vivendo 
habere possimus." Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. XXVI. 

27 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 6. 

28 De Spiritu et Lit. 15 fin. 

29 De Perf. Just. Horn. 40. 



MEANINGS OF TERM "FREEDOM'' 131 

ism with its rigorous insistence upon the power of 
free will, maintained both man's freedom and God's 
grace. We thus see that his former explicit state- 
ments of freedom must be viewed with this important 
qualification, that external aid is necessary for all 
good choices. But has not freedom, in its true signifi- 
cation, vanished in this endeavor to refute the Pela- 
gians ? 

VARIOUS MEANINGS OF THE TERM " FREEDOM." 

We can now clarify the whole situation by openly 
recognizing that Augustine did not use the term 
" freedom " with any one, fixed, connotation. To at- 
tempt to force any such interpretation upon his 
thought, would be absurd. In the light of what has 
already been said, it is perfectly evident that he con- 
ceived different creatures to be endowed with different 
kinds of freedom. By recognizing these different 
classes of beings and observing the freedom with 
which each group is supposed to have been endowed, 
we shall be able to understand clearly what Augus- 
tine's thought was regarding the freedom of the will. 
He uses the term with at least four distinct mean- 
ings. 1 

(1). The term is employed frequently in a most 
general sense. It is simply that power which dif- 
ferentiates man from a machine. It is his power to 
act, his ability to choose between any two alternative 
courses of action. Thus we find Augustine defining 
will in these words : " Voluntas est animi motus, 



- 



1 Julius Miiller points out three meanings. See Die christ- 
liche Lehre von der Siinde B. III., Th. I. C I. § 5. 



132 FREEDOM 

cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel 
adipiscendum." 2 A little later in the same writing 
he defines will as a movement of the mind free both 
for doing or not doing. 3 This signification of free- 
dom applies to all beings and to all states of man. 
Whether dealing with angels, demons, Adam, or in- 
dividual man, all are supposed to possess freedom in 
this general sense. It is that general spontaneity 
which distinguishes man from all the other works 
of creation. The acts of man are " voluntaria " al- 
though he is conceived as unable to do good without 
external aid. So likewise the deeds of the saints 
are " voluntaria " although they live under a holy 
necessity.* 

(2.) Man in his original, perfect condition was 
supposed to have been endowed with the power to 
choose between good and evil. 5 His freedom was in 
that sense absolute. Adam could have continued in 
his perfect state if he had willed it. 6 This aspect 



2 De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. 14. In the Retractions, 
Augustine interprets this passage thus : " Quod . propterea 
dictum est, ut hac definitione volens a nolente discerneretur, 
et sic ad illos referretur intentio, qui primi in paradiso fue- 
runt humano generi origo mali, nullo cogente peccando, hoc 
est libera voluntate peccando." I. XV. 3. It is very evident 
that the definition as thus interpreted would have been of 
no use against the Manicheans, and yet it was originally 
written for that very purpose. 

3 " Quamobrem illae animse quidquid f aciunt, si natura, non 
voluntate faciunt, id est, si libero et ad faciendum et ad non 
faciendum motu animi carent; si denique his abstinendi ab 
opere suo potestas nulla conceditur, peccatum earum tenere 
non possumus." De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. 17. 

4 For this general use of the term see De Spir. et Lit. 58, 
Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. et seq., De Grat. et Lib. arbit. I. 
et seq., Op. Imp. c. Jul. I., and especially Civ. Dei V. cap. IX. 

5 Compare the treatment of Adam in Chapter IV. pp. 99-114. 

6 De Cor. et Grat. 31. Cf. also De Natura Bon. c. Manich. 7. 



MEANINGS OF TERM " FREEDOM " 133 

of freedom Augustine formulated in the phrase 
"posse non peccare." Adam had it in his power not 
to sin, 7 but this phrase always presupposes the other 
possibility of Adam's sinning. In other words, it 
was in his power both to will what was right or to 
will what was wrong. 8 He was created with both 
these possibilities. " Et ita homo creatus est, ut et 
nolle posset et velle, et quod libet horum haberet in 
potestate." 9 The same conception finds expression 
in the words that man was created with a will free to 
do what was right. 10 Augustine insists then that 
Adam had full freedom. " Liberum ergo arbitrium 
perf ecte fuit in primo homine." " He was so con- 
stituted that absolutely nothing could hinder his will, 
if he chose to be good. 12 Consequently he sinned be- 
cause he willed it, for he was able not to will it. 13 
We have in this conception of freedom, laying aside 
the fact that Augustine looks upon it as a gift of God, 
that which appeals to reason. Here a dual possibility 
existed for Adam. It was in his power to reduce this 
dual future possibility to a single actual reality. This 
is freedom in its true significance. 14 In this second 



7 Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. XLVII. 

8 " Sic enim oportebat prius hominem fieri, ut et bene velle 
posset, et male;" Enchir. CV. init. Cf. also De Cor. et 
Grat. 32. 

9 Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XL. Cf. also De Agone Christiano II. 

10 De Lib. Arbit. III. 19. Quoted by himself in De Nat. 
et Grat. 81. 

11 Prop. ex. Ep. ad Rom. Exp. XIII.-XVIII. (in III. 20). 
12 " Hie sic f actus est, ut nihil omnino voluntate ejus 

r$sisteret, si vellet Dei praecepta servare." Acta seu Disp. 
c. Fort. 22. 

13 " Et ideo peccasse quia voluit, qui posset et nolle." Op. 
Imp. c. Jul. V. LIV. 

14 Professor G. H. Palmer defines freedom in these words : 
" Freedom is that self-guidance by which, for purposes of 



134 FREEDOM 

aspect of freedom which is expressed by the words 
" posse non peccare " and which implies the possi- 
bility of either a good or evil choice, we find Augus- 
tine's truest conception of freedom. This was limited 
to the first man. 

(3). Every individual since Adam possesses free- 
dom but no one is as free as Adam was. 15 The great 
powers of freedom which man received at creation 
were lost by Adam's sin. 16 His free will, therefore, 
which remains, only avails to induce him to sin. 17 
Statements are not wanting in which Augustine boldly 
affirms that by the Fall, man lost his freedom, 18 or 
that by sin freedom perished, 19 but these assertions 
cannot be isolated and set up as our author's doctrine. 
What is meant is that the freedom which Adam pos- 
sessed was lost. 20 The " posse non peccare " which 
Adam enjoyed now becomes " posse peccare." Man 
is no longer able to avoid sin. His freedom consists 
in the ability to sin. 21 Since man was unwilling to 
do what he could, when he possessed full freedom, he 
now, as a just punishment for that disobedience wills 



my own, I narrow a future multiple possibility to a single 
actual result." Lecture before Ethical Seminary of Yale 
University, Nov. 26, 1906. 

15 " Multa quippe sunt quae agunt homines mala, a quibus 
eis liberum est abstinere: sed nulli tarn liberum est, quam 
illi (Adam) fuit." Op. Imp. c. Jul. L XLVII. 

i6Sermo CXXXI. 

17 " Nam neque liberum arbitrium quidquam nisi ad peccan- 
dum valet." De Spir. et Lit. 5. 

18 " Victore peccato amissum est liberum arbitrium." En- 
chir. XXX. 

19 " Libertas quidem periit per peccatum." Cont. duas Ep. 
Pelag. I. 5. 

20 Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 5. 

21 Enchir. XXX. 



MEANINGS OF TERM ''FREEDOM" 135 

to do what he cannot. 22 He has lost his power of 
choice, for that will which availed for his sin is not 
sufficient to restore him to his original pristine condi- 
tion. 23 Julianus immediately interpreted this doctrine 
as robbing man of free will. 24 But Augustine vigor- 
ously denies this and insists that free will remains, 
but is of avail only for sin. 25 Man does act with free 
will, but without God's help his choices are only 
evil. 26 Free will is sufficient for evil but is of no 
avail for good. 27 A necessary implication of Au- 
gustine's insistence upon both freedom and the neces- 
sity of grace is that in man's present condition he is 
only free to sin. This is clearly formulated in the 
following way : " Liberum ergo arbitrium perfecte 
fuit in primo homine, in nobis autem ante gratiam 
non est liberum arbitrium ut non peccemus sed tantum 
ut peccare nolimus. Gratia vero efficit ut non tantum 
velimus recte facere, sed etiam possimus, non viribus 
nostris, sed Liberatoris auxilio." 28 
COne instinctively asks, why is not the same will 
which is free to choose sin, also free to choose right- 
eousness? Why may we not use our will in doing 
good as well as in doing evil? It is rather singular 
that Augustine did not recognize this difficulty more 
fully, and attempt to answer it. In one of his shorter 
treatises he raises the question but his answer fails 



22 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XV. 

23 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 4. Cf. also De Dono Persev. 
27. 

24 Augustine quotes his words in Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 4. 

25 Ibid. II. 9. 

26 Sermo CLVI. 11. 

27 De Cor. et Grat. 31. 

28 Prop. ex. Ep. ad Rom. Exp. XIII.-XVIII. (in III. 20). 
Cf. also De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 31. 



136 FREEDOM 

to meet the difficulty. He asserts that sin and lust 
begin from choices of the will, whereas the impulse 
to good does not arise from within but comes upon us 
from God. 29 The human will, argues Augustine, is 
not sufficient for good unless aided and kindled from 
above. 29 

An explanation is afforded by Dr. Warfield which 
is not lacking in suggestiveness, but which upon investi- 
gation is found to be somewhat wanting in cogency. 
He endeavors to maintain a distinction in Augustine's 
thought " between will as a faculty and will in the 
broader sense." 30 He then points out that the faculty 
of will remains intact, but that the person who uses 
the will has been enslaved as a result of the Fall. 
If Dr. Warfield is contending for the unity of char- 
acter and the influence of present choices upon sub- 
sequent volitions, we gladly recognize the truth of 
his statement. But just how he conceives the Fall to 
have been the means of robbing each of us of a part of 
his freedom and of giving our characters an inevitable 
bias toward sin, this is difficult to grasp. The in- 
fluence of the past, whether individual or racial cannot 



29 De Patientia 13, 14. 

30 His own words are as follows : " But it is clear that 
he distinguished, in his thinking, between will as a faculty 
and will in a broader sense. As a mere faculty, will is 
and always remains an indifferent thing (De Spir. et Lit. 58) 
. . . after the Fall, as before it, continuing poised in in- 
differency, and ready like a weather-cock, to be turned 
whithersoever the breeze that blows from the heart ('will' 
in the broader sense) may direct (De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 
30). It is not the faculty of willing but the man who makes 
use of that faculty, that has suffered change from the Fall." 
B. B. Warfield, Nic. and Post-Nic. Fath. Vol. V. pp. LXVIL- 
VIII. The writer prefers the fourfold classification indi- 
cated above which is supported by ample citations from 
Augustine's works. 



MEANINGS OF TERM "FREEDOM" 137 

be ignored nor can it be accounted for by the act of 
any one man. 

(4). There remains a final meaning of freedom 
which if interpreted in the right way may be incor- 
porated with the second aspect as here presented and 
form a rational conception of freedom. All men do 
not remain in that condition which has just been de- 
scribed. Adam's " posse non peccare " was dimin- 
ished to " posse peccare " by his own sin, but by 
" gratia Dei " this loss may be more than restored. The 
evil necessity may be replaced by full liberty. 31 Adam 
had the ability to will either well or ill, but in the fu- 
ture life the righteous will not be able to choose evil. 32 
The negative particle, therefore returns to our clause, 
but it takes a different position. The reward of the 
righteous will be a condition described by the words 
" non posse peccare." The dual possibility of Adam 
no longer exists. Freedom is present but only for the 
choice of good. " Si ergo quaeris, ubi vel quando 
detur homini non posse peccare: prsemia quare sanc- 
torum, quae post hanc vitam illos oportet accipere." 33 
Augustine likewise insists here that this condition is 
real freedom. He argues that God is not able to will 
to sin and yet we do not regard Him as under any 
necessity. 34 Real freedom then includes the impos- 
sibility to sin. 35 That will is alone truly free which is 



31 " Ac per hoc opitulante gratia per Jesum Christum Do- 
minum nostrum, et mala necessitas removebitur et libertas 
plena tribuetur." De Nat. et Grat. 79 fin. 

32 " Postea vero sic erit, ut male velle non possit;" Enchir. 
CV. Cf. also De Continentia 16. 

33 Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. XII. 

34 Op. Imp. c. Jul. VI. V. and De Nat. et Grat. 54. 

35 " Multo quippe liberius erit arbitrium quod omnino non 
poterit servire peccato." Enchir. CV. 



138 FREEDOM 

not the slave of sin or vice. 36 Augustine has drawn 
for us the distinction between the second and fourth 
aspects of freedom as here presented, in these words : 
" Prima ergo libertas voluntatis erat, posse non pec- 
care; novissima erit multo major, non posse pec- 
care." 3T 

It is plain that this last aspect of freedom cannot 
be regarded as an abridgment of free will if con- 
sidered from the right point of view. It is only a 
recognition of the unity of character and the power 
of habit. He has the greatest personality who has 
thus mechanized the largest portions of his life. His 
freedom is greatest who has most largely reduced the 
number of possibilities open to him. This is only con- 
ditioned by the fact that it must be the man himself 
who has driven out the possibilities. Thus " posse 
non peccare," presenting as it does a dual future pos- 
sibility, and " non posse peccare," representing the 
result of a continued choice of good may be easily 
welded into a consistent doctrine of freedom. The 
one may be described as formal, the other as real 
freedom. 38 But the difficulty arises from the fact 
that the former is limited to Adam and the latter to 
the saint. Poor mortal man about whom we are 
chiefly concerned must be satisfied with " posse pec- 
care." His only possibility for good lies in the aid 
furnished from an external source. Without " gratia 
Dei " his will is limited to the choice of evil. His 
choices for good then are determined by himself plus 
an objective power. Has not Augustine, even amid 



36 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XL 

37 De Cor. et Grat. 33. 

38 Cf. Julius Miiller op. cit. B. III. Th. I. C I. 



CAUSA EFFICIENS 139 

his vigorous declarations of freedom, passed over into 
determinism ? 



CAUSA EFFICIENS AND CAUSA DEFICIENS. 

The conceptions " causa efficiens " and " causa 
deficiens " reveal the same attitude to the whole 
problem of freedom. Augustine is ever searching 
for some power back of the will of man. His in- 
tensely religious frame of mind and his determination 
to make God the sole cause of all that really exists, 
do, no doubt, account in a large measure for these 
conceptions. Augustine's universe, as we have seen, 
is theocentric and in no respect is it more so than in 
the problem with which we are now dealing. Every 
person exists in absolute dependence upon God. Free- 
will itself is the direct gift of God to each man. 1 Let 
no one boast of his free will, for this, together with 
all else, is given him by his Creator. 2 God is the 
originator of every movement of the will toward good, 
for he both created it and then re-made it when it 
had become evil. 3 God then is the " causa efficiens " 
of the good will. " Si dixerimus nullam esse effi- 
cientem causam etiam voluntatis bonae, cavendum est, 
ne voluntas bona bonorum Angelorum, non facta sed 
Deo coseterna esse credatur." 4 Here we see that Au- 
gustine insists upon the dependence of the good wills 
of the angels upon God. Even these beings, Augus- 



1 Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 20. 

2 Enchir. XXXII. 

3 " Ad bonum vero ejus prior est voluntas Creatoris ejus, 
sive ut earn faceret quae nulla erat, sive ut reficiat quae lapsa 
perierat." Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XV. Cf. also ibid. XIV. cap. 
XXI. 

4 Ibid. XII. cap. IX. 



140 FREEDOM 

tine continues, would have remained helpless had not 
the Creator stimulated their wills to good choices. 
Augustine's doctrine of grace is only another ex- 
pression of this same conception. This is found 
everywhere throughout his writings. Man in his 
present condition makes no good choices, has no good 
impulses and makes no progress in the moral life, save 
as God stimulates his will. Every will, therefore, in 
every choice of good, depends upon God as its efficient 
cause. 

Now, as we have already seen, sin is a voluntary 
defection. " Motus ergo aversionis, quod fatemur 
esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, omnis 
autem defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineat, et 
ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites. Qui tamen de- 
fectus quoniam est voluntarius in nostra est positus 
potestate." 5 An evil will originates by turning or 
falling away from its Creator. 6 The first evil will 
arose in just this way. It was not any positive deed 
but a defection from the work of God to its own work. 7 
In the case of both angels and men, the cause of evil 
was the " voluntas deficiens " of a good creature. 8 
Sin consists in the turning of the will from the un- 
changeable and universal good to its own or to some 
inferior good. 9 In short, evil is a defection from 
good. 10 It is important to note here that there is no 



5 De Lib. Arbit. II. 54. 

6 " Ab eo (Deo) quippe defectus est origo voluntatis malae." 
De Grat. Christi 20. 

7 " Mala vero voluntas prima, quoniam mala opera praecessit 
in homine, defectus potius fuit quidam ab opere Dei ad sua 
opera, quam opus ullum." Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XI. 

8 Enchir. 8. 

8 Be Lib. Arbit. II. 53. 
10 Civ. Dei XII. cap. IX, 



CAUSA EFFICIENS 141 

inconsistency in Augustine's metaphysics. He has not 
said that the changeable or inferior goods to which 
the will turns are evil. Everything that exists is, in 
its own rank and class, good. The evil, therefore, is 
the defection itself, the turning or falling away, not 
the object to which the will turns. " Deficitur enim 
non ad mala, sed male; id est, non ad malas naturas, 
sed ideo male, quia contra ordinem naturarum ab eo 
quod summe est, ad id quod minus est." xl 

We now approach a most interesting phase of our 
author's thought. In fact we are at the very heart 
of the whole problem of evil as he conceived and 
solved it. God is the " causa efficiens " of the good 
will. Evil or sin is nothing other than the defection 
of the will from the highest good to a lower good. 
What now, and this is the crucial question, what is the 
cause of this evil will? We have found an efficient 
cause for every good will, what is the efficient cause 
of the evil will? Why should a being endowed with 
a good will, deliberately choose an inferior to a supe- 
rior good? Before giving his positive answer Augus- 
tine does just what we would expect him to do. He 
affirms that God is not the efficient cause of the evil 
will. In the Confessions 12 he declares God to be the 
Creator of all natures. Only that which is not, to- 
gether with the defection of the will from the highest 
good, does not find its source in Him. God is the Be- 
stower of all powers, but wicked wills, which are con- 
trary to nature, do not come from Him. 13 It is absurd 
to imagine that the good Creator could be the cause of 



11 Civ. Dei XII. cap. VIII. 

12 XII. II. 

13 Civ. Dei V. cap. IX. Cf. also " Non erit iste motus ex 
Deo." De Lib. Arbit. II. 54. 



142 FREEDOM 

evil wills. 14 And yet, Augustine still clings to the ne- 
cessity of relating all to the Creator. He is not willing 
that even this blemish of creation should exist utterly 
unrelated to God and so he maintains that whenever a 
depraved will has power to accomplish its evil de- 
signs, even this is an evidence of the judgment of 
God. 15 

What now is his positive answer? It is the most 
barren of negations. There is no efficient cause of an 
evil will. " Hujus porro malae voluntatis causa ef- 
ficiens si quseratur, nihil invenitur. Quid est enim 
quod facit voluntatem malam, cum ipsa faciat opus 
malum ? Ac per hoc mala voluntas efficiens est operis 
mali, malae autem voluntatis efficiens est nihil." 16 
Augustine sustains this declaration by the following 
argument. 17 If there were an efficient cause of an 
evil will, that cause would or would not have a will. 
If it had a will, that will would be good or bad. If it 
were a good will, it would be absurd to suppose that 
a good will caused an evil will. If on the other 
hand that cause had a bad will, we find ourselves with 
the original problem and to avoid an infinite regress, 
we ask at once what was the cause of this first bad 
will. 

But that is our problem. If you reply that it was 
always evil } this is refuted by his conception of na- 
ture, and the utter negativity of all evil. It exists 
only as something attached to a good nature and con- 
sequently could not have been eternally evil. We are 



14 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 30. 

15 " Porro cum voluntas mala potestatem accipit implere 
quod intendit, ex judicio Dei venit." De Spir. et Lit. 54. 

16 Civ. Dei XII. cap. VI. Cf. ibid. XII. cap. IX. 

17 Ibid. cap. VI. in toto. 



CAUSA DEFICIENS 143 

then left with the second of our original alternatives, 
which suggests that something without a will was the 
cause of the first evil will. If so, it must be superior, 
inferior or equal to that which it corrupted. If su- 
perior, it would be expected not only not to be without 
a will but to have a good will. Similarly, if equal 
to that which is vitiated, it would have a good will and 
consequently would not cause a bad will. There only 
remains the supposition that some inferior thing, with- 
out a will, was the cause of the first evil will. But 
all things in so far as they exist are good. The most 
earthly of objects is good in its own rank. Conse- 
quently, there is no efficient cause of an evil will. 
When the will turns from that which is above to that 
which is below itself, it becomes evil. The act of 
turning, and not the object to which it turns, is evil. 
The evil will then has no efficient but only a deficient 
cause. " Nemo igitur quserat efficient em causam 
malae voluntatis : non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens, 
quia nee ilia effectio est, sed defectio. Deficere 
namque ab eo quod summe est, ad id quod minus est, 
hoc est incipere habere voluntatem malam." 18 

Augustine continues this passage by stating that the 
effort to discover the " causa deficiens " of an evil will 
is just like the endeavor to see darkness or hear si- 
lence. Both are known to us not by their positive 
reality, but by their want of it. (" Non sane in specie, 
sed in speciei privatione.") Therefore, all that we 
can know of this deficient cause is that it is unknown. 
All that we can say is that we know it by not knowing 
it. All of this argument occurring in a work rep- 
resenting the mature thought of Augustine is remark- 



18 Civ. Dei XII. cap. VII. init. 



144 



FREEDOM 



ably corroborated and foreshadowed by an earlier 
writing. Referring to the turning of the will from 
the highest good he says : " Unde igitur erit ? Ita 
quaerenti tibi, si respondiam nescire me, fortasse eris 
tristior : sed tamen vera responderim. Sciri enim non 
potest quod nihil est." 19 The evil will is therefore 
a defection, of which the cause is deficient. 20 

In conclusion it is only necessary to recall what 
has been stated already regarding our author's doc- 
trine of creation ex nihilo. 21 It has been pointed out 
that an evil will arose out of the good nature of an- 
gels and men, not because that nature was created by 
God, but because it was fashioned out of nothing. 22 
The possibility of an evil will, therefore, is involved in 
metaphysical imperfection. Its actual existence can 
be traced to no " causa efficiens " but only to " causa 
deficiens." Our author leaves us in complete agnos- 
ticism, for " causa deficiens " is only another name 
for that of which the only thing that is known is that 
it is unknown. In his search for the origin of evil, 
he is unable to go back of the choice of an evil will. 
Metaphysical imperfection accounts for the possibility, 
freedom for the actuality, of sin. 



19 De Lib. Arbit II. 54. 

20 " Cujus defectionis etiam causa utique deficit." Civ. Dei 
XII. cap. IX. init. 

21 Vide pp. 14-18 and 56-60. 

22 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48 and Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XLIV. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

It is not our aim in this chapter to offer a full 
statement of the Augustinian doctrine of sin. We 
have already seen x the identification that existed for 
Augustine's mind, between malum and peccatum. 
Our second chapter was devoted to answering the 
question. " Quid est malum ? " Consequently, it 
becomes unnecessary to raise the general question 
" Quid est peccatum ? " To do so would be only a 
repetition. We have seen that evil when defined as 
" corruptio " seemed to leave its negative signifi- 
cance and assume a distinctly active connotation. It 
was that which attacked and destroyed nature or be- 
ing. Again it was called " vitium " or that flaw 
which attaches itself to any good when it becomes evil. 
Similarly it was characterized as a defection, a falling 
away from a higher to a lower good. Now it is one 
of our purposes in this chapter to attempt to show 
that even when Augustine is speaking, not only in 
a speculative, but also in an ethical sense, he always 
uses " peccatum " with a connotation that harmonizes 
perfectly with this conception of malum. 

Furthermore, in the preceding chapters, while deal- 
ing with the origin of evil, we stated fully our author's 
conception of the first man, describing the unique re- 
lation which he was supposed to have held to the en- 
tire race, and dwelling upon the place of freedom in 



1 Chapter I. pp. 21-26. " Malum est peccatum." 

145 



146 THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

the Augustinian system. Consequently in a large 
measure our author's conception of sin has already 
been set forth. There remains, however, some im- 
portant material and some significant distinctions, 
which demand treatment at this time. In the former 
chapters we have spoken often of original and actual 
sin, being compelled to assume that such a distinction 
existed in Augustine's thought. We must now raise 
the question, What is original sin as it exists in any 
given individual? What are its evidences? Like- 
wise just what is actual sin, and is there some common 
element in all the varied specific sins? Our author's 
answers to these questions are of such a nature that 
they could have been included only with difficulty in 
the second chapter, and yet they form such an in- 
tegral part of his system that to omit them would be 
unjust. Consequently, without in any sense raising 
the general question of what is sin, we further aim 
here to set forth our author's answers to these specific 
questions and to observe that they harmonize with 
his system as a whole. 

ORIGINAL SIN. 

What, then, is " originale peccatum " ? We are 
not asking what the original sin was. That we have 
seen was an act of the will of the first man. But 
what is original sin as it exists in the life of every hu- 
man being of every age, in his present individualized 
existence ? We have seen 2 that Augustine placed all 
sin in the will. Our original sin was committed by 
our wills when we were each a part of Adam. The 



2 Chapter IV. pp. 99-114. 



ORIGINAL SIN 147 

first man was both an individual and a " homo gener- 
alis." He was the whole human race in miniature. 
When Adam sinned, we sinned. We are guilty of 
original sin because we committed sin when we were 
still a part of the first man. All of this bald realism 
we have met in our endeavor to trace the origin of 
evil in man. The precise question before us now is 
this : How does this original sin manifest itself in 
the individualized existence of each of us to-day? To 
this question Augustine gives a full and interesting 
reply. 

The immediate result, says Augustine, of the first 
sin was the sense of shame. Here we begin to see 
the significance of our author's conception of original 
sin. 3 Before the Fall, man had no feeling of shame 
or occasion to blush. 4 It was only after man had 
sinned that he felt the need of hiding his shame. 5 
This was the first punishment of Adam's sin. 6 This 
idea is characteristically expressed in the following 
sentence : " Qua gratia remota, ut poena reciproca 
inobedientia plecteretur, exstitit in motu corporis 
qucedam impudens novitas unde esset indecens nuditas, 
et fecit attentos, reddiditque confusos." 7 Now the 
interesting feature of this notion is this : the sense of 
shame which every man possesses to-day is the direct 



3 Vide Chapter IV. pp. 99-114. 

4 Sermo CX 2. 

5 De Pec. Orig. 41. Cf. also De Nupt. et Concup. I. 1, 23, 
24 and II. 52. 

6 Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XIII. " Quae prius eadem membra 
erant, sed pudenda non erant. Senserunt ergo novum motum 
inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobe- 
dientiae suae." 

7 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XVII. Cf. De Genesi ad Lit. XI. 41, 
De Cor. et Grat. XL 31, and Cont. Jul. Pelag. IV. 82. 



148 THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

penalty of the first sin. 8 Here, then, is the first evi- 
dence of original sin. It consists in the " impudens 
novitas " by which sex and its action are inevitably 
attended. This is the penalty, the plague, and the 
mark of sin. It is that law in our members which wars 
against the law of our minds. 9 It was the first result 
of sin in original man and it has attached itself to all 
his posterity. 

A second aspect of original sin, closely allied to 
the first, is that which is expressed by the much used 
term, " concupiscentia." Augustine's early life, no 
doubt, influenced his doctrine at this point. He says 
that the nine years in which he espoused Manicheism 
were lived in divers lusts. 10 Man's flesh was origi- 
nally obedient to his spirit, but since Adam fell, all 
mankind derive from him the concupiscence of the 
flesh. 11 This defect was unknown before the first sin. 12 
Adam was afflicted with concupiscence because he 
sinned, 13 in fact it arose only as a penal consequence 
of his evil. 14 The whole mass of human nature was 
so altered and changed in Adam, that he experienced 
the conflict of disobedient lust. 15 Since the first man 
would not be obedient he brought upon himself the 
just punishment of being afflicted with a disobedient 



s Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XX. Cf. also cap. XVIII. 

9 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 22. Cf. also 25 and 36. 

10 Conf. IV. 1. 

11 In Evang. Joan. III. 12. 

12 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XXI. 
is Sermo. LXIX. 4. 

14 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XII. Cf. also De Nupt. et Concup. 
I. 6. 

15 " Sed hgetenus in eo natura humana vitiata atque mutata 
est, ut repugnantem pateretur in membris inobedientiam con- 
cupiscendi." Civ. Dei XIII. cap. III. 



ORIGINAL SIN 149 

body. As he had rebelled so he experienced the re- 
bellion of his own flesh. 16 In this aspect also of 
original sin the interesting feature is that this con- 
cupiscence, the punishment of the first sin, is the 
inevitable heritage of every person. It is the sin 
with which every man is born. 17 Every individual 
is under sin because of the concupiscence by means 
of which he is propagated. "Quia per illam nascuntur 
concupiscentiam." 18 Augustine makes some inter- 
esting statements in support of this doctrine when he 
defends marriage against the Manicheans. He spe- 
cifically states that the purpose of one of his writings 19 
is to make clear the distinction between carnal con- 
cupiscence which involves original sin, and the good 
of marriage itself. In one passage carnal concupis- 
cence is called sin. 20 A striking feature of this 
aspect of original sin is that it always remains even 
after regeneration. 21 It is the sin with which we are 
born. 22 And although it may be diminished grad- 
ually, 23 it remains until death. 

A third phase of original sin is seen in man's mor- 
tality. Physical death is the direct result of Adam's 
first sin. This is reiterated time and time again. This 



16 De Nupt. et Concup. I. 7 and II. 14, 54. Cf. also De 
Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 36. 

17 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 57 and Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. 
I. 27. 

18 Cont. Jul. Pelag. IV. 34. 

19 De Nupt. et Concup. I. 1. It is in this writing that 
Augustine calls concupiscence an accident of original sin. 

I. 19. Cf. also I. 6 and Retract. II. 53. 
20 Sermo CLV. 1. 

21 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 4. Cf. also II. 15, 37, 45, 46. 
De Perf. Just. Horn. XI. 27, 28. 

22 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 4. 

23 De Perf. Just. Horn. XIII. and Sermo CLI. 5. 



150 THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

is all the more striking because Augustine was com- 
pelled to face the argument that death came by natural- 
law. This idea he rejected, however, asserting that 
God had not ordained death for any one by a law of 
nature. 24 Adam's body was regarded by Augustine as 
capable of either death or immortality. Just as 
Adam's will was supposed to have the dual possibility 
of falling into sin or continuing in perfect righteous- 
ness, so his body was not necessarily subject to death. 
Rather it was so constituted that it could not die. 25 
The only qualification placed upon this assertion is 
that death was impossible unless Adam sinned. 26 
Therefore if Adam had not fallen he would not have 
been robbed of his body, but instead it would have 
been absorbed by life. 27 But Adam was cast down 
and mortality began its reign. 28 All human nature 
was changed by the Fall. After that fatal event 
man's flesh came into the unhappy state of mortality. 29 
" Peccato autem ita hunc statum naturae fuisse muta- 
tum ut hominem necesse sit mori." 30 Death, there- 
fore, became a necessity because of sin. Mortality is 
man's punishment for disobedience and is therefore 
called sin. 31 Nevertheless Augustine insists that no 
one sins simply by dying, but that death is called sin 
because it is the punishment of sin. 32 Neither birth- 



2 * Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XV. 

25 Civ. Dei XXI. cap. VIII. 

26 Ibid. XIII. cap. XXIV. 

27 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 2. 

28 In Ep. Joan, ad Parth. IV. 3. 

29 Civ. Dei XXI. cap. VIII. 

30 Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. XCVI. Cf. also " per peccatum 
hominis mutata est humana natura." Ibid. VI. XXVII. 

31 Cont. Faust. XIV. 3. 

32 Ibid, and De Nat. et Grat. 25. 



ORIGINAL SIN 151 

travail, nor the death of human off-spring would ever 
have ensued, if sin had not preceded. 33 Here, as in 
the two preceding aspects of original sin we must 
observe that the death of every individual since Adam 
is due to that first sin. We fell through Adam's sin 
and have all come into the inheritance of mortality. 34 
The first man was so punished that whosoever should 
arise out of his stock should be punished by the same 
death. 35 This, then, is a third evidence of original sin. 
Death is due to sin. 36 Mortality has accrued to man- 
kind as a result of sin. 37 Death here may be in- 
terpreted in either sense, for our author asserts that 
both the first and second deaths were inflicted on man 
because of sin. 38 

A fourth aspect of original sin is expressed by the 
term " vitium." We have already had occasion 39 to 
observe that this was one of Augustine's favorite 
terms for the description of evil. It finds particular 
application to man, and yet its full content is rather 
elusive. Thus far it has not been difficult to grasp 
our author's thought when he asserted that original 
sin manifests itself in the life of the actualized indi- 
vidual in the forms of shame, concupiscence and mor- 
tality. Those are facts of common experience, but 
when he tells us that original sin is " vitium " it is 
more difficult to respond to his suggestion. Original 
sin, then, in the present individualized existence of 



33 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 29. 

34 De Symbolo 2 and De Pec. Orig. 28, 45. 
85 Civ. Dei XIII. cap. XXIII. 

36 Conf . XIII. 16, Enchir. XXV and De Trin. XIII. XI\i6. 
37 Conf. I. 1, De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 4, Sermo XCVII. 
2 and In Joan. Evang. III. 13. 

38 Enchir. XCIII. \ 

39 Chapter II. pp. 30-31. \ 



152 THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

each person is manifested by a fault or flaw in his 
nature. That defect or blemish or imperfection which 
clings to all mankind is original sin. 

In this respect Augustine endeavored to take the 
middle course between the Manicheans and the Pela- 
gians. He insisted that all nature, including human 
nature, was good, but also that every man was born 
with a taint of original sin. 40 The human infant, 
contends Augustine, has a good origin, for all nature 
is created good, but he is corrupted by propagation. 41 
Pelagius strenuously denied that human nature could 
be altered by that airy, unsubstantial something which 
Augustine called original sin. 42 He likewise repudi- 
ated Augustine's dogma that every infant is tainted 
by birth. 43 Ccelestius, as might be expected, reiter- 
ated these truths with much more boldness, denying 
absolutely Augustine's idea of original sin, 44 and espe- 
cially repudiating the notion that some contagion 
clings to every new-born child. 45 Augustine, never- 
theless, insisted that there is present in man this de- 
fect or flaw which he expressed by the term " vitium." 
" In homine nato et natura est, quam non negas bonum, 
de quo laudamus Creatorem Deum; et vitium, quod 
non negas malum." 46 In man, therefore, two ele- 
ments are to be distinguished : his nature which comes 
from God, and his " vitium " 47 which is due to his 



40 Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. III. 25 and IV. 5. 
«■ Ibid. IV. 4. 

42 De Nat. et Grat. 21, where Augustine quotes Pelagius. 

43 De Pec. Orig. 24. 

44 Ibid. 2, 6 and 21. 

45 Ibid. 13. 

4 « Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CLIII. 
4 * In Joan. Evang. XLII. 16. 



ORIGINAL SIN 153 

own act. 48 This evil is referred to Adam's sin for its 
source. 49 Original sin then expresses itself in this 
flaw of our nature. 50 Augustine is very careful to 
guard himself against the charge that he makes human 
nature evil. He insists that human nature is not a 
" vitium " but only vitiated, 51 that the good nature is 
diminished by the defect or blemish, 52 and that this is 
done by attacking its integrity, beauty and virtue. 53 

Augustine did not fail to follow his doctrines to 
their logical conclusions and it is not until we see 
how rigidly he applied this idea of " vitium " to every 
member of the race, and especially to infants, that 
we can fully realize its significance. Infants newly 
born are guilty of sin, not sin that they themselves 
have committed, but that which they have contracted 
by their birth, due to the defect or flaw T of their nature 
(propter originis vitium). 54 Our author even goes 
to the absurd extreme of asserting that the helpless- 
ness of infants, 55 together with their various ills, 56 is 



48 " Fecisti tu aliquid, feci et ego aliquid : quod tu fecisti, 
natura dicitur ; quod ego feci, vitium vocatur. Vitium sane- 
tur, ut natura servetur." Sermo XIX. 1. 

49 " Causa porro hujus mali est, quod per unum hominem 
peccatum intravit in mundum.'' Op. Imp. c. Jul. V. XXI. 

50 De Nat. et Grat. 3, 50: and De Lib. Arbit. II. 19. 

51 Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CXC. " Non dixeram vitiatum non 
esse, sed vitium non esse." 

52 Cont. Jul. Pelag. IV. 14. " Quid enim aliud in vitio recte 
displicet, nisi quia detrahit vel minuit quod in natura placet ? " 

53 Civ. Dei XII. 3. 

54 " Unde veraciter parvulos in peccatorum remis^.ionem 
baptizat, non quse imitando fecerunt, propter primi pecca- 
toris exemplum ; sed quse nascendo traxerunt, propter originis 
vitium." De Pec. Orig. 17. 

55 Civ. Dei XIII. cap. III. and De Pec. Mer. et Remis. 
I. 68. Cf. also II. 48, where it is alleged that Christ as an 
infant was exempt from this helplessness. 

56 Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. XLVIII. and LXXVII. 



154 THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

due to this original blemish. Augustine admits in one 
of his Letters 57 that the idea of infants suffering for 
original sin embarrassed him and presented great dif- 
ficulties to his mind. He concedes that in his early 
writings he doubted the condemnation of infants for 
original sin, but in a late work 58 he glories in the 
progress he has made, having banished uncertainty 
and arrived at the conclusion that they are at birth 
guilty of original sin. Infants, before they have com- 
mitted any sins of their own, must partake of sinful 
flesh and are therefore guilty of this original taint. 59 
For Augustine's mind, the fact that Church usage de- 
manded infant baptism proved that the child was 
guilty of sin. 60 It has not yet committed any sin, con- 
sequently it must derive it from Adam. 61 Our author 
pushes this belief to a revolting conclusion when he 
asserts that infants which die without baptism are in- 
volved in condemnation. 62 Furthermore they are 
guilty not only for the sins in Adam but also for 
those of their parents. 63 Even the children of re- 
generate parents are born with this same taint and 
blemish. 64 Hence, original sin always continues and 



67 Ep. CLXVI. 16. Cf. also ibid. 6. 

58 De Dono Persev. 30. 

59 Ep. CXLIII. 6. 

60 Enchir. LII, Sermo CLXXIV. 7 and De Pec. Mer. et 
Remis. I. 23. 

«! Sermo CLIII. 14 and CLXV. 7- 

62 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 21, 35, 62, De Pec. Orig. 22 
and De Nupt. et Concup. I. 21, 22. 

63 Enchir. XLVI. Augustine, recognizing that this would 
involve the race in ever-increasing sin, finally suggests its 
limitation to three or four generations, but prefers to offer 
no definite solution. 

64 De Pec. Orig. 44, De Nupt. et Concup. I. 20, 21 and II. 



ORIGINAL SIN 155 

this vitium is ineradicable. It binds all alike. " Om- 
nes prorsus originale peccatum sequaliter colligavit; 
nemo esset cui malum hoc non in esset." 65 Here 
then is another evidence of original sin. It is this 
flaw of all nature for which every member of the 
race is guilty. 

Finally, original sin manifests itself in our defective 
wills. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon this aspect. 
It has already been pointed out that through Adam's 
sin man's perfect freedom (posse non peccare) was 
reduced to freedom for sin (posse peccare). This 
phase of original sin enables one to put some positive 
content into our author's conception of " vitium." The 
defect of man is that, unaided, he no longer possesses 
the ability to choose the good. 66 

If then we ask our author for the evidences of 
" originale peccatum " in the life of any individual 
since Adam, we receive this reply : the sense of shame, 
concupiscence, mortality, and a fatal flaw, present in 
the life of every person, are the direct results of that 
first original choice of evil. These factors of the indi- 
vidual's life are the penalties of Adam's first sin, and 
are justly endured because the will of the whole hu- 
man race was in Adam when he sinned. It is not dif- 
ficult to see that this all harmonizes with our author's 
speculative treatment of malum. All of these ele- 
ments are regarded as the corruption of an originally 
good nature. They describe a lessening or v diminu- 



58, De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 11 and Cont. Jul. Pelag. VI. 
14, which reads : " Mortuus enim peccato parens, et vivens 
Deo, generat tamen in peccato mortuum, nisi et ipse peccato 
regeneratione moriatur, et vivat Deo." 

65 Op. Imp. c. Jul. II. CXCIII. Cf. also De Nat. et Grat. 
9. fin. 

« 6 De Nat. et Grat. 50. 



156 THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

tion of being. They indicate a tendency to nonexist- 
ence. Consequently our author's conception of origi- 
nal sin adjusts itself fully to his system. The errors 
which underlie this explanation of the evils of the 
flesh will be treated in the concluding chapter. 

ACTUAL SIN. 

Our next task is to set forth Augustine's concep- 
tion of actual sin. That our author drew this dis- 
tinction between original and actual sin is very evi- 
dent. In all of his avowals of original sin in infants 
he is careful to maintain that they have committed 
no sins of their own. They have done no evil them- 
selves, but they are ruined in their source, and have 
derived their sin from the first man. 1 There lies latent 
in these assertions the implication that Augustine dis- 
tinguished original from actual sin. At other times 
our author boldly affirms that no proof is necessary 
to establish the sinlessness of infants as far as this 
life is concerned. 2 They possess no sins of their own. 
but only original sin. 3 But we are not limited to 
such statements as these to establish this distinction. 
In writing against the Pelagians he demands of them 
that they distinguish in their use of the word " sin " 
between that in which all share, and that which is 
peculiar to each person. " Certe manifestum est alia 



1 Sermo CXV. 4. Cf. all the references given in the pre- 
vious paragraph to establish original sin in infants. 

2 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 22. This is enlarged upon in 
ibid. I. 65, and III. 7. 

3 " A quibus in hac vita nulla peccata commissa sunt, nisi 
originale peccatum." De Pec. Orig. 22. Cf. also De Nupt. 
et Concup. I. 22. 



ACTUAL SIN 157 

esse propria cuique peccata, in quibus hi tantum pec- 
cant, quorum peccata sunt; aliud hoc unum, in quo 
omnes peccaverunt; quando omnes ille unus homo 
f uerunt." 4 Man increases his burdens by adding his 
own iniquities to his original sin. 5 The distinction, 
therefore, is this : man derives from Adam his original 
sin (originale peccatum) while he himself commits his 
actual sin (omnia nostra peccata). 6 

The question that now confronts us concerns this 
actual sin. What is it? We now find our author 
speaking of specific sins, of almost innumerable vari- 
eties. 7 It would be useless to enumerate the various 
acts and states which are described as sins, but it is a 
significant fact that out from this heterogeneous mass 
of evil acts, certain sins emerge which may be re- 
garded as typical and as including all the lesser sins. 
It is just at this juncture that our author's conception 
of evil and sin must endure the most severe strain. 
Can all these specific sins be regarded in such fashion 
that they fit into the general conception of evil as set 
forth in Chapter II? It is a most striking fact that 
even when Augustine is speaking in a purely religious 
or devotional sense, his descriptions of sin harmonize 
fully with his speculative treatment of evil. 

{^The first of these typical sins which we note, and 
which includes a great variety of other sins, is disobe- 



4 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. In. Cf. also ibid. III. cap. VII, 
Ep. CLXXXVI, and Sermo CLXV. 

5 De Perf. Just. Horn. XIX. 42 and Enchir. XXXIII. 

6 " Ac per hoc ab Adam, in quo omnes peccavimus, non 
omnia nostra peccata, sed tantum originale traduximus." De 
Pec. Mer. et Remis. I. 16. Cf. also ibid. I. 20. 

7 For example, Adam's sin is analyzed into pride, murder, 
blasphemy, spiritual fornication, theft and avarice. Enchir. 
XLV. 



158 THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

dience or transgression. Augustine regarded obedi- 
ence as the mother of all the virtues. Man was so 
created that obedience to the Creator was advan- 
tageous, while the doing of one's own will in prefer- 
ence to God's involves destruction. 8 That alone is 
sin, which is against what the Creator has enjoined. 9 
Sin then is disobedience of God. 10 Adam's sin con- 
sisted chiefly of violated obedience. 11 The same con- 
ception of actual sin is expressed by the term " trans- 
gressio." The voluntary infringement of the divine 
precept was Adam's sin. (Divini prsecepti transgres- 
sio). 12 The violation of the Creator's commands was 
the cause of original sin. 13 This aspect of actual sin 
Augustine formulates thus : " Ergo peccatum est, 
factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra seter- 
nam legem. Lex vero seterna est, ratio divina vel 
voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, 
perturbari vetens." 14 

A second aspect of Augustine's conception of actual 
sin, closely allied to the first, is self-will or the as- 
sertion of self against God. This Augustine con- 
ceived to be his own special sin before his conversion. 
His early life of self-will was transformed into a life 
subject to the will of God. 15 In the Confessions after 
enumerating a series of various sins, he declares that 
these things are done when the Creator, the fountain 



s Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XII. 

9 " Nam nee peccatum erit, si quid erit, si non divinitus 
jubetur ut non sit." De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 23. 

10 Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXVII. 43. 

11 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 35, 37, 48. 

12 De Vera Relig. 38. 

13 De Nupt. et Concup. II. 43. 

14 Cont. Faust. XXII. cap. XXVI. init. 
i&Conf. IX. 1. 



ACTUAL SIN 159 

of life, is forsaken and some false thing is selected by 
self-willed pride, and loved. 16 Sin, therefore, is self- 
ishness. Denning it in terms of love, Augustine 
formulates it thus : " Peccatum est autem, cum vel 
non est charitas quse esse debet, vel minor est quam 
debet." 17 This suggests the statement found else- 
where that a good will is well-directed love, and a bad 
will is ill-directed love. 18 It is very clear that the total 
impression which one gathers from Augustine's writ- 
ings is that sin is the assertion of self against God. 
It is preferring one's self to the Creator. This was 
undoubtedly the sin of that hypothetical " diabolus " 
when he fell from his perfect state. This was the 
sin of the fallen angels. This was the significant 
element in Adam's disobedience and transgression. 
In fact, disobedience was nothing other than the 
preference of one's own will to the Creator's will. 
Thus the two aspects of actual sin thus far considered 
seem to blend into the one idea that sin consists in 
the creature turning from the Creator and setting 
up his own will in preference to the Creator's com- 
mands. 

These aspects find ample confirmation in the third 
phase which is expressed by the term " superbia." 
There is in fact very little distinction in these varieties 
of actual sin. They all root back in the idea that 
sin consists in the setting up of self in opposition to 
the Creator. We separate them merely because Au- 
gustine did, and because they reveal different modes 



16 " Et ea fiunt cum tu derelinqueris, fons vitae, . et 
privata superbia diligitur in parte unum falsum." Conf. III. 
cap. VIII. 16. 

17 De Perf. Just. Horn. 15. 

18 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. VII. 



160 THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

of approach to the same fundamental conception. 
" Superbia " and " elatio " are Augustine's favorite 
terms for expressing this aspect of sin. This was the 
sin of the devil. He cannot be charged with fornica- 
tion nor drunkenness nor sensual indulgence, but his 
sin is pride. This is the sin which rules him although 
he has no flesh. 19 Similarly, pride and impiety caused 
the evil angels to rebel against God. 20 Likewise 
Adam and Eve fell into disobedience because of the 
pride of their hearts. 21 

Consequently, it is not surprising to find this aspect 
of actual sin emphasized beyond all others. Every one, 
says Augustine, has fallen by pride, which is the be- 
ginning of all sin. 22 " Vitiorum namque omnium hu- 
manorum causa superbia est." 23 Our author even 
goes so far as to say that the cause of our evil wills 
is pride. To this question we have found that Au- 
gustine was unwilling to return any answer, save that 
of " causa deficiens," but this statement occurs : 
" Porro malse voluntatis initium quod potuit esse nisi 
superbia? Initium enim omnis peccati superbia 
est." 24 Of all such sins as hatred, variance, emulation, 
strife, envying, the origin and head is pride. 24a " Omne 



19 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. Ill and De Nat. et Grat. 33. 

20 Enchir. XXVIII. 

21 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XIII. Cf. also : " In paradise ab 
animo quidem ccepit elatio, et ad prasceptum transgrediendum 
hide consensio, propter quod dictum est a serpente, Eritis 
sicut dii : sed peccatum illud homo totus implevit." Cont. 
Jul. Pelag. V. 17. 

22 Enar. in Ps. XXXVI. 18. 

23 De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 27. Cf . also De Spir. et Lit. 
11 and De Nat. et Grat. 31. 

24 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XIII. 1. 
24a ibid. XIV. cap. III. 



THE COMMON ELEMENT 161 

ergo peccatum et superbia est." 25 Under these three 
general aspects of actual sin, therefore, can be in- 
cluded practically all of the multitudinous varieties 
of sins. 26 It is very apparent that these various modes 
of expressing actual sin harmonize perfectly with Au- 
gustine's conception of evil and sin as " defectus." 

THE COMMON ELEMENT IN ALL SIN. 

/ It only remains to ask, What is the common ele- 
ment in all these sins? Having seen our author's 
conception of original sin, both as it transpired in 
Adam, and as it exists in individualized persons to- 
day, having recognized the various forms of actual 
sin, we may now, according to the Socratic fashion, 
ask what is the common element in all these sins? 
If we can answer this question, we will arrive at what 
may be called with propriety, our author's conception 
of sin. It is well to remember, however, that sin in 
the abstract is rather a delusive phantom. Sin never 
exists apart from the sinner, but nevertheless we may 
rightly ask our author what is common to the sins 
of all created beings. 

Our author's answer, like his conception of actual 
sin, falls under three aspects. These likewise do not 
lie entirely outside one another. They overlap and 



25 De Nat. et Grat. 33. 

26 A classification which Augustine occasionally uses is 
that of sins of ignorance and sins of infirmity. Both are 
the result of original sin, and therefore represent a defect or 
diminution of human nature. Vide Enchir. LXXXI, Sermo 
CLXXXII. 6, De Pec. Mer. et Remis. II. 26, Cont. duas Ep. 
Pelag. I. 23, and Ep. CXCIV. 27. Furthermore Augustine 
recognizes degrees of sinfulness. In this respect he combats 
the Stoics. Ep. CIV. 13, 17, Ep. CLXVII. d, 13, De Spir. et 
Lit. 48, Enchir. LXXVIII. 



162 THE CONCEPTION OF SIN 

in reality simply serve as different points of view 
from which to survey the same fact. 

(i). All sin is related to the will. Whether deal- 
ing with his diabolus, the fallen angels, Adam or in- 
dividual man, sin has always been referred to free- 
dom. Even that original sin which is manifested in 
the present existence of the individual is supposed to 
have been committed by each of us when we were 
a part of Adam. No sin exists apart from the will 
of the creature. No one is condemned on any other 
ground than because he possesses an evil will. 1 This 
aspect is emphasized by the affirmations of our author 
that that person is guilty who wishes to do an un- 
lawful deed, although he is deterred from it by fear 
of punishment. 2 He is already sinning within his 
will who refrains from sin only because of fear. 3 Not 
concupiscence but consent to it involves sin, 4 for he 
alone offends who permits himself to be persuaded by 
its allurements. 5 " Nee esse peccatum nisi pravum 
liberae voluntatis assensum, cum inclinamur ad ea jus- 
titia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere." 6 Sin, 
therefore, always involves an act of the will, whether 
we are dealing with original or actual sin. 

(2). Every act of the will, however, does not in- 
volve sin. It is only when the will is used to make 
a particular kind of choice that sin ensues. This 
choice consists in preferring a lower to a higher form 



1 Ep. CLXXIII. 2. 

2 CXLIV. 4. 

3 " Nam sic prof ecto in ipsa intus voluntate peccat, qui non 
voluntate sed timore non peccat." Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. I. 

15. 
* De Perf. Just. Horn. XXI. 44. 

5 Ibid. Cf . also De Nupt. et Concup. I. 25. 

6 De Genesi ad Lit. Imp. Liber 3. 



THE COMMON ELEMENT 163 

of nature. The cause of the misery of the fallen 
angels is that they forsook the supreme Existence 
for their own finite selves. 7 Becoming enamored of 
their own power, they lapsed to their own changeable 
good instead of adhering to the immutable good. 8 
The first defect of these creatures was simply that 
they preferred themselves to their Creator. 9 Like- 
wise this is the fundamental flaw of any creature. 
Not to adhere to the Creator, this is " vitium." 10 
Here we find positive content for this most elusive 
term. To choose the creature in place of the Creator, 
this is sin. " Diligit pro ipso Creatore creaturam." 1X 
Sin then is not an effort to obtain an evil nature, 
but it is the desertion of a better. 12 All natures 
are good and beautiful in their various classes, but to 
descend from a higher to a lower, this is to be false 
to our nature and involves guilt. 13 Now we have 
seen that this is precisely what Adam did when he 
committed the first sin. He turned from the highest 
nature to a lower. Similarly, the three aspects of 
actual sin, disobedience, self-assertion and pride are 
in essence just this defection from the Creator. 
Here, then, is the common element of all sin. It is all 
gathered up in the one term " defectus." It now be- 
comes apparent, also, how our author's negative con- 



7 Civ. Dei XII. cap. VI. 
s Civ. Dei XII. 1. 
» Ibid. XII. cap. VI. 

10 « Profecto non illi (Deo) adhaerere, vitium est." Ibid. 
XII. cap. I. 3. 
"Cont. Secund. Manich. XVIII. 

12 " Item quia peccatum vel iniquitas non est appetitio natur- 
arum malarum, sed desertio meliorum." De Nat. Boni c. 
Manich. cap. XXXIV. 

13 De Sermo Dom. in Monte I. XII. 34. 



i64 THE COXCEPTIOX OF SIN 

ception of sin sometimes assumed a positive quality. 
The inherent negativity of all evil and sin, however, 
lies in the fact that every evil choice in which alone 
evil can originate, is a defection, a turning or falling 
away from what is higher to what is lower. 14 Thus 
we find no inconsistency between our author's specu- 
lative and religious descriptions of " peccatum." In 
both instances his thought culminates in " defectus '' 
as applied to the will. 

s (3). Finally, this defection of the will from a 
higher to a lower nature leads us back to the concep- 
tion of sin as a tendency to nonexistence. He who 
deserts his Creator, says Augustine, and inclines to 
that whence he was made is tending toward nothing- 
ness. 15 " Et manifestum est, quia peccatum nihil est, 
et nihil fiunt homines cum peccant." 16 Similarly 
he says : " Sed quia nos nihil fieri voluimus pec- 
cando." 17 Sin then is self-destructive. The man 
who deserts God, argues Augustine, deserts himself in 
the true sense. 18 In order to avoid inconsistency in 
his metaphysical conceptions, our author qualifies 
these assertions by saying that man did not so fall 
(defecit) from his Creator, as to become absolutely 
nothing, but nevertheless he has approximated to that. 
" Relicto itaque Deo, esse in semetipso, hoc est sibi 



14 Dr. Martineau's definition of right and wrong is strik- 
ingly similar to this. He says: "Every action is right, 
which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher : 
every action is wrong, which, in presence of a higher prin- 
ciple, follows a lower." Types of Ethical Theory, 3rd ed. II. 
270. 

15 Enar. in Ps. VII. 19. 

16 In Joan. Evang. I. 13. 

1 7 Sermo XXII 9. 
i 8 Conf . III. 16. 



THE COMMON ELEMENT 165 

placere, non jam nihil esse est, sed nihilo propin- 
quare." 19 The common element of all sin, therefore, 
consists in an act of the will, by which the choice of 
a lower nature is made in the presence of a higher, 
and thus a tendency to nonexistence is manifested. 
That this conception of sin harmonizes perfectly with 
Augustine's treatment of malum is apparent on the 
face of it. Similarly, our author's identification of 
malum and peccatum not only becomes more evident, 
but also is seen to rest upon a rational basis. It only 
remains to set forth our author's conception of the 
final outcome of the strife between good and evil, 
before passing, in our concluding chapter, to an esti- 
mate and criticism of the doctrine as a whole. 



is Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XIII. 1. 



CHAPTER VII 
THE FINAL OUTCOME 

It is the aim of this chapter to trace briefly Au- 
gustine's thought regarding the ultimate relation of 
good and evil. Much that he wrote about the future 
need not concern us. There is no purpose in this 
chapter to enter in any sense into a discussion of the 
eschatological conceptions" of the Augustinian sys- 
tem. We only aim, therefore, to raise this question: 
What is to be the final result of the strife between 
good and evil? Is the latter necessarily inwrought in 
the very make of the universe or will it finally cease 
to exist? Does Augustine look forward to the final 
destruction of all evil or will it exist eternally as in- 
herent in the very constitution of things? Is it a 
necessary correlate of all life, even of perfect life, or 
does its existence mean the curtailment of real life? 
This aspect of the problem of evil leads us again into 
a field where we find our author dealing with concep- 
tions which time has outgrown. Nevertheless, Au- 
gustine offers us a definite answer to the questions 
here proposed, and that answer throws further light 
upon his conceptions of freedom and guilt. 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PREDESTINATION. 

Without endeavoring to state fully our author's 
doctrine of predestination, 1 we can with propriety note 



iVide De Prsedest. Sanct, and De Dono Persev. 

166 



PREDESTINATION 167 

its bearing upon the special aspect of the problem of 
evil that is now before us. If we ask what is to be 
the relation of good and evil in the life of any indi- 
vidual in this world, we receive a reply in which there 
lies implicit the doctrine of predestination. Evil and 
sin seem to be a necessary part of every human life. 
The reason for this is that Adam fell from his per- 
fect state. Sin was not a necessary part of his life, 
but for all his progeny no other possibility than sin 
exists. Many of the evils and sins of the individual 
to-day are the consequence, penalty, or punishment of 
that first sin. This conception is frequently reiter- 
ated. 2 Men live lives of misery, good and evil are 
mingled in them, because of that first sin. Further- 
more, and this is the significance of the thought, this 
evil life is the permanent and eternal condition of 
every individual unless God actively interferes. All 
mankind are condemned because of original sin. 3 Au- 
gustine does not hesitate to affirm that anyone who 
rightly appreciates the subject, could not possibly 
criticize the justice of God for wholly condemning 
all men. 4 It ought not to disturb anyone, says Au- 
gustine, because the gift of perseverance is granted 
to only a few, for if no one was delivered from the 
guilt of original sin, there would be no basis of com- 
plaint against God. 5 This is unmistakably our au- 



2 Vide de Lib. Arbit. III. 52, 53, De Nat. et Grat. 24, 
Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. Manich. 25, Ep. CXI. 3, Sermo 
CLXVII. 1 and Op. Imp. c. Jul. IV. XXXI. 

3 De Nat. et Grat. 5 init. 

4 " Qui recte nullo modo posset culpare justitiam universos 
omnino damnatis ? " Ibid. 5 fin. 

6 " Cur autem non omnibus detur, fidelem movere non 
debet, qui credit ex uno omnes isse in condemnationem, sine 
dubitatione justissimam : ita ut nulla Dei esset justa rep- 



1-68 THE FINAL OUTCOME 

thors doctrine. It is reiterated frequently in his later 
writings which bear upon the subject: " unde etiamsi 
nullus liberaretur, justum Dei judicium nemo juste 
reprehenderet." 6 

;' Moreover God does not actively condemn any. He 
only passively ignores those who deserve to be left 
alone or forsaken. 7 It must be borne in mind that 
this condemnation involved the complete and eternal 
separation of these unhappy creatures from their 
Creator. 8 Of Augustine's conception of the future 
life of the wicked, nothing need be mentioned save 
that feature which is of significance here, namely, 
that the wicked are finally to be cast into a region 
separate from the righteous. His doctrine was based 
upon a most literal interpretation of the eschatolog- 
ical material of the Bible. 9 But if the great bulk of 
mankind are thus by virtue of their evil choice in 
Adam condemned to eternal separation from the 
righteous, there are likewise some who must be saved. 
To them God's grace is irresistible. Augustine, there- 
fore, insists upon both condemnation through original 
sin and salvation through the gift of perseverance 
which the recipient cannot reject or resist. 

What then in brief is predestination? " Hsec est 
praaedestinatio sanctorum, nihil aliud : prsescientia 
scilicet, et prseparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus cer- 
tissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur. Cseteri au- 
tem ubi nisi in massa perditionis justo divino judicio 



rehensio, etiamsi nullus inde liberaretur." De Prsedest. Sanct. 
16. Cf. also De Dono Persev. 16. 

6 De Cor. et Grat. 28. 

7 De Nat. et Grat. 25. 

s Ep. CII. 27. 

• Vide Civ. Dei Liber. XXI. in toto. 



PREDESTIXA TIOX 169 

reliquuntur." 10 We see in this succinct definition of 
the doctrine a distinct foreshadowing of our author's 
conception of the ultimate relation of good and evil. 
The saints are to be delivered, the rest of mankind 
are to be simply and passively left in the ruined mass 
of mankind. The significance then of this doctrine 
for our present purpose lies in its distinct and un- 
qualified declaration of the complete separation of the 
good and evil in the life to come. The mere mention 
of the orthodox conceptions of heaven and hell give 
ample attestation of this statement. 

This, however, is not the full significance of the 
doctrine. We may well observe in passing that if 
every individual by virtue of his choice in Adam is 
thus condemned to an eternal life of evil, and only 
those are delivered from it upon whom God actively 
confers 1X the gift of perseverance which can not be 
resisted, then, herein lies another evidence of the de- 
terministic tendency of our author's thought. No mat- 
ter how loudly he may assert his belief in man's free- 
dom, this doctrine, if followed to its logical conclu- 
sions, would compel its believer to adopt a quietistic at- 
titude to life. Against this very criticism, however, 
our author directs one of his works. 12 He argues that 
since it is impossible for us to know those who are 
predestinated from those who are not, we ought on 
this very account to labor for the salvation of all. 13 

A second observation upon this doctrine, important 
for our author's treatment of sin and evil, is the con- 
ception of guilt which it involves. It declares with- 



10 De Dono Persev. 35. 

11 Enchir. XCVIII. init. 

12 De Cor. et Gratia. 

13 Ibid. 49. Cf . also De Dono Persev. 34. 



170 THE FINAL OUTCOME 

out reserve that original sin is sufficient for condem- 
nation. Every man is guilty because of his choice in 
Adam and because of that original sin is worthy of 
eternal separation from the righteous. " Quia suffi- 
ceret ad condemnationem etiamsi non esset in homin- 
ibus nisi originale peccatum. 14 This aspect of the 
doctrine, however, is only another statement, from a 
different point of view, of the idea expressed in the 
previous paragraph. They both rest upon the con- 
ception that our wills were present in Adam's will. 
Consequently we acted when Adam did, and are there- 
fore justly separated from the righteous in the life 
to come. The doctrine of predestination, therefore, 
clearly asserts the final separation of the good and 
evil and defends the justice of the wholesale con- 
demnation of the race by an appeal to the misuse of 
freedom 15 when mankind existed potentially or semi- 
nally in the first man. 

TEMPORARY MINGLING OF GOOD AND EVIL. 

This conception of the ultimate separation of good 
and evil which is the logical implication of the doc- 
trine of predestination, receives explicit formulation 
in the idea that in this world we have the temporary 
mingling of good and evil. In the City of God 1 
Augustine has left abundant evidence that he so con- 
ceived this world. There exist two distinct cities 
among men, the earthly and the heavenly. These two 



14 De Pec. Mer et Remis. I. 15. Cf. also ibid. I. 16, 17, 
De Nat. et Grat. 9 fin., De Pec. Orig. 34 and In Joan. 
Evang. LIU. 8. - 

15 Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. Manich. 25. 
1 Liber XI. et seq. 



MINGLING OF GOOD AND EVIL 171 

cities owe their origin to two kinds of love. The 
earthly city originated in the love of self which went 
to the extent of contempt for God; the heavenly city 
in love of God which included contempt of self. The 
one glories in the creature, the other in the Creator. 2 
The foundation of these two cities, therefore, as far 
as man is concerned, must have been in Adam. 3 The 
members of both cities were derived from him al- 
though some were destined to be associated with the 
good, others with the evil angels. This, however, 
does not imply the existence of four but rather two 
cities for the good angels and men are grouped in 
one society, and the evil angels and men in the other. 4 
The origin and nature of these two cities need not be 
enlarged upon here, for our former treatment of the 
origin of evil in that pre-existent world of angels 5 
and our portrayal of the conception of the first man, 6 
have, we trust, adequately presented Augustine's 
thought in this regard. The matter of consequence 
for our present purpose is this : Augustine conceived 
these two cities to be temporarily mingled in this 
world but destined to be ultimately separated forever, 
after the judgment of man. 7 In the present life 



2 Civ. Dei XIV. cap. XXVIII. " Fecerunt itaque civitates 
duas amores duo; terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad con- 
temptum Dei, ccelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum 
sui." Cf. also De Gen. ad Lit. XL 20. 

3 Civ. Dei XII. cap. XXVII. 

4 " Ut non quatuor, duae scilicet Angelorum totidemque 
hominum, sed duae potius civitates, hoc est societates, merito 
esse dicantur; una in bonis, altera in malis, non solum An- 
gelis verum etiam hominibus constitutse." Civ. Dei XII. cap. 
I. 1. 

5 Chapter III. pp. 60-69. 

6 Chapter IV. pp. 99-1 14. 

7 Civ. Dei XX. — XXII. in toto. It is unnecessary to en- 



172 THE FINAL OUTCOME 

" kingdom heavenly " groans amid the citizens of 
"kingdom earthly." 8 It becomes the duty, says Au- 
gustine, of the righteous to endure patiently the ad- 
mixture of good and evil persons here, remembering 
that it is only temporary. " Hsec quippe commixtio, 
non seterna, sed temporalis ; nee spiritualis, sed cor- 
poralis est." 9 These two communities, one composed 
of the holy and righteous, and the other of the un- 
godly, began in this life with the first man and will 
continue to the end of the world. They are mingled 
here only in body and separated in will, but are des- 
tined to be separated in both body and will upon the 
day of judgment. 10 Here, then, we find explicit af- 
firmation of the conception that the good and evil 
are not necessary to each other, and that their co- 
existence in this life is only temporary and accidental. 

FINAL DESTRUCTION OF EVIL. 

Furthermore, Augustine passes on to affirm the 
final destruction of all evil. He recognizes the value 
of the evils of this life as a training school for the 
righteous. They serve as a means for developing the 
goodness and strength of the faithful but only to the 
end that they may be prepared for a new world de- 
void of all evil ? 1 The life there is described as true 



large upon this conception for it is involved in the per- 
fectly familiar orthodox doctrines of heaven and hell. 

8 Enar. in Ps. LI I. 4. 

9 Cont. Lit. Petil. III. 4. 

10 " Duse itaque civitates, una iniquorum, altera sanctorum, 
ab initio generis humani usque in finem saeculi perducuntur, 
nunc permixtae corporibus, sed voluntatibus separate, in die 
vero judicii etiam corpore separandse." De Catech. Rud. 31. 

1 '' Ut novus homo per testamentum novum inter mala hujus 
saeculi novo sseculo prsepararetur." De Trin. XIII. XVI. 20. 



FINAL DESTRUCTION OF EVIL 173 

and perpetual blessedness. 2 If the Creator in his per- 
fect wisdom disposes the evils of this life so that they 
serve some good purpose, what may the righteous not 
expect when set free from all evils? (Cum liberaverit 
ab omnibus malis?) 3 The greatness of such felicity 
seems beyond description, for it will be tainted with no 
evil, will lack no good of any kind and will afford per- 
fect leisure for the praises of God. 4 There the reward 
of victory over vice and evil will be enjoyed. " Ibi vir- 
tutes, non contra ulla vitia vel mala quaecumque cer- 
tantes, sed habentes victorias praemium aeternam pacem, 
quam nullus adversarius inquietet." 5 The struggle 
with all vice is past. That perfect life has no need 
for further conflict and effort. All dissatisfaction 
with self has vanished and eternal peace reigns. 6 The 
final outcome of the struggle of good and evil then is 
tersely stated in these words : " Erit quandoque 
etiam perfectio boni, quando consumptio mali: illud 
summum, hoc erit nullum" 7 The good comes to 
perfection, and evil ceases to exist. 

That this conclusion is entirely consistent with the 
Augustinian system becomes apparent when we re- 
call our author's conception of the original condi- 
tion of heaven before the fall of the first evil angel. 
God and his creatures lived a perfect life in which 



2 Ibid. XIII. XVI. 20. 

3 De Continentia 16. 

4 Civ. Dei XXII. cap. XXX. 
s Ibid. XIX. cap. X. 

6 The marked contrast here between Augustine and Pro- 
fessor Royce is very apparent. The latter would ask Augus- 
tine " what next ? " in the life of these righteous beings. The 
difference between Augustine and Professor Royce lies in 
their conceptions of what constitutes real life. 

7 De Continentia 20. Cf. also : " consumpto penitus omni 
malo." Ibid. 21. 



m THE FINAL OUTCOME 

evil was absolutely unknown. Similarly Adam's origi- 
nal pristine condition was regarded as devoid of all 
evil, both natural and moral. Furthermore, the con- 
ceptions that good can exist without evil and that a 
perfectly sinless life is a possibility (though never 
realized), both of these point to the same general at- 
titude to the ultimate relation of good and evil. 
Finally, our author's fundamental and underlying met- 
aphysical conception, that all nature is good and that 
evil exists only as a parasite, as an empty negation 
whose seeming reality results from its attachment to 
a good nature, indicates clearly that evil is not re- 
garded as a part of perfect life and that its final ex- 
tinction is necessary accompaniment of the con- 
summation of the " Civitas Dei." 



CIVITAS TERRENA ETERNAL. 

But has the " civitas terrena " vanished ? Do these 
statements apply to the whole universe or only to the 
abode of the righteous? Clearly to the latter. The 
souls of the bulk of mankind together with the fallen 
angels under the leadership of " princeps peccator- 
um," x still exist. Nothing is ever permitted to go 
to the length of nonexistence. 2 A casual reading of 
the twenty-first book of the City of God shows fully 
that these evil spirits are expected to live forever. 
Whole chapters are devoted to proving that it is possi- 
ble for bodies to exist forever in burning fire, 3 and 
examples are cited from nature in defense of the 



1 De Symbolo 2. 

2 " Nihil per divinam providentiam, ad id ut non sit per- 
venire permittitur." De Mor. Manich. 9 fin. 

3 Civ. Dei XXI. cap. II. 



" CIVITAS TERRENA " ETERNAL 175 

notion that bodies may exist alive and unconsumed 
in eternal fire. 4 This region of evil then exists. 
Bearing in mind his metaphysical conception that all 
things in so far as they exist are good and that evil 
can exist only as a parasite upon some good nature, 
it becomes evident that the evil of these spirits con- 
sists in their falling away from the true being and pre- 
ferring self to God. 

That the ideas presented in this chapter lay Au- 
gustine open to the charge of dualism is very evident. 
This evil region has been separated from the good 
and exists as a dark spot upon the universe. The 
antinomy of good and evil has not been solved but 
only transcended. Evil has been excluded from one 
region, only to give it full dominance in another. 
Both good and evil still exist, only now they are 
geographically separated. In his conception of the 
two cities there lies implicit an unconcealed element 
of inherent dualism. There is an essential rift in his 
universe. Like Plato's conception of to firj s ov it forms 
an unsolved element in his system which neither of 
them ever fully overcame. 

The philosophical basis of Augustine's conception 
of sin is now before us. In our concluding chapter, 
it remains to enter into a criticism of these concep- 
tions, with the endeavor to sift out the truth from the 
error and to indicate the fundamental fallacies that 
underlie the whole doctrine. 

4 Ibid. cap. IV. 



CHAPTER VIII 

A CRITIQUE 

In the foregoing chapters, while endeavoring to set 
forth the speculative basis upon which the whole 
Augustinian doctrine of sin rests, we have from time 
to time offered brief criticisms, accepting or rejecting 
certain aspects of our author's thought. The pur- 
pose in this method has been twofold : ( I ) We have 
aimed to avoid the necessity of too much repetition 
which would have been involved in a complete sepa- 
ration of statement and criticism, and (2) we have 
attempted to clear away legitimate criticisms of what 
might be termed the minor phases of our auther's 
thought in order that the present chapter, relieved of 
the burden of details, might the better be devoted to a 
more searching criticism of the underlying and funda- 
mental principles of the whole doctrine. 

EVIL AS NEGATION. 

It has become perfectly apparent that one of the 
most significant features of Augustine's thought was 
his conception of evil as negation. No doubt he was 
led to the exact formulation of this conception by his 
opposition to Manicheism. In his determined resist- 
ance to the fatalistic dualism of Manicheus and in 
his complete repudiation of his irrational exaltation 
of evil into a principle coeternal with God, he was 
naturally and inevitably led toward a privative con- 
ception of evil. He insisted without qualification that 

176 



EVIL AS NEGATION 177 

God was the author of all nature and consequently of 
all that exists. To him, likewise, it was unthinkable 
that God was the author of evil, and thus his rigorous 
logic compelled him to regard evil simply as the ne- 
gation of what was good, as a flaw of nature, as that 
which metamorphoses its utter negativity into ap- 
parent reality by attacking and diminishing the good- 
ness of nature. To make a place for evil in the uni- 
verse he was forced to conceive it as desertion, as a 
falling away from true being. 

That there is a large element of truth in the nega- 
tive conception of evil is unmistakable. That it pos- 
sesses this characteristic in some sense is apparent 
from the fact that philosophers in widely different 
periods have so conceived it. Plato was evidently 
unable to put any positive content into his idea of evil. 
His conception of non-being (to prj 5 ov) is ample wit- 
ness to the fact that he did not conceive evil as any- 
thing really existent. The change, unreality and in- 
stability of the world of sense in contrast to the per- 
manence, reality and fixity of the eternal world was 
referred for its cause to this negative conception. 
Plotinus served as a source for Augustine's own 
thought of evil as negation. John Scotus Erigena, 
like Augustine, was unable to conceive of anything 
outside of God and consequently looked upon evil and 
sin as separation from the Creator. It is therefore 
nothing real, but only a privation devoid of all true 
existence. Spinoza maintained that sin and evil were 
real only for our finite minds. Nothing is evil to 
God. Sin, therefore, is purely relative and possesses 
no real existence. It is mere negation or privation. 
Its character is wholly negative. Leibniz also has been 
accused of reducing moral to metaphysical evil and 



178 A CRITIQUE 

conceiving it, not as anything real, but merely as the 
absence of perfection, or privation. Likewise, Hegel 
may be cited among those who have thus conceived of 
evil. It is mere sham existence and utter negativity. 
(Der absolute Schein der Negativatat in sich.) 
Finally, Professor Paulsen affirms that evil as such 
possesses no value and enjoys no real existence. It 
is a purely negative quality and receives it seeming 
reality only from its opposite, the good. Clearly, 
then, we find historical support for this conception. 

Is it not possible to find in the differing terminol- 
ogies of these philosophical systems that essentially 
the same truth has been struggling for expression? 
These thinkers have felt the inherent unreality in 
evil and have formulated it in the terms of their own 
day. Whether it is expressed by to firj 'ov, vitium, 
corruptio, negatio, defectus, or Negativitat, it involves 
the recognition of the essentially negative character 
of evil. This same element of truth finds expression 
to-day in the affirmation that evil is disorganization. 
It is then in a very real sense the diminution of be- 
ing. It is that which diminishes life. Says Professor 
Palmer. " Poverty of powers is everywhere a form of 
evil. For how can there be largeness of organization 
except as a mode of furnishing the smoothest and 
most compact expression to powers? Wealth and 
order are accordingly everywhere the double trait of 
goodness, and a chief test of the worth of any or- 
ganism will be the diversity of the powers it in- 
cludes." 1 Consequently it becomes apparent that evil 



1 Nature of Goodness, p. 40. Compare with this the fol- 
lowing statement from the same author : " Ethical writers 
of our time have come to see that the goodness of a person 
or thing consists in its being as richly diversified as is 



EVIL AS NEGATION 179 

must be regarded as that which is self-destructive. 
Evil in the last analysis then becomes suicidal. Mr. 
Herbert Spencer has rightly affirmed that " we re- 
gard as bad the conduct tending to self-destruction." 3 
The negative tendency implied in this formulation of 
the truth is very apparent. 

On the other hand we find a strange recognition 
in our author of an essentially active aspect of evil. 
Amid all his rigid insistence upon the unreality of 
evil we find it at times suddenly metamorphosed into 
an active principle. " Negatio " has been replaced 
by " corruptio " and to this conception positive and 
active content has been given. We have seen that 
Augustine insisted, in complete accord with his 
metaphysical conceptions, that the flesh must not be 
considered as evil but as good, the evil propensities 
arising therefrom being regarded as the action of 
" corruptio." Again, we see a curious mingling of 
the negative and positive aspects of the conception 
in the term " defectus." It is a distinct choice or act 
of the will, but an act of a negative character in the 
sense that it chooses the lower instead of the higher 
good. 3 In these respects, therefore, we find our 



possible up to the limit of harmonious working, and also 
in being orderly up to the limit of repression of powers. 
Beyond either of these limits evil begins." Ibid. p. 43. 

2 Principles of Ethics, Vol. I. p. 25. Compare also : " Al- 
ways, then, acts are called good or bad, according as they 
are well or ill adjusted to ends; . . . bad is the name 
we apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved." Ibid. 
" Other things equal, conduct is right or wrong according 
as its special acts, well or ill adjusted to special ends, do or 
do not further the general end of self-preservation." Ibid. 
p. 20. 

3 It is interesting to observe here how Dr. Martineau has 
formulated his thought on this aspect of our problem : " So 



180 A CRITIQUE 

author recognizing that element of the truth which 
those emphasize who insist upon the positive reality of 
evil. 

Principal Fairbairn endeavors to draw the dis- 
tinction that physical evil is negative ; but that moral 
evil is positive and real. 4 Professor Royce insists 
that evil is a " distinctly real fact." 5 In the sense in 
which he uses the phrase, the truth of his contention 
must be admitted. Evil is real to the helpless sufferer 
or to the remorseful sinner. Similarly we agree that 
none of our experiences of evil may be rightly de- 
scribed as mere illusions. 6 But at the same time 
Professor Royce defines evil as " whatever we find in 
any sense repugnant and intolerable." 7 Evil exists 
to be overcome, cast down and subordinated. It is 
a challenge to our moral manhood. It becomes ap- 
parent, therefore, that even here evil assumes a nega- 
tive significance. Its existence is real, but it exists to 
be cast down and defeated. It is just this mingling 
of the negative and positive aspects of evil that Ed- 
ward Caird recognizes in Augustine's conception of 
evil when he says : " He could not believe in the sub- 



far, therefore, it seems undoubtedly correct to regard evil as 
simply negative, — a detention among lower things, — a failure 
of reverence for the higher, — a withholding of the will from 
God, and a living in the meanwhile entirely out of the desires 
and affections of the self." Types of Ethical Theories, 3rd 
ed. Vol. II. p. 90. 

4 His own words are : " They belong, indeed, to entirely 
distinct categories : physical evil is incidental, occasional, or 
relative, and may be termed negative or privative ; but moral 
evil is positive, and may be termed actual or real." Phil, of 
the Christ. Relig. p. 134. 

5 Studies of Good and Evil, p. 16. 

6 See ibid. p. 17. 

7 See ibid. p. 18. 



EVIL AS NEGATION 181 

stantiality of evil, but must hold that there is a point 
of view from which it disappears or appears only as 
an instrument, or transitory stage to higher good. 8 
Now Professor Royce would not agree to the " tran- 
sitory " character of evil but he does plainly regard 
it as an instrument to higher good. We believe that 
Augustine by means of his conception of " defectus " 
has succeeded in giving due recognition to both phases 
of evil. He does not deny its active positive quality, 
nor does he exalt it into a reality co-ordinate with the 
good. Schleiermacher's negative conception of sin 
recognizes the positive phase of it by making it sub- 
jectively real. Sin is the consciousness of sin. This 
suggests the basis upon which a reconciliation may be 
made between the two opposing ideas of evil. 

(Evil, viewed from one position, does undoubtedly 
appear to be a stern reality. Every experience of evil 
emphasizes this aspect of it. From another point of 
view evil is inherently negative, the disorganizing, 
suicidal principle of all life. But, have we not in 
these two sentences shifted from one sphere of thought 
to another. Subjectively and ethically, the reality of 
evil cannot be denied. Metaphysically, however, its 
reality is only seeming and privative. Here then we 
transcend the antinomy, without denying either of its 
parts. A distinction between bonum metaphysicum 
and bonum morale resolves the antithesis. In his own 
terms Augustine has accomplished this result. He 
did not deny the reality of the experiences ox evil. 
We have seen that he could portray the evils of life 
with a fullness and vigor arising only out of personal 
experience. At the same time he could not find any 



s The evolution of Religion, Vol. II. p. 288. 



182 A CRITIQUE 

place for evil in his metaphysics. It must exist solely 
as " contra naturam." In his conception of " de- 
fectus " he has welded these two seemingly contradic- 
tory elements into one whole. 

Has then our author reached any adequate concep- 
tion of sin? In his denial of the reality of evil and 
in his practical identification of evil and sin has he 
not robbed the term " sin" of its full content? The 
question may be rightly asked when our author's neg- 
ative conception of evil is under emphasis, but a brief 
perusal of his writings will reveal a most intense de- 
nial of this proposition. Few have conceived sin in 
all its awfulness as did Augustine. His doctrine of 
grace and the idea that external aid is necessary for 
overcoming sin, are ample evidence that ethically he 
did not underestimate sin. We have found that the 
common element of all sin consisted for Augustine in 
a defection of the will from that which was higher to 
that which was lower. Stated ethically it was trans- 
gression or disobedience, self-assertion and pride. 

All these aspects root down into the idea of setting 
up of self in opposition to the Creator. Sin is " de- 
fectus." It is essentially negative in that it chooses 
a lower for a higher nature. Hence it is selfishness. 
It is lovelessness. In this Augustine has sounded 
the bottom of the problem and given utterance to a 
truth which even to-day is not gainsaid in the theolog- 
ical world. Essentially sin is the exaltation of self. 
It represents the utterly false and futile effort of the 
individual to realize his low desire, or his highest good, 
in complete independence of or opposition to his fel- 
low man and the changeless, rational, and beneficent 
will of his Creator ; that is selfishness ; that is sin. 
This idea Augustine has formulated for us in his 



METAPHYSICAL IMPERFECTION 183 

conception of " defectus." We accept, therefore, our 
author's contention that evil is negative 9 and that sin 
is selfishness. That no inner inconsistency exists be- 
tween these two affirmations we have already endeav- 
ored to prove in our sixth chapter. 

METAPHYSICAL IMPERFECTION. 

A second fundamental doctrine of Augustine's was 
that of creation ex nihilo. Just as we have seen that 
the exact formulation of our author's idea of evil as 
negation was due to the exigencies of the Manichean 
controversy, so here we come upon a striking feature 
of Augustine's thought which may be traced to the 
same influence. Over against its inherent dualism 
which made creation compulsory, which asserted that 
God created the world out of material essentially evil, 
which insisted that all created things, all substance- 
and all matter are evil 5 Augustine maintained his doc- 
trine of creation ex nihilo. It therefore becomes ap- 
parent why our author put such emphasis on the 
source of the material out of which finite things were 
created. 

Manicheism insisted that the primeval stuff was in- 
herently evil. Augustine repudiated this idea and set 
up in its place the conception that the world was made 
out of nothing. Thus he seeks to make it absolutely 
impossible for the Manicheans to affirm an evil source 
for created being. It is clear, therefore, that this 
special aspect of his doctrine was due to the historical 
setting in which it developed and, like many other 



9 At the same time, insisting upon the recognition of the 
important qualification implied in his conception of " defectus." 



184 A CRITIQUE 

ideas of our author, has no significance or value for 
the present day. Disregarding the apparent influence 
of the controversy in which this doctrine was de- 
veloped as it is manifested in the particular formula- 
tion of the idea, we may with propriety enter into a 
criticism of what it signified for our author. 

It was by means of this doctrine that he accounted 
for the different kinds of nature. God was the su- 
preme and immutable good. All other natures are 
good in their class or rank, but their mutability, in- 
stability and imperfection are due to the fact that 
they have been made out of nothing. The significance 
then of this doctrine is twofold: (i) It asserts that 
all natures, of whatever rank and just in so far as they 
exist, are good. Clearly this is directed at the Man- 
ichean tenet which asserted with equal vigor that all 
these natures were evil. If it becomes a choice be- 
tween affirming with Augustine that all derived being 
is good, or with the Manicheans that it is all evil, 
then we must choose the former. 

That Augustine has here given utterance to an im- 
portant truth as compared with that of his adversaries 
is evident. We naturally raise the question, however, 
whether he, too, was not in error in asserting that 
these natures are good. Our reply must depend upon 
the definition of the term " good." If it is distinctly 
understood that what i\ugustine meant by " bonum " 
is simply that the object so described has existence, 
then agreement is possible. To-day we must replace 
his adjective, affirming that finite nature as such is 
neither good nor bad in the ethical sense, but simply 
non-moral or neutral. Evil does not inhere in things 
but in the will. (2) This doctrine is also a clear 
recognition of metaphysical imperfection. He has 



METAPHYSICAL IMPERFECTION 185 

formulated in it his own statement of what to-day is 
an accepted truism. It points out with correctness the 
separation between infinite and all finite or derived be- 
ing. 

Again, Augustine found in this idea of creation ex 
nihilo an explanation of the possibility of evil. It 
seems to serve as the metaphysical basis for his theory 
of the origin of evil. He reconciles this with his 
fundamental doctrine of freedom by saying that the 
possibility of evil wills was due to their creation out of 
nothing. This relating of metaphysical and moral 
evil, was a striking anticipation of Leibniz, who af- 
firmed that not only the ability but the certainty of 
sinning was based on the metaphysical imperfection of 
the creature. 1 Augustine, of course, would not go 
to this extreme and yet no doubt unconsciously he has 
laid himself open to the same criticism. But while 
Augustine repeatedly affirms that this doctrine ex- 
plains the possibility of evil, he protests with equal 
vigor against the charge that it involved the necessity 
of evil. When this criticism is brought against him, 
he specifically distinguishes between the two ideas, 
maintaining that creation ex nihilo accounts for the 
possibility of evil without making it a necessity. 

, Here we come upon a peculiar intermingling of 
truth and error. It seems as though the real truth 
of metaphysical imperfection is struggling for expres- 
sion and yet he rigorously insists that it does not in- 
volve the necessity of evil. The difficulty reveals 
a fundamental error in our author's thought: namely, 
his attempted identification of evil and sin. Begin- 
ning with that assumption, it became an impossibility 



1 Theodicee, § 156. 



1 86 A CRITIQUE 

to come to terms with metaphysical imperfection. 
How could one reconcile it with the idea that all evil 
is sin ? Had our author distinguished between natural 
and moral evil, between malum and peccatum, he 
would not have fallen into this fallacy. He saw 
clearly the implication of metaphysical imperfection, 
but he could not recognize the necessity of natural 
evil, for to him all evil was defined as moral evil. 
This was due in large measure to the confusion in- 
troduced by his idea of original sin. Consequently 
metaphysical imperfection meant to Augustine only 
the possibility of sin, whereas it should have included 
the necessity of evil. 

We are now prepared to understand the secret of 
another fallacy of our author's thought. Because of 
his failure to recognize that the necessity of natural 
evil is a logical implication of metaphysical imperfec- 
tion, he w r as led into a false conception of real life. 
His insistence upon the possibility of the good existing 
without evil, his conception of the perfect life of the 
pre-existent angels, his vivid portrayal of the original 
pristine glory of the first pair, his beatific visions of 
the perfect life of the saints, are all evidences of the 
error which failed to realize the necessity of imperfec- 
tion, with its consequent struggle, strain and effort 
for all real life. If man's life can be regarded as a 
type of true life, then it becomes perfectly apparent 
that all the evils consequent upon finiteness cannot be 
rightly excluded. Life to be real must include resist- 
ance and exertion. 2 Let the sense of dissatisfaction 



2 Professor Royce says : " I pass from these instances to 
point out what must be the law, not only of human nature, 
but of every broader form of life as well. I maintain that 
this organization of life by virtue of the tension of manifold 



METAPHYSICAL IMPERFECTION 187 

with one's present attainments disappear and life 
ceases to develop, even if it does not perish. Evil 
therefore is involved in all finite life, but in such a 
way that it may become the means to a higher good. 
A life which provided no obstacles and could be lived 
in one effortless span of existence would be unen- 
durable. Remove the possibility of self-realization 
through the mastery and overthrow of difficulties, and 
you remove life itself. If this is a true conception, 
and we believe it is, then we must reject our author's 
notions of original unfallen man and his picture of 
the life to come. His own dualism as portrayed in 
his ultimate separation of all created beings into good 
and bad realms must likewise be set aside or materi- 
ally modified. He has not solved the ultimate relation 
of good and evil by thus separating them into distinct 
compartments of the universe. Rather a clearer 
recognition of the implications of created being, to- 
gether with a more rational conception of the type of 
organization of all life must offer the solution. Ac- 
ceptance of the eternal necessity of natural evil as a 
permanent element and inevitable factor of all life in 
every sphere, but nevertheless a factor which exists 
as defeated and cast down, is necessary for any ade- 
quate treatment of the problem. 

Furthermore, a difficulty closely allied to this error, 
is our author's conception of God's relation to evil 
and suffering. To separate the Creator entirely from 
the life of the world in so far as that life includes 
suffering and misery, is to propose an insoluble prob- 



impulses and interests is not a mere accident of our imperfect 
human nature, but must be a type of every rational life." 
Studies of Good and Evil, p. 22. Cf. Fairbairn, The Phil. 
of the Christ. Relig. p. 135. Bowne's Theism, pp. 276, 278. 



188 A CRITIQUE 

lem. Professor Royce's interesting thesis here is this : 
" Grant Job's own presupposition that God is a being, 
other than this world, that He is its eternal creator and 
ruler and then all solutions fail. — The answer to Job 
is: God is not in ultimate essence another being than 
yourself. — Your sufferings are God's sufferings." 3 

While it is difficult to accept Professor Royce's full 
thought regarding the relation of the individual to 
God, nevertheless he has rightly pointed out that our 
life does not exist in utter independence of God. This 
universe is not a chaos but a unity. Augustine's con- 
ception of God sitting aloft unmoved while man is 
tossed about in misery and woe must be rejected. All 
of these errors issue from our author's conception of 
metaphysical imperfection and its implications regard- 
ing the possibility and necessity of evil. His chief 
fallacy arose from the inability to recognize the neces- 
sity of evil which in turn resulted from the failure to 
distinguish clearly between natural and moral evil. 

man's original perfection. 

We now enter into the consideration of a series of 
untenable propositions all of which grow out of our 
author's realistic conception of the first man. Thus 
far we have found elements of truth in Augustine's 
conception of evil as negative and in his partial 
recognition of metaphysical imperfection and its real 
significance. From this point onward, however, we 
shall be compelled to attack unsparingly the very 
foundations of Augustinian doctrine of sin and at- 
tempt to show that it rests upon a group of such un- 



8 Studies of Good and Evil, pp. 13-14. 



MAN'S ORIGINAL PERFECTION 189 

tenable suppositions that its validity can not be main- 
tained. In the present section we wish to deal with 
the idea of man's original perfection. 

The absurd extremes to which men have gone in 
developing this conception is a sad commentary upon 
the intelligence of mankind. Bishop Bull dwells upon 
the marvellous wisdom of Adam exhibited in his nam- 
ing without meditation the innumerable varieties of 
animals which were brought before him. The as- 
tounding fact is that God approved the nomenclature. 1 
He says in concluding this account : " What single 
man, among all the philosophers since the Fall, what 
Plato, what Aristotle, etc., among the ancients, what 
Descartes or Gassendi among the moderns, nay, what 
Royal Society durst have undertaken this ? " Simi- 
larity Bishop South characterized Aristotle as but the 
rubbish of Adam. 

If we endeavor to account for the origin of this be- 
lief, two facts appear : ( 1 ) It is an inevitable tendency 
of all nations to look back into a distant and remote 
past and idealize their progenitors; (2) such a tend- 
ency is manifested in the Story of Eden. Once in 
the Hebrew Canon this splendid allegory was accepted 
as actual history by the Church and her teachers, and 
consequently found its natural place in Augustine's 
thought. 

In rejecting this idea of man's original righteous- 
ness, there is no need of denying the universal sinful- 
ness of mankind. To do so is only to confuse the 
facts of experience with a purely speculative explana- 
tion as to the origin of those facts. To reject the 
idea of a catastrophic moral fall, does not deny the 



1 Bull's Works II. 349. 



igo A CRITIQUE 

present existence of that all-prevailing blemish of hu- 
man life which for centuries has been explained by 
that Fall. That all men sin is a fact beyond doubt. 
The denial of any theoretic explanation of the reason 
for that universal fact will never alter its truth. 

The real question then becomes not what the present 
condition of mankind is, but what it was originally. 
Now clearly two hypotheses present themselves : ( i ) 
Man was originally righteous and perfect but by some 
strange and striking accident he became hopelessly sin- 
ful. (2) Man was originally a non-moral being and 
gradually emerged from that stage into a state of in- 
creasing moral value. The real issue then is this : 
Was man's original condition chaos or harmony? 
That both possibilities may be conceived cannot be de- 
nied. " A chaos not yet reduced to order " and a 
" wreck and ruin of a once fair and perfect harmony " 
cannot be distinguished from one another. The strug- 
gle to control the heritage of a sensuous past must pre- 
sent the same scene of inner conflict as the discord aris- 
ing from strife with a ruined but originally perfect 
moral nature. That this double possibility exists is 
then to be conceded. 

Which of these possibilities shall we choose? We 
are dealing with this problem from a purely specula- 
tive point of view and do. not feel it incumbent upon 
us to recognize the seeming difficulties which might 
arise in regard to biblical sources. It is sufficient to 
say in passing, that historical criticism 2 has fully 
solved any perplexities that might arise from this 
quarter. Nor is it within the scope of this work to 
enter into any argument touching evolution. It is 



2 See esp. " The Fall and Original Sin," by F. R. Tennant. 



INDIVIDUAL WILLS IN ADAM 191 

perfectly evident that its major contentions must be 
accepted. It is becoming increasingly difficult to im- 
agine any such original state of perfection for man as 
Augustine continually presupposed. The various 
sciences all add their weight to this general conclusion. 
Astronomy, cosmic chemistry and geology reveal a 
world developing through long ages. Paleontology, 
embryology and anthropology point to unnumbered 
cycles and generations even before the historic curtain 
rises. Comparative religion reveals primitive moral 
conditions which argue ill for original righteousness. 
The whole basis of the doctrine of original sin is thus 
undermined and made unstable. The mind familiar 
with modern scientific conception finds it impossible to 
conceive of any originally perfect condition of man. 
We are compelled, therefore, to reject the idea of a 
catastrophic fall and regard man's moral condition 
from another point of view. Man's fall was his rise. 
His present sinful condition is not due to some falling 
away from an original uprightness. His condition 
must be described rather as a present non-attainment. 

INDIVIDUAL WILLS IN ADAM. 

\We now turn to investigate the tenability of the 
Augustinian conception which so regarded Adam as 
to suppose that in him were contained all the wills of 
the still unindividualized human race. The realism 
involved in Augustine's conception of Adam suggests 
the later Medieval thought. That he did regard the 
will of every individual as actually present in the 
first man has already been set forth. Although this 
idea involves error of fundamental significance its crit- 
icism need not delay us long. 



192 A CRITIQUE 

It clearly rests upon a false conception of person- 
ality. How can an individual be conceived as having 
two existences? Just what was that existence which 
each of us was supposed to have enjoyed in Adam? 
To answer that we were only present in a germinal, 
seminal or potential sense does not relieve the question 
of its difficulty so long as he insists that our wills were 
present and acted when Adam's did. In what re- 
spects did our Adamic existence differ from our pres- 
ent individual existence? To raise these questions is 
to reveal the utter untenableness of the whole idea. If 
personality means anything, it means among other 
things the possession of a will. But how can we con- 
ceive that our wills existed in Adam? 

We have already seen how Augustine repudiated 
the idea of pre-existence as an explanation of the 
origin of evil in man. The same reasoning which re- 
pudiated the Platonic reminiscence theory must van- 
quish his own doctrine of the pre-existence of our wills 
in Adam. That Augustine consciously transformed 
the outer appearance of the theory cannot be affirmed. 
But in the last analysis wherein does the Platonic pre- 
existence theory differ from his own notion of our 
presence in Adam ? Origen, influenced by Plato's doc- 
trine of reminiscence had explained the source of evil 
in man by an appeal to an evil choice of the will in 
a pre-existent state. Augustine rejected this only 
to fall into precisely the same error disguised by 
another garb. 

The Old Testament instead of Plato's dialogues 
furnished him the form of his thought. 1 The two 



1 For an excellent comparison of the systems of Origen 
and Augustine see Dr. Baur's Vorlesungen iiber die christl. 
Dogmengeschichte, Vol. I. P. II. p. 30 seq. 



INDIVIDUAL WILLS IN ADAM 193 

systems rest upon the same basal idea of pre-existence, 
the one appealing to an individual choice in a pre-tem- 
poral state, the other endeavoring to confine it within 
the bounds of historic life by merging our person- 
alities into the supposed organic head of the race. 
Both assert an unconscious but responsible act in a 
pre-existent life. 2 If a choice must be made between 
individual existence in a pre-temporal state and a 
germinal, non-personal existence in a supposedly rep- 
resentative man, then the former is far more appeal- 
ing. Augustine by merging our personalities in 
Adam, has robbed us of real individuality. 

Furthermore, the logical correlate of this untenable 
conception of personality is the false idea of guilt or 
responsibility which it involves. This is the fatal 
error in the doctrine of original sin. Any theory 
which purports to satisfactorily account for the pres- 
ence of sin in the world must grapple with both horns 
of a dilemma which for centuries has seemed intract- 
able. The universality of sin is an acknowledged fact 
of human experience. But at the same time every 
individual believes himself responsible for his acts. 
How then shall we reconcile the two seemingly con- 
tradictory but accepted facts of universal sinfulness 
and individual guilt? That the Augustinian doctrine 
accounted for the former, although upon a false 
premise, we shall see later, but that it failed utterly 
to form a tenable theory of guilt is evident from its 
insistence upon the presence of our wills in Adam. If 
this can now be established, it suggests the necessity of 
a revision of the theory propounded for the other side 



2 See Ph. Schaff's formulation of this in Nicene and Post- 
Nicene Fath. Vol. I. p. 14. 



194 A CRITIQUE 

of the antinomy. It was just this historic antithesis 
between the universality of sin and personal guilt, to- 
gether with the failure of our author's doctrine to rec- 
ognize adequately the latter fact, that compelled Dr. 
Julius Miiller in his most searching and analytical dis- 
quisition upon the whole doctrine of sin, to resort to 
the explanation of an evil choice upon the part of 
every individual in an extra-temporal state. 

Upon a little investigation the utter absurdity of 
Augustine's conception of guilt becomes evident. We 
have seen that he asserts that because of Adam's evil 
choice every individual is guilty. Every new born 
babe which departs from this life without baptism is 
condemned to eternal punishment. Even more revolt- 
ing is the doctrine of predestination which defends 
the justice of God for condemning the great mass of 
mankind to eternal punishment because of their evil 
choice in Adam. Such a theory of guilt can never 
satisfy the consciences of men. All are sinners, each 
is responsible, — this is readily admitted, but while 
men honestly acknowledge their responsibility they 
repudiate the idea of guilt attaching to a choice made 
while yet they existed potentially in the first man. 

The most absurd of contradictions is involved in the 
idea of original guilt. It is in fact simply unthink- 
able to suppose that before the individual's personality 
exists he can make a voluntary choice for which he is 
guilty. Personality ceases to exist in any true sense 
the moment you rob it of responsible choice. If Au- 
gustine had not been so subservient to the letter of 
scripture and if he had not been determined upon the 
complete overthrow of the truth as well as the error 
involved in Pelagianism, he might have recognized 
that the more rational way of interpreting his concep- 



INDIVIDUAL WILLS IN ADAM 195 

tion of Adam would have been to regard him as guilty 
of all the sins of his posterity rather than they of his. 3 
Or, if mankind is guilty of Adam's first sin it must be 
guilty of all the sins he committed. Again, if the de- 
tails of the Fall-story are to be magnified, then in re- 
ality man should be regarded as guilty of Eve's rather 
than Adam's sin for she it was who first fell. Fur- 
thermore, if in our present individualized existence 
we are guilty of Adam's sin, then in reality as each 
succeeding generation comes on, the burden of 
original sin grows heavier. Mankind is gradually 
becoming worse and the last individual becomes guilty 
of all the sins of innumerable generations. 

Such are the absurdities into which our author's 
idea of guilt leads him. The consciousness of man- 
kind demands another explanation of that ineradicable 
feeling of responsibility. It can attach no value to a 
theory which imputes guilt to the newborn child. It 
demands an explanation which, while accounting for 
the universality of sin, puts positive content into the 
idea of responsibility. It insists that responsibility 
attaches only to those acts committed by a voluntary 
choice of the will. The evolutionary explanation of 
the doctrine of sin fulfils both these demands. It rec- 
ognizes the common elements of sin in every life as 
the inevitable heritage of countless ages of sensuous 
life. It attaches responsibility to the individual by 
holding him responsible for every failure to obey the 
call to a higher morality. Plainly, the idea of our 
author which places all our wills in Adam is utterly 
untenable both because of its false conception of per- 



3 Compare Principal Caird's " Fundamental Idea of Chris- 
tianity," Vol. I. pp. 210-21 1. 



ig6 A CRITIQUE 

sonality and its consequent inadequacy in dealing with 
the question of responsibility. 



CATASTROPHIC FALL AND FREEDOM. 

Continuing our method of pointing out a basal error 
in Augustine's conception of Adam and following it 
out to its logical consequences in his system as a whole, 
we may now turn to another aspect of the idea of will, 
which naturally involves a criticism of his doctrine 
of freedom. The aspect to which we refer is that a 
sinful act is supposed to have arisen directly out of a 
state of perfection. Our criticism in the preceding 
section was directed against the fallacies involved in 
the supposition that our wills were actually present in 
Adam. We now come to deal more specifically with 
Adam's own individual will and to pass on from that 
to our author's whole treatment of freedom. 

We have seen in our effort to state Augustine's ex- 
planation of the origin of evil, that he led us into a 
pre-existent world, asserted its original absolute moral 
perfection and goodness, and then affirmed that by the 
act of will of a particular being, evil arose. This 
marvellous transition is difficult to conceive. When 
we arrive upon this earth and are ushered into a similar 
situation of unqualified perfection, this same being, 
now evil, is introduced into the scene as a tempter of 
the first man but not in any way to relieve Adam of 
his responsibility. To introduce this " diabolus " may 
lessen the startling effect of man's first choice of evil, 
but it only shifts the problem to another room, where 
the first transition from a hypothetical state of per- 
fection to a state of sin, is beyond the bounds of ra- 
tional conception and where its utterly catastrophic 



CATASTROPHIC FALL 197 

character must be accounted for by something more 
than free-will. With the understanding then that the 
introduction of this evil being does in no sense effect 
the problem but only presents the same difficulties in a 
more mysterious fashion, we may with entire propriety 
ask how we are to account for this most striking 
transition in the life of Adam. To be sure we have 
already rejected our author's conception of an original 
state of perfection but it will not be carrying coals to 
Newcastle to develop the inconsistencies involved in 
this notion of a catastrophic fall. Assuming then that 
Adam did enjoy this perfect condition, how can we ac- 
count for the sudden transition to evil? To posit 
mere formal freedom will not explain it. Augustine 
found it necessary to postulate a sinful state (originale 
peccatum) to account for our choices of sin, why did 
he not recognize the necessity of some such inner 
solicitation in the case of the first man? To suppose 
that sin would arise out of a perfectly good being is 
beyond all comprehension. F. R. Tennant says : " It 
is the approach to evil, the indwelling propulsion to a 
wrong course which, on the theory that man was made 
at once an innocent and a moral being, precisely needs 
to be accounted for." x 

The very formulation of our author's conception of 
Adam's freedom assumes the precise thing that most 
needs explanation. To say that his freedom consisted 
in " posse non peccare," begs the question. It pre- 
supposes the possibility of sin, due to some evil choice. 
It is just here that Augustine's pre-existent world of 
angels in which evil was supposed to have originated 
introduces the greatest difficulty, but if we bear in 



1 " The Origin of Sin," p. 28. 



198 A CRITIQUE 

mind that the same problem is left for solution in that 
realm, if we allow its evil to affect our thought at 
this juncture, then that element is instantly eliminated. 
Precisely here then our author has failed to explain 
how this transition to evil could have occurred. The 
moment he says posse non peccare " he imports the 
necessary presupposition to account for the Fall. But 
in what did that possibility consist ? Why should this 
perfect being feel drawn toward evil, if no evil ex- 
isted ? How can he introduce this totally new element 
into his universe? On his hypothesis of a perfect 
moral state and a pre-established harmony it becomes 
an impossibility. 

Augustine's thought in its entirety fully recognizes 
the unity of character but the atomistic conception of 
life which would permit any such startling transition 
as the Fall to occur is a greater error than the Pelagian 
over-emphasis of the power of free-will. To suppose^ 
that a moral being who has never known or committed 
evil would suddenly perform such an act as the first 
sin was imagined to be, is to disregard completely the 
influence of antecedent upon subsequent volitions. 

That all these difficulties vanish upon the evolu- 
tionary hypothesis is readily seen. To account for the 
first sin out of perfect morality is beyond the power 
of reason, but that view which looks upon man's moral 
progress as an effort to moralize the non-moral at once 
relieves the difficulty. The material for sin is ready 
at hand. After countless generations of mere brute 
existence, man has emerged with the burden of a sen- 
suous nature. Now " posse non peccare " has some 
real significance and is not a question-begging epithet. 
Here is all the necessary inner solicitation and propul- 
sion that is needed to account for the choice of evil. 



CATASTROPHIC FALL 199 

But to postulate a perfect moral condition at the begin- 
ning and to eliminate every known allurement to evil, 
and then to imagine a terrible act of sin to appear 
upon that background seems strangely incongruous. 
Consequently we are compelled to reject the idea of a 
catastrophic fall, implying as it does a sudden transi- 
tion from moral perfection to sin, and to substitute 
in its place the idea that man's rise was his fall, that 
sin emerged when man failed to subordinate his lower 
animal propensities to his dawning higher nature and 
the rule of conscience. 

Although we are thus compelled to reject our au- 
thor's conception of Adam's freedom which affirmed 
the power to choose either good or evil, when a per- 
fectly moral condition was presupposed, we must at 
the same time recognize the very large and important 
element of truth which is here affirmed. We believe 
that Augustine was thoroughly right in placing the 
origin of sin in an act of free-will. When he accounts 
for the possibility of sin by an appeal to freedom we 
accept his result with unqualified agreement. That 
this was Augustine's endeavor, no one can doubt. 
But the exigencies of theological controversies led 
him into such curious deviations from this general 
contention that in our next paragraph we must enter 
into a criticism of his treatment of freedom. It is 
in fact our author's deviations from this basal conten- 
tion that open the way to error. But that for Augus- 
tine, good and bad inhere in the will is perfectly evi- 
dent. However we may differ from him in our for- 
mulation of the truth, Augustine has here taken an un- 
assailable position. No solution of the problem of evil 
emerges until we recognize the responsibility of the 
individual in freedom. That his conception of re- 



200 A CRITIQUE 

sponsibility was defective we have already seen, but 
that in his own terms, and with qualifications forced 
upon him by opponents, he contended stoutly for the 
origin of sin in free-will no one can question. And in 
this he was right. We must of course eliminate all 
that he contends for in regard to Adam's will injuring 
all the individual wills of mankind, but when he places 
in freedom the origin and the possibility of sin then 
we heartily accept his statement. 

In other words we believe that the duty incumbent 
upon every man of working out his character involves 
the possibility but not the necessity of sin. It is only 
thus that we may rightly regard man as a moral, per- 
sonal being. If we once grant that moral being 
is a desirable form of existence, then we must grant 
the possibility of sin. Obedience loses all its moral 
content unless the possibility of disobedience exists. 
Unless the opportunity to do evil is granted, then no 
value can be attached to the term good. If we once 
admit the wisdom of a moral universe we must grant 
the possibility of moral evil. The only rational world 
is a world of persons capable, through freedom, of do- 
ing good or evil. Consequently when Augustine 
finds, as we have seen that he does, the common ele- 
ment of all sin in the will, we gladly acknowledge the 
truth of his conclusion. We would only formulate 
the statement of it from a different point of view. 

Instead of postulating an original state of moral 
perfection and accounting for the origin of evil by a 
catastrophic fall, that is, by a sinful act arising out of 
a pre-established harmony, we would regard man's 
original condition as simply non-moral, as chaotic, and 
contend that evil arose when by a voluntary choice 
man deliberately failed to subordinate the non-moral- 



CATASTROPHIC FALL 201 

ized element to his developing conscience. We would 
maintain that no moral evil existed until the will 
emerged. Consequently moral evil is possible because 
of man's freedom. Sin becomes the failure of the 
man as expressed in his will to overcome and cast 
down the evil propensities of his inherited constitution. 
It is the failure to moralize the non-moral, to subject 
the hitherto neutral heritage of his animal nature to 
his growing consciousness of the right. This is sin. 
It becomes apparent therefore that Augustine reached 
a most tenable conclusion when he insisted upon the 
central significance of freedom. Sin in the last analy- 
sis is a matter of the will. 

Having thus endeavored to recognize the essential 
element of truth in our author's defense of freedom, 
without in any sense accepting the premises upon 
which it rests we may now with justice attempt to 
point out the inconsistency into which he fell in his en- 
deavor to formulate that general truth. It must not 
be forgotten at this juncture that every age has its 
own terminology. We have no right to suppose that 
a writer of the fourth century of our era, no matter 
how keen or subtle his reasonings, would express his 
conceptions by means of the same terms as present 
day writers. Consequently it may be that Augustine 
was endeavoring to state the same ideas and to think 
the same thoughts in his own way that we are in 
passing our criticism upon him. If this is so, then our 
criticism is but the translation of his thought into 
modern terminology. In any case it is an endeavor 
to state the truth. The total impression which one 
gathers from our author's handling of the problem of 
freedom is that the essential truth is struggling for ex- 
pression but is constantly stifled by the burden of then- 



202 A CRITIQUE 

logical dogma and false philosophical conceptions 
which rest upon it. At any rate we cannot accept his 
own expression of the doctrine of freedom and must 
now indicate the errors which we detect in it. 

The first observation which we make concerns our 
author's entire attitude to the will. One constantly 
feels that he looks upon it as something too objective. 
It almost seems to be a tangible entity thrust into man 
by the Creator. Not that we seek in any sense to 
sever the bond existing between the infinite and the 
finite will but because the will is constantly treated as 
something conferred upon man and as something that 
can be broken into pieces and doled out in various 
ways, do we make this criticism. Free-will is con- 
stantly referred to as a " donum." It is something 
handed over to man by his Creator. Adam possessed 
the ability to choose either good or evil but at the Fall 
this freedom was reduced to freedom for sin only. In 
other words a piece of the human will dropped out of 
man at that crucial moment. We would prefer to re-" 
gard the will as the eternal possession of man, as 
something which necessarily inheres in the very idea 
of a moral universe, as something essential to the very 
constitution of personality itself. 

On the other hand we must guard against the sup- 
position that we entirely disregard the power of habit 
or the influence of past volitions upon present choices, 
or the basal truth of the unity of character. What we 
contend for is simply this : the will cannot be tossed 
about and broken up like some separate and objective 
entity but belongs to the eternal world. It inheres in 
the very nature of personality and is a necessary pre- 
requisite of a moral universe. Consequently we con- 



CATASTROPHIC FALL 203 

tend foi; the clear independence of man's finite will. 
If it is to possess any real power, if it is to assume any 
vital significance, it must in a very distinct sense be 
man's own possession. 

We are conscious of the fact that this leads us upon 
very uncertain ground. Just what the relation of the 
finite will is to God's will is a subject which has re- 
ceived very different treatment. Professor Royce 
merges the will of the individual into the will of God. 
Our wills are God's will. Yet he would insist that 
this in no sense robs man of his volitional independ- 
ence. It is this very point for which we contend. 
Man's will is eternal. It does not, of course, exist in 
complete independence of the world-will nor at the 
same time must its identity be lost by absorption 
in God's will. This may involve a pluralism within 
an essential monism, but this need not frighten us. 
Unless we maintain the independence and real power 
of the finite will our moral universe collapses. 

Again, the Pelagian controversy led our author, as 
we have seen, to make some very important qualifica- 
tions upon his assertions of freedom. This at once 
raises the general question whether Augustine after 
all must not be ranked as a determinist. His concep- 
tion of the freedom of all men since Adam, as formu- 
lated in the phrase " posse peccare " seems to be some- 
thing more than a recognition of heredity and en- 
vironment. The common man, if Augustine's re- 
peated declarations mean what they distinctly seem to 
say, has lost a part of his freedom. To be sure he is 
free in a certain sense. He has the capability of 
choosing between various non-moral possibilities but 
the moment you enter the moral realm his freedom 



204 A CRITIQUE 

is limited to the choice of evil. His will avails for 
sin. It is described by " posse peccare." This fearful 
condition came about solely through the first evil 
choice. Since that time all finite wills are evil. This 
raises to prominence the constant classification of all 
wills as either good or bad. The distinction is rigid. 
The bad will is free to sin (posse peccare), the good 
will is unable to sin (non posse peccare). Experience 
on the contrary teaches us that often the same will 
makes both good and evil choices. This distinction 
then while not disregarding the element of character 
seems either to over-emphasize its truth or to rob man 
of his freedom. No man is truly free, who is unable 
to make a good choice. That " qusedam necessitas " 
which attaches to all of Adam's posterity is, we fear, 
a fatal blow to our author's libertarianism. 

This brings us to the consideration of the implica- 
tions from our author's doctrine of grace. No man 
can make a good choice without gratia Dei. Here it 
is difficult to pass judgment upon our author. Per- 
haps he was trying to recognize that element of truth 
which declares the influence of the divine upon man. 
This is especially suggested by his emphasis on the 
thought that gratia Dei does not relieve man of the 
necessity of action. Nevertheless he seems to have 
completely overstated this truth and to have advocated 
the absolute necessity of external aid, if man is to 
make any good choice. His illustration of the neces- 
sity of external light for the eye clearly emphasizes 
this aspect of his doctrine. His Pelagian opponent, 
Ccelestius, did not hesitate to convert his conception 
of grace into determinism. He says : " Si gratia 
Dei est quando vincimus peccata; ergo ipse est in 



CATASTROPHIC FALL 205 

culpa, quando a peccato vincimur, quia omnino custo- 
dire nos aut non potuit, aut noluit." 2 

We are inclined to agree with Coelestius. We be- 
lieve that Augustine, owing to tne Pelagian conten- 
tions, converted his doctrine of freedom into complete 
and absolute dependence upon God. If by determin- 
ism we mean that choices of the will are the result of 
character and external influence combined, then Augus- 
tine must be classed as a determinist. He himself 
would not escape this by identifying man with God. 
He would not reject the idea that God's grace is an 
external influence. The total impression of his writ- 
ings is that man and God are to be separated com- 
pletely in nature and essence. Man's good choices then 
are the product of alien interference. To suppose 
that any man since Adam has possessed that " aequilib- 
rium arbitrii," that " posse non peccare " by which he 
is capable of choosing either good or evil, is to en- 
tertain heretical notions. It abandons the necessity of 
grace. But if by freedonij we mean with Professor 
Palmer, the ability to reduce a dual or multiple future 
possibility to a single actual result, then freedom is 
gone upon the Augustinian premises. 

The doctrine of predestination only serves to con- 
firm this contention. Indeed this belief makes free- 
dom a mere name. Every man since Adam is con- 
demned to choose only evil. A few elect ones have 
conferred upon them the " bona boni necessitas," and 
they are equally condemned to a holy life. They are 
unable to choose aught but the good. Evidently man 



2 De Gest. Pelag. 30, where Augustine quotes these words 
of Coelestius. 



206 A CRITIQUE 

has been transformed into a tool. Since Adam, his 
every choice is determined from without. To recog- 
nize formal freedom without excluding the influence 
of God upon man, we must grant to man the full 
power to accept or reject any influence from without. 
We must conclude, therefore, that Augustine in his 
endeavor to overthrow the atomistic Pelagian concep- 
tion, and to defend his own inner sense of the need 
of divine grace to save a man from sin, has even in 
his determined insistence upon man's freedom, per- 
mitted it to crumbie in his hands. 3 

The conception of " causa efnciens " is only another 
statement of the same deterministic tendency, but what 
shall we say of that curious idea found in " causa de- 
ficiens " ? Unwilling to relate the evil will to God, 
he resorts to this idea which harmonizes perfectly with 
his whole tendency to make evil run off into the dark. 
He is constantly looking for something back of man's 
will and in the case of the good will it was most 
natural to make God its efficient cause. But having 
banished his evil principle and being unwilling in any 
sense to make God the cause of evil, he endeavors to 
combine his desire for a cause of the bad will with 



3 That we are not unsupported in this interpretation of 
Augustine, we quote the following sentence from Edward 
Caird, which we chanced upon after reaching our own con- 
clusion. Speaking of St. Paul, he says : " Thus he prepares 
the way for those Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrines, 
which practically involve the idea that man is the inert victim 
of external influence, and that since the Fall at least, he has 
become the plaything of an evil power which can only be 
driven out by the equally external influence of the Divine 
Spirit . . . doctrines which set religion in direct antag- 
onism to morality and the grace of God to the activity of 
man." Evolution of Religion, Vol. II. p. 213. 



HUMAN NATURE A MASS 207 

his privative conception of evil, and welds the two 
into the correlative term " causa deficiens." 

The striking fact which we observe here is this: 
it seems that Augustine realizes that something more 
than freedom 4 is necessary to account for the tran- 
sition from a perfect moral state to evil. He tries to 
find the cause but ends in a barren negation. His 
fundamental presupposition of an original state of 
perfection compels him to reach such a conclusion. 
How successful his search would have been had he 
been able to utilize the results of evolutionary thought 
it would be hard to overestimate. Just that inner 
solicitation is furnished by the still unmoralized her- 
itage of man which would have enabled him to place 
a positive content into his idea. That he clung tena- 
ciously to the idea that evil is to be attributed to an 
act of the will is most praiseworthy. 

HUMAN NATURE A MASS. 

Again we return to Adam, to find the basis of another 
element of both truth and error. The idea which we 
now approach is closely allied to the one already dealt 
with, namely, that all the wills of individual men were 
in Adam. We now propose to consider another phase 
of the same idea which receives expression in the 
words that all human nature existed as a mass in 



4 Compare this statement from Professor Royce : " There 
is I doubt not, moral free will in the universe. But the 
presence of evil in the world simply cannot be explained by 
free will alone. One who maintains this view asserts in 
substance, 'all real evils are the results of acts of free and 
finite moral agents.'" Studies of Good and Evil, p. 10. 



208 A CRITIQUE 

Adam. When dealing with the former aspect we 
found that it contained the fatal error of the doctrine 
of original sin in that it failed utterly to account for 
individual responsibility. In the phase that is now 
to be considered we find the essential truth of the 
doctrine of original sin in that it recognizes, though 
upon false premises, the solidarity of mankind and the 
truth of universal sinfulness. 

It was just here that Augustine made his most suc- 
cessful attack upon Pelagianism. The latter doctrine 
stands for isolation. It not only fails to recognize the 
unity of character but makes each man a solitary unit. 1 
Over against this error we find that Augustine not 
only endeavors to recognize the power of habit 2 but 
specifically and consciously attempts to explain the 
solidarity of the race. He conceives this to be the 
purpose of God in the creation of a single man in 
whom he placed all human nature. It was not done 
that Adam might live a solitary life but that thus the 
unity of society (societatis unitas) might be empha- 
sized and that men might be united both by similarity 
of nature and by family affection. 3 He asserts that 
nothing is so social by nature as the human race. 4 
Here then we find a profound truth coming to ex- 



1 See Peter Holmes' statement, " The Anti-Pelagian Writ- 
ings," in Works of St. Aug., Vol. I. Preface pp. XVIII.-XIX. 

2 Conf. VIII. 10. 

3 " Unum ac singulum creavit, non utique solum sine humana 
societate deserendum, sed ut eo modo vehementius ei com- 
mendaretur ipsius societatis unitas vinculumque concordise si 
non tantum inter se naturae similitudine, verum etiam cog- 
nationis affectu homines necterentur." Civ. Dei XII. cap. 
XXI 

* Civ. Dei XII. cap. XXVII. 



HUMAN NATURE A MASS 209 

pression. All human nature existed as a mass in 
Adam that in this way all mankind might be bound 
together. Similarly the moment that Adam sinned 
all human nature was contaminated and the basis is 
laid for the recognition of the truth of universal sin- 
fulness. His observation in experience of the uni- 
versality of sin was thus accounted for upon the 
theory that all human nature was originally one mass 
in Adam and was deranged, tainted or injured by the 
Fall. That blemish, fault, flaw or imperfection, of 
all human nature which is expressed by the term 
" vitium " is thus accounted for. Bearing in mind 
that the seemingly insoluble antithesis which the doc- 
trine of sin has been called upon to deal with is 
summed up in the words " universal sinfulness " and 
" individual guilt " we see that Augustine has pro- 
posed a theory which accounts for the former but not 
for the latter. Consequently his defective conception 
of individual responsibility suggests the necessity of a 
reformulation of the other member of the antithesis. 

Wherein then lies the error of his recognition of 
universal sinfulness? Just in the conception of hu- 
man nature as a mass. All of the difficulties which 
arose in our effort to understand how individual wills 
of unindividualized persons could exist in Adam, arise 
here also. What was that potential human nature 
that was massed in Adam? How is it related to and 
how does it differ from our individual human nature? 
In fact, to raise the crucial question at once, what is 
human nature apart from the individual ? Obviously 
our author's realism is again responsible for the. error 
underlying his explanation of the solidarity of the 
race. We must reject the idea that human nature 



210 A CRITIQUE 

existed as a mass in Adam. This need not involve 
the rejection of the truth involved in the idea of race 
solidarity. 

Similarly how could all human nature be injured 
in Adam? We understand from experience that oc- 
casionally some choice irremediably affects all the 
future of an individual, but usually such a choice is 
but the full flower of a germ that has developed for 
years. But to transfer such an idea back into the 
life of Adam and suppose that his first evil choice 
could have had such a damaging effect upon all man- 
kind is to overleap the bounds of rational thinking. 
Again we find truth and error wedded — truth in 
that the solidarity of mankind and the universality of 
sin are recognized; error in that all human nature 
was supposed to have been injured en masse and that 
as a consequence every man is born a guilty sinner. 

It is rather astounding to find our author's own 
opponent voicing the remarkably modern statement 
that nothing good or evil is born with a man for 
which he is responsible. He enters this world in 
an undeveloped state with capacity for either good 
or bad conduct. Man is before the action of his own 
will neither good nor bad. Neither vice nor virtue 
can be attributed to him for he comes fresh from the 
Creator's hand. 5 That this line of thought is a strik- 
ing anticipation of modern conclusions is most ap- 
parent. Universal sinfulness, no more than individual 



5 " Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vitupera- 
biles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis : capaces 
enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, 
ita et sine vitio procreamur: atque ante actionem propriae 
voluntatis, id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit." 
Quoted from Pelagius by Aug. in De Pec. Orig. 14. 



PROPAGATIO 211 

guilt, can be accounted for upon the basis of our ex- 
istence in Adam. Evolutionary thought saves the 
truth of race solidarity and of the universality of sin, 
by giving to man a common heritage of instincts and 
natural endowments which in no sense are to be re- 
garded as a ruined nature, but simply as man's natural 
inheritance. They are, moreover, the common in- 
heritance of all men, and thus the organic unity of 
the race is recognized. Similarly these propensities 
and instincts exist as the neutral non-moral material 
out of which each man, by his own free-will, may 
make a good or evil life. Thus the universality of 
sin is made a possibility and is adequately accounted 
for together with a full recognition of man's freedom. 
Consequently the age long antinomy of universal sin 
and individual guilt is transcended not by abolishing 
either member but by a full and adequate recognition 
of both. Sin is universal because of our common 
natural heritage, the individual is responsible because 
by his will he may or may not moralize the neutral 
material which his life furnishes to him. - 



PROPAGATIO. 

We have now in the last four sections entered into 
a discussion of the untenable features of our author's 
conception of Adam. We have been compelled to set 
aside his idea of the original perfection of man and 
to account for his present sinful state by regarding it 
simply as present non-attainment rather than the 
wreck of a previous perfect morality. We have seen 
the false conception of personality involved in the 
idea that our wills were all in Adam and the conse- 
quent impossibility for the doctrine of original sin to 



212 A CRITIQUE 

maintain the responsibility of the individual. We 
have likewise endeavored to indicate the impossibility 
of a sinful act arising directly out of perfection, and 
the necessary rejection of a catastrophic fall. At the 
same time we attempted to give full credit to his 
recognition of freedom while being forced to point 
out his deterministic tendencies. Finally we have 
found in his conception of human nature as a mass in 
Adam a worthy effort to recognize the solidarity of 
mankind and to account for the universality of sin, 
but were unable to retain the idea because of its ap- 
parent error and its vain endeavor to account for the 
injury of all human nature. We are, therefore, pre- 
pared to leave Adam, and in our attempt to do so 
come upon the final error of our author's doctrine 
which demands criticism. 

The fallacy to which we refer is his doctrine of 
propagatio " which he developed in opposition to the 
Pelagian term " imitatio." When asked how the fatal 
flaw incurred by the Fall was transmitted from the 
germinal existence of each person to his individual- 
ized self, our author replied with this doctrine of 
propagation. That it lays him open to all the charges 
against traducianism is apparent. We must not for- 
get that for our author this sin inhered in the soul 
but was transmitted by the flesh. That the doctrine 
of original sin rests on traducianism cannot be denied 
with any appearance of reason. To cite passages 
from our author's writings in which he asserts that 
he has no quarrel with creationism 1 or refers the 
origin of souls to creation ex nihilo, 2 is beside the 



1 E.g. De Anim. et ejus. Orig. I. 33. 

2 Ibid. II. 21. 



PROPAGATIO 213 

mark. It is of far greater importance to see the un- 
avoidable implications of the whole doctrine of orig- 
inal sin and the idea of " propagatio." The very fact 
that Augustine wavered so much in his own thought 
is ample evidence that he recognized this difficulty. 
His own mind could not be satisfied with its crass 
materialism but it seemed impossible for him to throw 
it off. The church dogma of the necessity of baptism 
for infants held him to the belief that they were born 
with sin transmitted to them through their fleshly 
origin. This birth-sin could only be accounted for by 
their derivation from the one primeval soul which 
sinned in the first father of mankind. 3 It was pre- 
cisely this difficulty which made it impossible for Au- 
gustine to accept Jerome's view of creationism. 4 
Perhaps Augustine's nearest approach to an admitted 
opinion on the question of the origin of the soul is 
his assertion that we are forced to regard the soul as 
derived by natural descent (propagatio) from the 
parent or by creation ex nihilo. 6 If, then, we had 
not already found our author's conception of Adam 
totally untenable, we would find here in his mode of 
transmitting original sin to the individual an in- 
superable difficulty. 

Furthermore this doctrine of " propagatio " leads 
our author into an erroneous conception of man's 
sensuous nature. Augustine was right in not regard- 
ing the flesh as the origin of evil but he was in error 
in regarding all its allurements and propensities as 



8 De Anim. et ejus. Orig. I. 16. " Sed ad hoc peccatum 
subeundum cur damnata sit, quaerimus, si non ex ilia una 
trahitur, quae in generis humani primo patre peccavit." 

4 Ep. CLXVI. 10. 

5 De Anim. et ejus Orig. I. 24. 



214 A CRITIQUE 

the direct punishment of the first sin. To attribute 
man's sense of shame, and the power of concupis- 
cence to Adam's Fall seems preposterous. Similarly 
his notion that natural death was the consequence of 
the Fall needs no comment. His idea of " vitium " 
as attached to all human nature has already been dis- 
cussed. All of these ideas arose out of the concep- 
tion that man's present bodily endowments which com- 
pel the soul to combat the body are the penalties for 
a sin which arose when no such conflict existed be- 
tween them. 

. The difficulties involved in such a conception have 
already been suggested. It throws us back into the 
question of man's original state of righteousness and 
our whole attitude to the probable course of man's 
development. It is increasingly difficult in the light 
of evolutionary thought to postulate any such con- 
ception of man's original fleshly nature or to look upon 
his sensuous propensities as in themselves evil. On 
the contrary when we recall that these very instincts, 
passions and appetites have been the means by which 
through countless ages he has arrived at his present 
stage of development, their marvelous strength and 
continuous solicitation are not to be wondered at. 
They are not to be regarded as the evidences of a past 
sin but rather as the non-moral neutral material which 
the dawning higher nature of man must cast down 
and subject to his growing moral consciousness. The 
first sin, then, instead of being the most heinous and 
degrading was rather comparatively insignificant. 
Paradoxical though it may seem man's first sin be- 
comes the occasion of his glory in the sense that it 
forced the emergence of moral consciousness and hu- 
man freedom. We are not therefore to deplore hu- 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 215 

man passions in the mastery of which life has been 
evolved and made possible, but rather to look upon 
them as elements out of which character has been and 
is being developed. 6 To suggest this line of thought 
is to reveal the utter untenability of Augustine's doc- 
trine of " propagatio " together with his whole con- 
ception of man's fleshly nature as the punishment 
of that hypothetical moral catastrophe. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 

It only remains by way of conclusion to gather 
together our results. This may be done best by en- 
deavoring to bring together the essential truth of the 
Augustinian system and then set over against it the 
inherent fallacies. Having done this we shall then be 
prepared to draw our final conclusion as to the 
strength or weakness of the doctrine as a whole. 

(1). That Augustine, after nine years of instruc- 
tion in a system thoroughly dualistic, emerged with a 
monistic philosophy is to be placed to his credit. In 
the last analysis it is this basal truth that shaped much 
of his thought which we have accepted. To this gen- 
eral philosophical point of view must be referred his 
insistence upon the goodness of all nature whatever 
may be its rank or class. Likewise his recognition of 
metaphysical imperfection as the necessary implica- 
tion of creation may be traced to the same point of 
view. In it he found the possibility of evil instead 
of attributing it to an evil principle coeternal with his 
ground of the universe. Similarly this monistic stand- 



6 Compare T. Gomperz' recognition of this truth while 
commenting on Plato's Philebus. " Greek Thinkers," Vol. III. 
p. 197. 



216 A CRITIQUE 

point compelled him to look upon all evil as something 
unreal and at bottom nonexistent. It could find no 
place in his perfect universe save as a blemish upon 
good nature. Its utter negativity only attained to a 
seeming reality by attacking and destroying real be- 
ing. Consequently his conception of sin as " de- 
fectus." as a falling away from the highest reality 
harmonizes perfectly with his system. Sin becomes an 
attempt to destroy the essential unity of the universe. 

Again, Augustine has given expression to an un- 
assailable truth when he insists upon the central sig- 
nificance of freedom. In our endeavor to state his 
explanation of the origin of evil we found the lines 
from all points converging upon this truth. His ter- 
minology differs from that of the present, his de- 
votion to certain theological dogmas led him into 
curious deviations, the exigencies of theological de- 
bate forced him into qualifications, but amid them all 
rings the one clear note that man is free. The com- 
mon element of all sin is in the will. 

Furthermore that it is the glory of the Augustinian 
doctrine to have emphasized the important truths of 
the unity of character and the organic oneness of man- 
kind has always been conceded. Though the premises 
upon which his thought rests must be rejected, never- 
theless, the recognition of the truth, though the theo- 
retic explanation was false, must always stand to the 
credit of our author. 

(2). Similarly we find the fallacies of the system 
centering about certain basal ideas. Doubtless the 
confusion introduced into our author's thought by the 
failure to carefully distinguish " malum " and " pec- 
catum " is responsible for much of his error. It was 
just because his philosophy was monistic that he fell 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 217 

into this mistake. His universe was theocentric and 
all evil must be regarded either as actual or original 
sin, either as sin or its punishment. Consequently, 
we find that his conception of real life failed to make 
room for the imperfections of all finite existence. 
He looked forward to the elimination of all evil. His 
perfect life was to be one of leisure, where all re- 
sistance and effort to overcome were absent. His 
explanation of the ultimate relation of the good and 
evil may be traced to the same conception. 

Again, much of the error noted in our author's 
thought may be referred to his endeavor to treat sin 
in the abstract, not realizing that no sin can exist apart 
from the sinner. The bald realism of his Adamic 
conception is the prolific source of flagrant error and 
a veritable nest of absurd fallacies and ridiculous in- 
consistencies. It was just this realism that led him to 
regard Adam as the . whole race in embryo. Adam 
was the " homo generalis." Consequently all our wills 
were in his will and out from this grew the un- 
endurable conceptions of personality and responsi- 
bility which have made the doctrine of original sin so 
revolting. It was precisely this fundamental method 
of thought combined with his over-emphasis of man's 
dependence upon God (which in turn was due to his 
rigid monism) that led him into his chief errors re- 
garding freedom, enabling him to conceive of it as 
being permanently reduced at the Fall, and to resort to 
the idea of " qusedam necessitas " when driven to it 
by the Pelagian conflict. A further evidence of this 
realistic tendency is his conception of human nature 
as a mass, which led him straight into traducianism 
and its untenable materialism. 

Furthermore, much of our author's error may be 



2i8 A CRITIQUE 

traced to his false conception of the past and his 
general view of man's moral development. It is true 
that we ought not to expect Augustine to have antici- 
pated the evolutionary idea but his errors illustrate its 
necessity. His conceptions of an original righteous 
state of man and the sudden and catastrophic transi- 
tion to sin reveal the need of a different point of 
view. His false idea^of man's sensuous nature, his 
underestimate of its natural instincts and passions, 
and his vain endeavor to regard all its propensities and 
solicitations as an evidence of an original taint in all 
nature, likewise demand a new point of view. 

(3). Finally we have seen that the ultimate test 
to which any satisfactory doctrine of sin must be 
brought is its ability to solve the antinomy of universal 
sin and individual responsibility. That Augustine 
recognized fully the first member of this antithesis has 
been made clear. That he did so, however, upon a 
false premise, became apparent after his utter failure 
to grapple successfully with the second member had 
suggested the necessity of a revision of the first. It 
becomes evident, therefore, that the validity of the 
Augustinian doctrine of sin cannot be maintained. 
It must be replaced by some theory which recognizes 
at one and the same time the solidarity of mankind, 
the universality of sin and the responsibility of every 
individual. It must explain why all men sin and why 
each man is guilty for his sin. 

That such a theory becomes possible upon the basis 
afforded by evolution has already been repeatedly 
suggested. It does not fall within the scope of this 
work to enter into the positive construction of a new 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 219 

theory of sin in all its details and implications. 1 But 
that the general basis of such a theory has been sug- 
gested as a necessary part of our criticism of the Au- 
gustinian system we trust is apparent. It finds a 
recognition of the organic unity of the race and of 
man's universal sinfulness in his common heritage 
of physical instincts and appetites. It holds each per- 
son responsible for his failure to overcome and sub- 
ordinate all these lower instincts and passions to his 
developing moral life. Sin, therefore, is not mere 
sensuousness, but is the moral state which emerges 
when the will yields its consent. Thus the historic 
and hitherto irreconcilable antinomy of universal sin 
and individual responsibility disappears, while at the 
same time the primal and central significance of the 
will is adequately recognized. 



1 The only partial attempts at such a result which have 
come under the notice of the writer are those of F. R. 
Tennant in his four Hulsean Lectures entitled " The Origin 
and Propagation of Sin," and of Professor Otto Pfleiderer 
in his " Philosophy of Religion," E. T. Vol. IV. pp. 34-38. 
Mr. Tennant also suggests an earlier but very brief attempt 
of Archdeacon Wilson. 

The writer is especially indebted to Mr. Tennant, and to 
the late Professor Stevens. The latter embodied his thought 
in a very brief article in the Yale Divinity Quarterly, May '04. 



FINIS 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

ARISTOTLE. Metaphysics. 

AUGUSTINUS, S.A. Opera Omnia, Ed. Paris. 

AUGUSTINUS. Opera Omnia, Patrologia Latina, 

Vols. 32-47. 
AUGUSTINUS. 

De Anima et ejus Origine. 

De Duabus Animabus contra Mani- 
chaeos. 

De Spiritu et Anima. 

De Libero Arbitrio. 

De Libero Arbitrio et Gratia. 

De Natura Boni contra Manichaeos. 

De Civitate Dei. 

De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia. 

Confessiones. 

De Continentia. 

De Correptione et Gratia. 

Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Chari- 

tate. 
Epistolae. 
Contra Duas Epistolas Pelagianorum. 

Contra Faustum Manichaeum. 
Acta seu Disputatio contra Fortuna- 
tum Manichaeum. 
220 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 221 

AUGUSTINUS. (Continued.) 

Contra Epistolaum Manichsei quam 
vocant Fundamenti. 

De Genesi ad Litteram. 
De Gestis Pelagii. 
De Gratia Christi. 

Opus Imperfectus contra secundam 
Juliani responsionem. 

De Moribus Manichseorum. 

De Natura et Gratia. 

De Ordine. 

De Peccato Originali. 

De Peccatorum Meritis et Remis- 

sione. 
De Perfectione Justitise hominis. 
De Dono Perseverantise. 
De Prsedestinatione Sanctorum. 
Enarrationes in Psalmos. 

De Diversis Quaestionibus octoginta 

tribus. 
De Vera Religione. 
Retractiones. 
Expositio quarumdam propositionum 

ex Epistola ad Romanos. 

Contra Secundium Manichseum. 
Sermones. 



222 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

AUGUSTINUS (continued.) 

De Sermone Domini in Monte. 

Soliloquia. 

De Spiritu et Littera. 

De Symbolo ad Catechumenos. 

De Trinitate. 

BAUR, F. C. Vorlesungen iiber die christliche Dog- 

mengeschichte. 
BERNARD, E. R. Article " Sin " in Hasting's Bible 

Dictionary. 
BERNARD, J. H. Article " Fall " in Hasting's Bible 

Dictionary. 
BEYSCHLAG, W. New Testament Theology. 
BOWNE, B. P. Theism. 

CAIRD, E. The Evolution of Religion. 

The Evolution of Theology in the Greek 
Philosophers. 
CAIRD, J. Fundamental Ideas of Christianity. 
CLARKE, W. N. An Outline of Christian Theology. 
CUNNINGHAM, W. S. Austin and his Place in 
the History of Christian Thought. 

DALE, R. W. Christian Doctrine. 

DODS, M. The Works of Aurelius Augustine. 

DORNER, J. A. A System of Christian Doctrine. 

EDERSHEIM, A. The Life and Times of Jesus the 

Messiah. 
ERDMANN, J. E. A History of Philosophy. 

FAIRBAIRN, A. M. The Philosophy of the Chris- 
tian Religion. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 22$ 

GOMPERZ, T. Greek Thinkers. 

HARNACK, A. History of Dogma. 

HEWIT, A. F. Problems of the Age with Studies in 
St. Augustine. 

HODGE, C. Systematic Theology. 

HOLMES, P. Preface to the Anti-Pelagian Writ- 
ings, Vol. IV. The Works of A. Augustine. 

JANET, P. Theory of Morals. 
JOWETT, B. The Dialogues of Plato. 

KANT, I. Theory of Ethics, E. T. by Abbot. 
KING, J. R. Preface to Writings on the Donatist 
Controversy, Vol. III. Works of A. Augustine. 

LIBRARY OF THE FATHERS, by members of the 

English Church. 
LADD, G. T. Philosophy of Knowledge., 
LEIBNIZ. Theodicy. 

MACKENZIE, J. S. A Manual of Ethics. 

MACKINTOSH. "Evolution and the Doctrine of 
Sin " in Peake's Theological Lectures. 

MARTIN, J. Saint Augustin. 

MARTINEAU, J. A Study of Religion. 

Types of Ethical Theory, 3rd ed. 

MILL, J. S. Essays on Nature. 

MOZLEY, J. B. Augustinian Doctrine of Predesti- 
nation. 

MULLER, J. Die christliche Lehre von der Sunde. 

NEANDER, A. General History of the Christian 

Religion. 
History of Christian Dogma. 



2X24 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

NEWMAN, A. H. A Manual of Church History. 

Introductory Essay on the Man- 

ichean Heresy. Vol. IV. Ni- 

cene and Post-Nicene Fathers. 

NOURRISSON, F. La Philosophic de St. Augus- 

tin. 

PALMER, George H. The Nature of Goodness. 
PAULSEN, F. A System of Ethics. 
PEAKE, A. S. Theological Lectures. 
PFLEIDERER, O. Philosophy of Religion. 

Philosophy and Development of 
Religion. 
PUSEY, E. B. Preface to the Confessions of St. 
Augustine, Vol. I. Library of the Fathers. 

RITTER, H. Geschichte der Philosophic 
ROYCE, J. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. 

Studies of Good and Evil. 

The World and the Individual. 

SAISSET, E. E. Modern Pantheism. 
SCHAFF, P. H. History of the Christian Church. 
Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers. 
Prolegomena : " St. Augustine's 
Life and Work." Vol. I. Ni- 
cene and Post Nicene Fathers. 
St. Augustine, Melanchthon and 
Neander. 
SCHLEIERMACHER, F. Der christliche Glaube. 
SCHOLER, H. Augustins Verhaltniss zu Plato in 

genetischer Entwicklung. 
SCHWEGLER, A. Handbook of the History of 
Philosophy. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 225 

SHEDD, W. G. T. Dogmatic Theology. 

History of Christian Doctrine. 
SHELDON, H. C. System of Christian Doctrine. 
SPENCER, H. Principles of Ethics. J 

STEVENS, G. B. " The Doctrine of Sin " in the - 

American Journal of Theology, 
Vol. VIII. p. 588. 
" An Old Problem from a New 
Viewpoint " Yale Divinity 
Quarterly, May, 1904. 
The Theology of the New Tes- 
tament. 
STIRLING, J. H. Annotations of Schwegler's His- 
tory of Philosophy. 
STOCK, ST. G. " The Problem of Evil." Hibbertjf 

Journal, Vol. II., No. 4, July, 1904. 
STRATTON, G. M. "Some Scientific Apologies 
for evil." Univ. of Calif. Publications. Vol. L, 
No. 3. 

TAYLOR, A. E. Problem of Conduct. 
TENNANT, F. R. The Fall and Original Sin. 

The Origin and Propagation of 
Sin. 
TYMMS, T. V. The Christian Idea of Atonement. 

UEBERWEG, F. A History of Philosophy. 
ULLMANN, C. Sinlessness of Jesus. * 

WARFIELD, B. B. " Introductory Essay on Augus- 
tine and the Pelagian Controversy." Vol. V. Ni- 
cene and Post-Nicene Fathers. 

WEBER, A. History of Philosophy. 



INDEX. 



Actual sin, see Sin and Evil, also, 113, 1 56-161 ; is disobe- 
dience, 157-158; is pride, 159-160; is self-will, 158-159; is 
selfishness, 159; is transgression, 158. 

Adam, conception of, 99-104; conception criticized, 76, 211, 
212; all mankind, 109-110; mass of mankind, 107; root of 
race, 108; seed of race, 109; originally perfect, 99, 188- 
191; body capable of immortality, 150; able not to sin, 
101 ; will, 100-103 ; lost freedom, 102-103 ; originated evil, 
105, 107 ; founder of kingdom earthly, 171 ; individual 
wills, 191-196; fall of, 197, 199; naming of animals, 189. 

Agnosticism, 51, 143, 144. 

Amissio, see Evil, also, 33, 34. 

Analysis of conception of nature, 5-14. 

Angels, Evil, fully described, 64-69; creatures of God, 5, 39; 
originally good and free, 64; fell through pride, 53; dif- 
ferent in wisdom, 65, and will, 66. 

Angels, Good, unable to sin, 102. 

Anti-Manichean writings, see Manicheism, also, 58. 

Anti- Pelagian writings, see Pelagianism, also, 78, 96. 

Aristotle, conception of fay, 9; rubbish of Adam, 189. 

Augustine, Agnostic, 51 ; determinist, 125, 203-205 ; Manichean, 
27, 28, 35; rejects Manicheism, 45-46; not a dualist, 45; 
open to charge of dualism, 175, 187 ; Monist, 46, 215 ; 
relates all to God, 50; Materialist, 112, 213, 217; staunch 
defender of freedom, 1 17-123, 125, 204, 216; criticism of 
conception of freedom, 202-207; Platonist, 28, 37, 46. 

Authority of scripture, see Knowledge, also, 22, 73. 

B 

Babe, see Infant. 
Bibliography, 220-225. 

Body, see Flesh, also Adam's, 150; neither good nor bad, 
87; evidence of original sin, 148-149; punishment of sin, 

85. 
Bonum, morale et metaphysicum, 11, 13, 14, 181. 
Bowne, B. P., 187. 
Bull, Bishop, 189. 

227 



228 INDEX 

C. 

Caird, E., 180, 20611. 

Caird, J., 19511. 

Catastrophic fall, 196-207; rejected, 199. 

Causa deficiens, 43, 63, 139-144, 206. 

Causa efficiens, 43, 139-141 ; evil will has none, 142. 

Character, unity of, 136, 198, 202, 208, 216. 

Cicero, 53. 

Civitas terrena eternal, 174-175. 

Ccelestius, 100, 116, 125, 152, 204-205. 

Common element in all sin, 161-165 ; is will, 162 ; is def ectus ; 

162-164; is tendency to non-existence, 164. 
Concupiscentia, 77, 103 ; evidence of original sin, 148. 
Contrast theory, stated, 89; truth recognized, 90-93; rejected, 

88-99; accounts for evil when here, 92; inconsistent with 

metaphysics of Augustine, 95. 
Corruptio, 33, 34, 52, 145. 
Creation, Manichean idea of, 15; ex nihilo, 14-18, 57-60, 183- 

188. 
Creationism, see Origin of Souls, also, 112, 212. 
Creator, see God, also, of man, 48; of good, 85; not of evil, 

49- 
Creature, made by God but not of God, 2, 15. 
Criticism of entire doctrine, 176-219. 

D 

Death, caused by the fall, 150; therefore necessary, 150; evi- 
dence of original sin, 149-150. 

Defectus, 52, 140, 143, 144, 161, 162-164, 179, 181, 182. 

Defection, see Defectus; is evil, 26, 40-43. 

Deficient cause of evil will, 143-144. 

Destruction of evil, 172-174. 

Determinism, see Freedom, also, 125, 169, 203, 204, 205. 

Devil, fully described, 61-62; creature of God, 5, 39; or- 
iginated evil in preexistent world, 62, 64, 68. 

Diabolus, see Devil, also, 61-62, 104, 196. 

Disobedience, form of actual sin, 157-158; first sin, 105; neces- 
sity of its possibility for moral universe, 200. 

Dualism in Augustine, 45, 175, 187. 



Elatio, form of actual sin, 160. 
Erigena, John Scotus, 177. 
Eschatology of Augustine, 166, 168. 
Eve, guilt of, 195. 

Evolution, demands reconstruction of doctrine of sin, 86-87, 
190, 195, 198, 211, 214, 218. 



INDEX 22Q 

Ex nihilo, creation, 14-18, 56-60, 144, 183-188. 

Evil, Defined, 27-44; as amissio, 33, 34; as corruptio, 33, 34, 
52, which gives power to the flesh, 82, 179; as contra 
naturam, 8, 10, 31-33 ; therefore depends upon nature, 14, 
57; as diminution of being, 3, 22, 44; as defection, see 
Defectus, also, 26, 40-43 ; as disorganization, 44, 178, 181 ; 
as flaw, see Vitium, 30-31; as inconvenientia, 31-33; as 
inimicum naturae, 32; as indigentia, 33, 34; as mock ex- 
istence, 40, 43, 81, 177; Manichean idea of, see Maniche- 
ism, also, 27; means to life, 97; as privation, 22, 33; as 
negation, 22, 33, 36, 40, 43, 44, 142, 176-183; as sin, 24, 
25, 185; or punishment of sin, 25, 26; distinguished from 
sin, 21-22; as not a substance, 29, 30; as tendency to non- 
existence, 3, 8, 36, 38, 164; as vitium, 30-31; final de- 
struction of, 172-174. 

Evil, Necessity of, 17, 55, 59, 68, 97, 98, 167, 186. 

Evil, Origin of, not God, 3, 5, 47-55, 177; regulated by God, 
50; permitted by God, 51, 52; originated by devil, 62, 64, 
68; in evil angels due to freedom, 60-69; in man due to 
creation ex nihilo, 16, 56-60; to self, 85; also see Free- 
dom, source of evil. 

Evil, Possibility of, 15, 17, 52, 55, 57, 56-60. 

Evils, presence of, in the world, 18-21, 46, 181 ; are good, 13, 
I4> 3°, 92, 97; how related to God, 53~54- 



Fairbairn, 5n, 90, 180, i87n. 

Fall, not caused by God, 51; presence of diabolus, 104; and 
serpent, 104; was man's rise, 191, 199; catastrophic fall 
rejected, 190-207, 199. 

Fallacies of doctrine of original sin, 216-218; also, 176-219. 

Faustus, 50. 

Final outcome, 166-175. 

Flaw, in man, 13; as evil, 30-31; evidence of original sin, 
151-152; originated by devil, 61. 

Flesh, defended, 80, 83-84; effect of sin, 79, 82, 87, 213; power 
due to corruptio, 179; rejected as theory for origin of 
sin, 77-88; means self, 84; instrument of lust, 85; is 
neutral, 87, 184, 214. 

Foreknowledge of God and freedom, 53, 123-124. 

Freedom, 1 15-144; various meanings, 131-139; general sense, 
131-132; absolute, 132-134; free to sin, 134-137; real, 137- 
139; formal, 138, 197; source of evil, 25, 52, 56, 60-69, 
106, 99-114, 144; relation to catastrophic fall, 196-207; man 
free to sin, 113, 204; freedom of actualized individual, 
119; freedom and grace, 129; common element of all sin, 
162; truth of Augustinian conception, 199, 201, 216; criti- 
cism of, 202-207; something more required, 207. 



230 INDEX 



God, see Creator, source of all being, 1-5, 46, 48; supreme 
existence, 11, 40, 46; summum bonum, 1, 40, 57, 184; im- 
mutable good, 11, 42; creator of man, 48; of devil and 
evil angels, 5 ; of universe ex nihilo, 16, 57 ; omnipotence, 
47; foreknowledge, 53, 123-124; justice, 167, 168, 194; does 
not suffer, 54, 187; grace a necessity, 100, 127, 128, 138, 
140, 204. 

God, Relation to Evil, 3, 5, 47-55, 177; not the cause of 
evil will, 42, 141; ordinator of, 49; permits, 51, 52; regu- 
lates, 50; not the cause of the fall, 51. 

Gomperz, T., 215m 

Good, metaphysical and moral, 11, 13, 14, 181. 

Grace, necessity of, 100, 127, 128, 138, 140, 204; and freedom, 
129; restores freedom, 137; irresistible, 168. 

Gradations in nature, 12; see Creation ex Nihilo. 

Gratia, dei, see Grace. 

Guilt, false conception of, in doctrine of original sin, 193- 
196; false conception of, in doctrine of predestination, 
169; of eve, 195. 

H 

Habit, power of, 208. 

Heaven, 169, 173. 

Hegel, negative conception of evil, 178. 

Hell, 169. 

Heredity, 203. 

Holmes, P., 2o8n. 

Human nature a mass, 207-211. 



Identification of evil and sin, see Evil and Sin, also, 21-26, 

185, 216. 
Identity of Adam and race, 109. 
Imitatio, no, 212. 

Imperfection, metaphysical, 12, 56-60, 68, 115, 144, 183-188. 
Inconvenientia, 31-33. 
Indigentia, 33, 34. 
Inimicum naturae, 32. 

Individual, actualized, no, 192; free to sin, 119. 
Infants, undergo evil, 20; have no actual sin, 21 ; have original 

sin, 106; corrupted at birth, 152; guilty, 108, 153, 154, 194, 

195 ; helplessness due to sin, 153. 



INDEX 231 



Job, Royce's thesis, 188, 5411. 
Judas, 50. 

Julianus, opposed, 10, 23, 34, 106; accused Augustine of mak- 
ing sin a necessity, 59; and destroying freedom, 135. 

K 

Knowledge, scripture a source of, for Augustine, 22, 73. 

L 

Leibniz, 177, 185. 

Libertarianism, see Freedom, also, 125, 204. 

Life, conception of, 186, 217; future, 173. 

Love, 159; two kinds reveal origin of two cities, 171. 

Lovelessness is sin, see Selfishness, also, 182. 

M 

Malum, see Evil and Sin, also summum malum, non existent, 

4, 37, 40; relation to peccatum, 21; its general meaning, 

22; Manichean idea of, 28; Unde est, 45-114- 
Man, primitive, 99-104, 188-191 ; originally without lust, 103 ; 

and righteous, 190; or non-moral, 190; his fall was his 

rise, 191, 199. 
Manicheism, dualism of, 1, 2, 6, 12, 176, 183 ; Mani, quoted, 

6n; chief tenets, 6; idea of creation, 15; of evil, 27, 28; 

all created things evil, 7, 183; 0Xi? evil, 10, 12. 
Marriage, defended, 80, 149. 
Martineau, J., i64n, i79-i8on. 
Mass, Adam, 107; human nature, 207. 
Materialism of Augustine, 112, 213, 217. 
Metaphysical, good, 11, 13, 14, 181; imperfection, 12, 56-60, 

68, 115, 144, 183-188. 
Mill, J. S., 19. 

Mingling of good and evil, 170-172. 
Monism, 203. 

Moral good, 11, 13, 14, 181. 
Mortality, evidence of original sin, 150. 
Miiller, Julius, 72, 75, 89, 13m, 194. 

N 

Nature, conception analysed, 5-14; is being, 8; all nature is 
good, 9, 10, 14, 184; vices prove its goodness, 13; not 
equally good, 11, 14, 184; created ex nihilo, see Creation 
ex Nihilo, also, 57; therefore capable of change, 12; 
threefold, 9; gradations, 12; created by God, see God, 



232 INDEX 

also, 57, 61 ; is neutral, .?££ Flesh, also, 184 ; evil is con- 
tra naturam, 8, 10, 31-33. 

Necessity, of evil, 17, 55, 59, 68, 97, 98, 167, 186; of sin denied, 
121, 185, 200; certain necessity affirmed, 126, 128. 

Negation, evil as, see Evil, also, 22, 33, 36; truth of, 176-183, 

178. 
Newman, A. H., 39n, 95n, n6n. 
Non-being, see Evil, also, 37, 175, 177, 178. 
Non posse peccare, 102, 137, 204. 

O 

Obedience, 200. 

Origen, pre-existence theory, 72, 192. 

Origin, of evil, 45-H4, see Evil; rejects Manichean principle 
of evil, 45-47; God not the cause, 47-55; rejects pre- 
existence theory, 71-77; rejects flesh theory, 77-88; rejects 
contrast theory, 88-99; due to creation ex nihilo, 16, 56- 
59; defends freedom, 17, 25, 60-70, 99-1 14; in self, 86; 
in Adam's will, 105, 107. 

Origin of souls, 49, 75, 112, 212, 213. 

Original sin, source in freedom, 106; various forms, 146-156; 
sense of shame, 147; lust, 148; mortality, 149-150; vitium, 
151; defective wills, 155; summarized, 155; errors of, 
208, 216-218; truth of, 208; doctrine rejected, 218. 

Outcome, the final, 166-175. 



Palmer, G. H., 97, i33"» 178, 205. 

Paulsen, 97n, 178. 

Peccatum, see Sin, relation to malum, 21-26. 

Perfection, man's original, 188-191 ; possibility of sin arising 

from, 196-207; possibility of man's, 79, 96; actual per- 
fection denied, 79. 
Perseverance, gift of, 128, 168. 
Pelagianism, doctrine of will, 116; of imitatio, no; modernity 

of, 210; influence on Augustine, 124-13 1 ; opposed by 

Augustine, 6, 7, 100, no, 194. 
Pfleiderer, O., 2i9n. 
Plato, influence over Augustine, 37, 46; pre-existence theory, 

71, 73, 192; to p) '6v, 37, 175, 177, 178. 
Platonism, 28, 37, 115. 
Plotinus, 177. 
Pluralism, 203. 
Posse non peccare, 102; possessed by Adam, 132-134; lost by 

Adam, 102, 105; begs the question, 197, 198. 
Posse peccare, 134, 203, 204. 
Possibility, of evil, 15, 55, 57, 68; arises from creation ex 

nihilo, 17, 56-60, 144, 185; arises from freedom, 52, 200. 



INDEX 233 

Possibility, of perfection, 79, 96. 

Predestination, defined, 168-169; revolting, 194; implications 

of, 166-170, 205. 
Pre-existence theory, of origin of sin rejected, 71-77. 
Presence of evils, 18-21. 
Pride, form of actual sin, 159. 
Privation, evil as, 22, ^3- 
Problem of evil, 1-26; summarized, 26. 
Propagatio, in; criticized, 211-215. 
Punishment, one form of evil, 25 ; body evidence of, 214 

Q 

Quid est Malum, 27-44; see Evil and Malum. 

R 

Realism of Augustine, 147, 191, 209, 217. 

Relation of malum and peccatum, 21-26. 

Responsibility, 195 ; false conception of, in doctrine of original 

sin, 193-196. 
Root, Adam of race, 108. 
Royce, J., 43n, S4n, 97n, 98, 173", i86n, 188, 207n. 



Schaff, Ph., n6n, I93n. 

Schleiermacher, 181. 

Seed, Adam, of race, 109. 

Self, origin of sin, 86. 

Selfishness, is sin, 159, 182. 

Self-will, form of actual sin, 158-159. 

Separation of good and evil 169, 170, 171. 

Serpent in the Fall, 104. 

Sex before the Fall, 103. 

Shame, sense of, 147. 

Sin, see Evil, Original Sin, and Actual Sin, also, distin- 
guished from evil, 21-22, 98, 185 ; definition summarized, 
145, 201; common element of, 161-165 ; universality of. 
190, 193, 195, 209; necessity of, denied, 121, 185, 200; cer- 
tain necessity affirmed, 126, 128; origin of, 45-114; see 
Origin, God's relation to, see God. 

Sinless life, possibility of, 79, 96. 

Socrates, 115. 

Souls, origin of, 49, 75, 112, 212, 213. 

Source of evil in creature, 55-114, see Origin. 

Spinoza, 177. 

Stevens, G. B., 2i9n and preface. 

Substance, evil not, 29-30. 

Summary of conclusions, 215-219. 



234 INDEX 

Summum malum, non-existent, 4, 37, 40; Manichean idea of, 

28. 
Superbia, form of actual sin, 159-160. 



Tendency to non-existence, see Evil, also, 3, 8, 36, 38, 164. 

Tennant, F. R., i9on, 197, 2i9n. 

to m '6p, 37, 175, 177, 178. 

Traducianism, 112, 212, 217. 

Transgression, form of actual sin, 158. 

Truth of doctrine of original sin, 215-216. 

U 

Ueberweg, 58m 

fay, 6, 9, 28; wholly evil, 10, 12. 

Unde est malum, 45-114; see Origin. 

Unity of Character, 136, 198, 202, 208, 216. 



Vices, prove goodness of nature, 13. 
Vincentius Victor, 74. 

Vitium, 30-31 ; originated by devil, 61 ; evidence of original 
sin, 1 51-152, 209. 

W 

Warfield, B. B., 35n, 136 and note. 

Will, Evil, of devil, source of evil, 63, 64, 68; of Adam 
source of all sin, 100-103, 105, 107; in man due to crea- 
tion ex nihilo, 58; not caused by God, 50; has onlj 
causa deficiens, 142, 143 ; evidence of original sin, 155. 

Will, turning of, from higher to lower nature is sin, 41' 
common element in all sin, 162 ; emergence of, 201 ; eter 
nal possession of man, 202; individual wills in Adam 
191-196. 

Wilson, Archdeacon, 219J1. 

Windelband, 58n. 

World, pre-existent, 60-69, 71. 



Yale Divinity Quarterly, 21911. 

H 125 82 l| 







o , * 




.♦ y "V 



b o 4** .•Ski. ~* 







• •< 







4* *■ 



<& ^, 







^d 1 




W #»•• W -'tar- W 








Deacidified using the Bookkeeper proces 
* Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 



Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 



%!ii^% ^ A -&? PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 



ii 
\/*$ 



1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 







"oV T 




,4 










© • » 




4 ,0 <+ *'^ T% ^ 







e 




o* » 




k t * 











^ 






. V'^V* %>•••> ^ <; 5^\c^ ' 






HOft 



^0« 











^ "%?®§? ; A V ^c - 




# I * 



